ECOLOGY, RELIGION, AND ENVIRONMENT: SAMBORI INDIGENOUS RELIGION'S PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS NATURE AND CONSERVATIONS

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ABSTRACT

This paper aimed to examine cosmological aspects in Sambori indigenous community perspectives towards nature and conservations in which the inter-subjective relational relationship between human beings and non-humans becoming the primary resource to protect the environment and the surrounding area in Sambori indigenous community, particularly with their respective sacred land, wellspring, and forest. This study employed a qualitative approach in which the primary resources were literature studies and internet observations; the data were then descriptively and qualitatively described. This study found that the inter-subjective relational relationship between the Sambori indigenous people and non-humans lying in their daily lives and rituals is mainly related to their primary source of livelihood, which relies on natural resources. They believed their surrounding area had sacred sites where the *Holy Being,* locally known as *Parafu,* and the other respected ancestral spirit resided. Therefore, they firmly believe that natural resources, including land, water, forest, and so forth, cannot be separated from their everyday life. They have a unique way of understanding and engaging with their natural resource. This perspective proposes mutual, ethical, and responsible commitment between a human being and the other. Some spiritual ceremonies are performed, such as *Pamali Manggodo* and *Balaleha* Music Art, as a means to engage, interact and connect to the Holy beings to ask for help, safety, and peaceful life, as well as to refuse reinforcements, particularly for their agricultural activities.

Keywords: ecology, religion, environment, indigenous community, Sambori

INTRODUCTION

Instead of a large number of historical, anthropological, and political discourses over indigenous religions in Indonesia, the traditional practices of the indigenous communities have been widely known as spiritual practices that contain religious dimensions in the indigenous religion paradigm. In a recent study, an Indonesian scholar of religious studies, Samsul Maarif, brings up a new paradigm of indigenous communities to reconstruct the definition of religions and proposes a state recognition of indigenous communities as recognized religions in Indonesia. He problematized the categorizations of indigenous communities' practices as a primitive tradition continuously perpetuated by the state, religious authorities, and academia. (Maarif, 2017, Maarif, 2012). It can be seen through indigenous communities'

categories, which are identified as *adat,* culture, and local traditions that opposed the religious category in the Indonesian context (Davidson & Henley, 2007; Tyson, 2010; Rachman, 2011; Ramstedt, 2004, p.17). In the political arena at the beginning of the independence of Indonesia, the non-religious dimensions of traditional practices in the indigenous communities were used as a means to legitimize the power of state official religions to control the local communities in society (Michael Picard & Madinier, 2011; Ropi, 2017).

In the historical and political context, the definition of religion in Indonesia has been strongly influenced by the western culture category and widely shared with the general society (Asad, 1993; Masuzawa, 2005; Smith, 1962). Consequently, the discourse of the categorization of religion has historically and politically contributed to the marginalization of religious dimensions of traditional practices of indigenous communities in Indonesia.

The indigenous communities were increasingly substantially marginalized in line with the dominant religions' power in Indonesia's early independence. The categorization of religion at the time was based on a theological sense of religion that significantly made Islam and Christianity the general category of religious standards (Maarif, 2017, p.32). Those who have not in line with the qualifications to the standards of religions were categorized as syncretism, paganism, animist beliefs, *masyarakat adat,* culture, *adat* law, and so forth (Henley & Davidson, 2007, p.10; Simarmata & Steni, 2017; Mikirou Zitukawa and Michael York, 2008).

As a result, the purification movement quickly flourished in society due to the coming of Islamic organizations. Religions at this time began to be discussed, particularly in some Indonesian constitutional literature, and became a national issue. The discourses of the indigenous communities were then less popular than the point of religion.

In the post-colonial period and new order era, various policies were issued toward the idea of modern Indonesia, where people are differentiated based on their religious identity to give a clear distinction between religion and *kepercayaan* (belief). In this phase, the indigenous communities had a new hope for state recognition due to the category of *masyarakat adat* as a synonymous term with *kepercayaan* (belief). However, in social practices, the indigenous communities became more marginalized. They were discriminated against by the dominant power and religious authority due to the identification of non-religious affiliation or "*lack of religion*" stigmatizations over the indigenous communities, which was strengthened and produced by the religious and academic circles (Geertz, 1976; Hefner, 1990, 2011; Ricklefs, 2012).

Despite all the discourses over indigenous religion that tended to be recognized as a local tradition, syncretism, paganism, animist belief, *masyarakat adat,* the initial characteristics of anthropological accounts on local rules, including all aspects of their

everyday life show the religious and spiritual dimension of their traditional practices (Maarif, 2019; Rachman, 2011).

Theoretically, several academic works can be considered as the framework to examine the indigenous religious perspectives related to the spiritual and religious dimensions of their traditional practices. Firstly, the theory of animism paradigm, which conceptualized the relationship between human and non-human beings, including natural resources: land, water, mountain, forest, and animals as hierarchical systems extending beyond the human being proposed by Bird-David have changed the perspective in looking at the traditional practices of the indigenous communities. In his seminal works on "Animism Revisited," Bird-David comes up with the personhood paradigm and revisits the interpretation of the animism concept in E.B. Taylor's perspective to explain the relationship of human and non-human beings as a non-limited relationship (Bird-David, 1999, p.68). He problematized the concept of animism proposed by Tylorian in which animism is viewed as a delusion, and he confidently argued that Tylor read the indigenous religion perspective just based on the modernist spiritualist understanding, not based on the local indigenous communities' views (Bird-David, 1999, p.69).

Secondly, the discourse of the indigenous religion paradigm proposed by Samsul Maarif comes up with and covers the broader concept of religions that try to reconstruct the world religion paradigm to better understand the indigenous religion perspectives to their respective traditional practices because he argues that religion (*agama*), belief (*kepercayaan*), customs (*adat*), and culture (*kebudayaan*) are socially politically constructed to legitimize the power of the dominant religion in Indonesia. Maarif proposes the concept of the inter-subjective relationship between human and non-human beings to define how human and non-human actors are related through the lens of inter-subjective relational relationships. The interactions between humans and their cosmological environment, including water, mountain, forest, animals, and so forth, are not seen as the relation of subject and object where humans are considered the dominant power over the non-human being. Still, they have mutual, ethical, and responsible relations as a single unity.

Based on those frameworks, it can be considered that the indigenous people have a distinctive perception to view their sacred sites. They perceive the environment and natural resources, including nature and animals, as more than just property or an object; they are viewed as holy sites as living beings that should be considered subjects. Therefore, they can be assumed to have a relational epistemological and cosmological relationship as the independent subjects between human and non-human beings, including the living and the dead, and other beings: the land, mountain, forest, animals, and invisible beings: gods and spirits. Maarif argues that religion covers all forms of daily life and practice, including politics, economics, agriculture, rituals, and so on (Maarif, 2012). Therefore, it can be concluded that indigenous religions with

their respective sacred sites and practices can be identified as a religion because it is continuously practiced with full awareness in society. Besides, when the communities have a relationship with their sacred sites, various rituals and religious practices will be carried out to their respective traditional methods to relate and interact with such places. Living alongside the "others," inanimate and superpower, encourage them to share the space and responsibly engage to maintain the sacredness of their environmental life.

Furthermore, in the indigenous religion paradigm, being religious engages in inter-subjective relations. Therefore, each person commits and carries out responsibility, ethics, and reciprocity. In an inter-subjective relationship, responsibility means "what I do would affect me." While ethics implies "what I do would affect others," reciprocity indicates "what I give is what I take, or what I take is what I give." Maarif concluded that those three principles of inter-subjective relationship are religious principles in the indigenous religion paradigm. This is an appropriate framework for the religious practices of indigenous communities in Indonesia (Maarif, 2019).

Several research has been conducted to understand the inter-subjective relationship between human and non-human beings, such as the study of Ammatoa indigenous communities in South Sulawesi. They believed in their ancestors and performed rituals related to their sacred land to protect their forest and environment (Maarif, 2012). The same belief can be found in Orang Rimba (People of the forest) in Jambi and South Sumatra, who depends on their livelihood in the forest, particularly for annual fruit seasons. Forest is a sacred site for them where some ceremonies are annually conducted related to their yearly fruit seasons, particularly for the preceding period of planting seasons (Sagar, 2008). Similar rituals are also performed by Marapu indigenous communities in East Nusa Tenggara. They perform spiritual ceremonies to their ancestors to please them and prevent them from being angry because they believe their ancestors are around them daily (Fowler, 2003). Also, the beliefs of personhood upheld by the Aboriginal indigenous communities in Australia show that the interconnectedness of the elements of the earth and the universe, animate and inanimate, whereby people, plants and animals, landforms and celestial bodies are interrelated (Vicki Grieves, 2008). Therefore, it can be concluded that indigenous communities believed in non-human beings because non-living beings (visible and invisible) are part of their life that has mutual relation as subject versus subject.

In short, this paper will propose the other indigenous communities in Eastern Sumbawa Island, known as Sambori. This community has a distinctive way of agricultural activity, which is strongly influenced by their respected belief in nature, environment, land, and forest. The inter-subjective relationships between human beings and other beings are continuously practiced today. It can be seen from how they

protect their sacred sites and perform spiritual ceremonies related to their holy being and ancestor.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Sambori is the territory's name and the indigenous communities living in the eastern Lambitu mountain forest, Sumbawa Island. Sambori has two villages, namely, inner and outer villages. The inner village or the old village of Sambori indigenous communities (Kampung Sambori Lama) is only inhabited by the native Sambori communities. In contrast, the outer village or new village of Sambori (Kampung Sambori Baru) is inhabited by some indigenous people and immigrants who are married to the native Sambori communities (Dinas Pariwisata Kabupaten Bima, 2020). This village is located at an altitude of around 800 meters above sea level on the hills and the slopes of Lambitu Mount. Hence, the location of this village is higher than the other village in Bima, and it consequently makes their dependency on natural resources for their livelihood, including the roots of their cosmological beliefs towards the existence of non-human beings in their surrounding environment that protect their land, water, and forest.

The relationship of Sambori indigenous communities with their sacred land is based on their traditional beliefs. They view the land, mountain, forest, and natural resources, including water and animals, as a single unity as a living being. Maarif calls this relationship an inter-subjectivity relationship (Maarif, 2019). From the Sambori perspective, they believe that certain land has a sacred site that is guarded by Holy beings in the Sambori local language known as Parafu, who was thought as tribal descendants of Sambori that should be treated through traditional rituals such as Pamali Manggodo and traditional music arts Belaleha as a means to interact and relate with the holy beings. The following paragraph will propose the concept of Parafu, or Holy beings, and Pamali Manggodo, including the Belaleha song as a means of spiritual practices as well as its relation to the efforts of Sambori communities to maintain their natural resource and environmental life.

Holy Beings, Parafu: The Guardians of Sacred Land

Although most Sambori communities are Muslim, they consider themselves indigenous and still uphold their traditional practices and beliefs. They believe that the land and surrounding area of Lambitu mountain have a sacred site where the holy beings or Parafu live. In the theory of The Universal Code of Conduct on Holy Sites (UCCHS), it is clearly stated that what means by the Holy sites are understood as places of religious significance to particular religious communities. They include but are not limited to places of worship, cemeteries, and shrines, incorporating their immediate surroundings when these form an integral part of the site (Suhadi, 2016). In Sambori indigenous communities, Parafu was believed as tribal descendants of the

Sambori ethnic and were considered to live around them to maintain their land and environment. Therefore, the offering practice "Sesajen" in this area is commonly found to treat the Parafu or holy beings to give them (Sambori communities) peaceful and safe life.

They believe that Parafu has the power to control social and environmental life and resides in certain sacred places such as mountains, shady trees, large rocks, wellspring, and supernatural things like choppers. To interact and connect to the Parafu, Sambori communities pointed to a respective leader, known as Ncuhi, elder people to communicate and lead the spiritual rituals and offering practices. This offering practice was generally known as Toho Dore, or animal slaughter (Nurnazmi et al., 2020)

In addition, they also believe that the spirits of the ancestors who have died, especially the spirits of those whom they think have respected during their lives, such as Ncuhi, still have a role and control over their lives and daily life. They believe that the spirits and souls of the ancestor have lived with Parafu in certain places. Sambori indigenous people also have spiritual traditions through rituals to honor ancestral spirits holding worship ceremonies at certain times. The ceremony was accompanied by offerings and sacrifices of livestock led by Ncuhi. These places of worship are commonly known as Parafu Ra Pamboro, located in sacred sites such as wellsprings, trees, and forests (Saidin Hamzah et al., 2017; Fahrurizki, 2015; PDAM Tirta Benteng, 2018).

The understanding of Holy spirits, Parafu, and the spirits of the ancestor in Sambori communities implies that their understanding of their land is not just non-human beings. Still, it represents the "other" beings with an inter-subjective relationship between a living being and a non-living being. In this case, the function of ritual lies in the relationship between humans and the invisible life around their lives. The ceremony becomes a mechanism of interaction that unites the communities in an institutionalized system of action. Therefore, Durkheim considers spiritual traditions to strengthen collective feelings, social integration, and cohesion (Durkheim, 1912).

Sambori Indigenous cases can be seen from how they respond to ecological phenomena such as drought and natural disasters. In responding to this ecological difficulty, Sambori people see that whatever tragedy befalls their life, they accept it with resignation. They view it as a punishment from Parafu (their ancestor's spirits) for their wrong attitudes toward the natural resources surrounding them. However, they also enjoy the disaster from Parafu as a superpower to control the area over the nature they inhabit by performing traditional ceremonies that require animal sacrifices in the local language known as "Toho Dore," followed by some traditions such as du'a and mantra. The Sambori people see ecological problems regarding survival in their dependency on nature and the surrounding environmental life. They worry about

severe problems behind natural disasters, such as famine, rather than ecological phenomena such as natural disasters, which in their perspective, are a form of punishment and anger of Parafu towards their attitudes.

Religious Ceremony in Agricultural commodities and environmental life of Sambori indigenous communities

The spiritual practices conducted by the Sambori communities have been in line with the mutual relationship between human beings and non-human beings, particularly natural resources and conservation. In Sambori indigenous case, their daily needs are highly dependent on natural resources in the entire area and surrounding environment of Lambitu Mount. The local people who live around the mount utilize natural resources from the mountain and forest to fulfill their daily needs and family earnings (Nurhasanah, 2016; Rijal, 2016; Junaidin et al., 2019). Thus, In general, the livelihoods of Sambori communities are still classified as traditional, focused on rural farming and conventional agricultural activity, and are highly dependent on natural resources such as mountains and forests. However, to maintain their sacred land, the utilization of the natural resources is regulated based on the traditional rules and customary leader accompanied by the village head of the local communities through a meeting (mbolo weki, musyawarah). This ethnological utilization is also regulated to limit the paddy fields ownership in which they rotate the ownership of the fields annually alternately from one to another family member, from one season to the next harvesting season, unceasingly from year to year. The rotation system runs from the first offspring layer of the family (Junaidin et al., 2019, p. 1623).

The Sambori people named the paddy fields a term of Bangga. The Bangga in Sambori communities is widely used for farming rice in the rainy season because it is a rainfed area. In addition, some terms similar to Bangga are So and Oma (moorland). The opened Bangga field must be an area that is close to the river or water resources to facilitate the irrigation process. In the dry season, Bangga areas are usually planted with secondary crops such as palawija, pumpkins, garlic, and other productive plants (Zulharman et al., 2017).

Junaidin et al. (2019) explained that the process of opening an Oma (moorland) is initially done in groups, preceded by the activity of Ma'a (clearing the land of the former vegetation), Hui karaso (cleaning the bush and weeds), Kuta (fencing), and Ngguda or mentie (planting). To facilitate the management system, the people fence off their oma with a pile of stones and mark it. Before planning to open oma, they initially have to ask Ncuhi (The Ancestor spirits) for permission. After that, they will gather with the customary figures to plan the traditional ritual of Weha Oha Dana or Wea Oha Oma to prevent their field crops from the plague or pest attacks. They jointly have to collect seeds to be distributed after the traditional ritual is finished. Afterward, the elders will start planting crops in the fields.

This strategy of the territorial divisions and traditional practices is related to preserving their environment and other beings (land, water, forest, and mountain) in Sambori communities. If seen from the indigenous religious paradigm, preserving paddy fields ownerships, including their spiritual ceremonies and everyday rituals regarding their agricultural life, may be identified as religious practices which align with the indigenous religious paradigm proposed by Samsul Maarif (2019).

Due to their dependency on natural resources, certain rituals are performed as a form of appreciation and respect for the guardians of their land and forests; those ceremonies are done before starting agricultural activities and commodities, as well as after the harvesting period. Those activities show that they account for and depend on nature which has given them life. There are at least two religious traditions related to their sacred land utilization and conservation in Sambori indigenous communities: Pamali Manggodo and Belaleha music art.

The Pamali Manggodo ceremony is generally performed as an important event in the life of the Sambori people. Still, because their livelihood, in general, is farming, the Pamali Manggodo ceremony is often found in agricultural activities. The tradition is carried out before opening the field, and directly on the land to be opened with hopes that their field crops are not attacked by the plague, such as caterpillars, rats, birds, pigs, and so on. At the start of the planting season, the Sambori communities visit Holy beings, Parafu, and their respected ancestor to ask for permission to carry out activities in the fields. At harvest time, they perform a Pamali Manggodo ceremony as an expression of gratitude for their harvest. In its implementation, the Pamali Manggodo ceremony is led by a traditional figure and attended by several traditional leaders who had their respective duties to conduct the ceremony of rejecting reinforcements (Junaidin et al., 2019).

The community place the Pamali Mangodo ceremony in a high position for the sustainability of their livelihood. The danger of vulnerability in their agricultural system makes them afraid to ignore the rules that apply during the ceremony and customary law. The Pamali Mangodo ceremony is also based on beliefs essential to creating social solidarity. The general function of religion is believed to lie in its ability to build solidarity and a sense of togetherness and legitimize differences in power (Eriksen, 2009:126). In Sambori indigenous case, their agricultural activity is taken up communally, beginning with the preparation of the soil, followed by the sowing of crops, land maintenance, and cultivation, to the point of harvest. This local tradition knowledge creates units of environment and activities of community production, including forests, paddy fields, yards, moors, swamps, ponds, and rivers (Junaidin et al., 2019).

The reciprocal relationship between society (humans) and nature (non-human beings) has implications for harmonization between human beings and other beings. By maintaining this relationship, they feel saved from various disasters that can

threaten the safety of the environment and their safety. In Maarif's perspective, this relational relationship encourages society to commit and carry out the responsibility, ethics, and reciprocity to mutually engage and relate to other beings (Maarif, 2019). In Ma'arif's language, that responsibility means "what I do would affect me." While ethics implies "what I do would affect others," and reciprocity indicates "what I give is what I take, or what I take is what I give" (Maarif, 2019). This attitude leads the indigenous communities, including the Sambori Indigenous group, to take responsibility for preserving their natural resources: land, water, and forest.

Despite the offering ritual, another thing found in the process of the Pamali Manggodo ceremony is Balaleha music art. The element of art can be seen in the chanting of Belaleha poetry. Belaleha is the oldest vocal music artist. This verbal art contains prayers and hopes so that the land, state, family, and society will always receive protection from the Holy beings and stay away from disasters. Belaleha's vocal strains are generally sung at circumcision events and weddings. Therefore, the Sambori people commonly called it Belaleha Suna Ro Ndoso (Circumcision) and Belaleha Nika Ro Neku (Marriage). Belaleha poetry contains advice, rhymes, praise, and hopes for the Almighty through singing together (Malingi, 2012).

The verse of the Belaleha song has a high social function and gives the feeling of spiritual power. Those song lyrics deeply influence the communities, especially for older people who have long experienced and felt the nuances that existed during the ceremony. These feelings increase along with the spiritual reality that they perceive in their everyday life.

CONCLUSION

Inter-subjective relational relationships between Sambori indigenous communities and non-human beings, particularly with the sacred land, water, forest, and so forth, are closely related to their dependent life and livelihoods over natural resources. They believed their surrounding area had sacred sites where the Holy being, locally known as Parafu, resided. Some spiritual ceremonies are performed, like Pamali Manggodo and Balaleha Music Art, to engage and connect to the Holy beings to ask for help, safety, and peaceful life, as well as refuse reinforcements, particularly for their agricultural activities. In addition, their rituals represent their belief in the importance of natural resources and ecological aspects in their surrounding area as the other living beings.

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DIGITAL RELIGIOUS SERVICES: ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS FUSION AND ENTERTAINMENT IN THE SHORT FILM "CERITA HIJRAHKU"

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses new religious digital services reflected in the Muslim inspiration film "Cerita Hijrahku". Through new media platforms such as Youtube, this film is here to fulfill the religious learning desires of young Muslims who have connected, confident, and creative characters. This is a new phenomenon in the millennial era and, at the same time, confirms that religious learning is no longer just about attending religious events but also through various ways. The two points outlined include: first, how digital religious services form in the millennial era, and second, how to mean the film "Hijrahku Story" in representing Islam in new media as one of the loci of religious learning. This research is qualitative, using Julia Kristeva's inter-technicality approach. As a result, first, digital services are incarnated in two forms: da'wahtainment and religiotainment. Da'wahtainment refers to the combination of da'wah (read: lectures) with entertainment, while religiotainment combines religion and entertainment. However, the scope of religiotainment is broader than da'wahtainment, covering movies, fashion, music, and social media content, including memes. Second, despite having different meanings, the signs presented in the short film "Cerita Hijrahku" boil down to the message of the conception of hijrah to become an excellent Islamic person following the standard religious text. The meaning presented by the audience confirms that the short film "Cerita Hijrahku" is one of the digital religious services for young Muslims.

Keywords: digital religious services, young Muslims, movie, hijrah

INTRODUCTION

The complexity of technological developments and social media (read: internet) has impacted various aspects (Downey & Fenton, 2003; Gaddy, 1984; Hjarvard, 2012; Pabbajah et al., 2020), especially religion. Today, social media is used as a convenient means of communication for the community and as a place where religious information is disseminated and, at the same time, studied by others. In his study of how the internet has become a distributor and reflection of religion, Oliver Krueger shows the typology of how the internet functions in religious discourse (Krueger, 2004, p. 185). First is the presentation of the presence of a religious institution, group, and doctrine. Second, as a means of exchanging ideas about specific themes in religion. Third, as a free and paid religious service, it is also not uncommon to be used as a commercial for items, teachings, and values in religious rituals. These functions are often present at once, but also often one aspect that appears and dominates. The development of technology and social media shows that learning religion is not only

about going to religious events but can be done anywhere and anytime; It also confirms a shift in religious authority.

I searched more deeply, and the theme of searching about religion on social media, especially youtube, is widely scattered. These themes are generally present following the existing momentum (Ali & Purwandi, 2019, p. 146). For example, about valentines, the issue of marriage of different religions, polygamy, Ramadan, ta'aruf, and hijrah. This new trend of online religious learning has invited academics to look at it more deeply. Some of them conducted studies on the involvement of the internet in religious discourse (Eisenlohr, 2012; Greifenhagen, 2010; Krueger, 2004; Pabbajah et al., 2020), teaching patterns about religion on the internet, and the impact of his presence on religious discourse (Abdullah, 2017; Fikriyati & Fawaid, 2019; Georgiou, 2013; Hjarvard, 2012, 2016; Sukarman et al., 2021; Thomas, 2015).

This article discusses one form of digital religious service on Youtube, reflected in the short film "Cerita Hijrahku" (Film Maker Muslim - FMM Studios, 2019). This film was released in 2019 on the Film Marker Muslim Youtube channel, which has a subscriber of 750 thousand. This youtube channel was established at the end of 2014 with the primary mission of spreading the values of kindness and positive values, from which it is expected that the audience will get inspiration and motivation to live after watching it (*Famouse.ID a Network of Content Creators*, n.d.). Since its first release until this article was written, the film has been watched 1,271,904 times and received various responses. As an affirmation, this article only focuses on the effort to describe some crucial aspects of Islamic image in new media and its meaning of digital religious service.

This article argues that the short film "Cerita Hijrahku" actively constructs religious knowledge among young Muslims in the media. The two points outlined include: first, how digital religious services form in the millennial era, and second, how to mean the film "Cerita Hijrahku" in representing Islam in new media as one of the loci of religious learning.

METHODS

This research is a type of qualitative research. The material object in this study is the short film "Cerita Hijrahku". The author used Julia Kristeva's sem analysis-intertextual theory to support this research. This selection is based on the fact that both offers have provided a methodological set that can help to understand the process of forming meanings. Intertextuality examines typical language strategies in typical situations; it studies language as a specific discourse, not as a generally accepted system (langue) (Kristeva, 1980, pp. vii–viii). This study has two main data sources, primary and secondary. The primary data is from a short film show, "Cerita Hijrahku," on the Film Marker Muslim Youtube Channel. While secondary data sources are in the form of literature that is directly related or not, both contained in physical and online libraries.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Religious Services and the Internet

Hasanuddin Ali and Lilik Purwandi, in a study on Islam in Indonesia, said there are at least three significant phenomena that occur in Indonesia in the current vulnerable time, namely the phenomenon of the presence of millennials, the middle class, and urban communities (Ali & Purwandi, 2019, p. 28). These three groups have character similarities: connected, confident, and creative. The similarity of the character makes these three groups very calculated. This is not only the case in how new institutions related to Islam are present, but furthermore, also has an impact on changes in religious practices (Emile Durkheim, 2017, p. 47), social, cultural, and political in Muslim countries, especially in Indonesia (Jati, 2017, p. xix). At the same time, when the group is also experiencing identity shocks over complex modern realities. The shake-up of the identities of these three groups has led to the desire to seek religious guidance that fits the market line and is easily accessible and tradable.

To meet the desires and needs of this religious market, there appears at least—with no intention of ignoring other patterns beyond the author's attention—two alternative patterns of religious services, namely "da'wahtainment" and "religiotainment" (Alansori & Zahidi, 2019; Fiardhi, 2021, p. 78; Kurniawan, 2021, p. 215; *Ramadhan, Televisi, Dan Kelesuan Rohani - Remotivi*, n.d.; Saefulloh, 2009; Sofjan, 2012, p. 60; Tajuddin, 2016, p. 424). Simply put, the first pattern, "da'wahtainment", refers to a concept of preaching that is packaged in such a way as to combine elements of da'wah with elements of entertainment. This can be seen in various da'wah programs on national television and social media that present preachers (Fealy & (ed.), 2012, pp. 44–45). The pattern is almost similar to conventional da'wah; it is just that this is done online. Meanwhile, the second alternative pattern, "religiotainment", refers to the merger of religion with entertainment that is neatly present in the new media area (read: popular culture). In addition to these two patterns, religious websites summarize their writings related to religion.

As mentioned above, the first two alternative patterns have significant differences despite the same base, namely technology and the internet. The first pattern, as contained in Anwar's account, is very biased toward Islam (Kurniawan, 2021, p. 215). The coverage area is relatively narrow. This pattern only applies to studying the presence of social symptoms involving the subject of "preachers". A review of this pattern will be complex when looking at broader aspects, especially in aspects of popular culture. On the other hand, a review of the "religiotainment" pattern has a broader area of study than the "da'wahtainment". Religiotainment in this context includes film, music, fashion, and television shows (Heryanto, 2018, p. 22) and social media content.

"Cerita Hijrahku" and Islamic Imagery in New Media

The short film "Cerita Hijrahku" tells the story of the journey of hijrah, a character named Sasha, a city woman looks attractive and has a job with a sufficient income. Actors in the film include Dinda Rahmawati as Sasha, Pipien Putri as Mother, Sita Ratri as Jihan, and Andre M. Addin as Bima. The short film "Cerita Hijrahku" is the result of a collaboration—if so to speak—between "Sasha Pancaran Aura Islam", a company that sells beauty products, cosmetics, and treatments based on sharia-compliant ingredients (read: halal) (*Sasha Pancaran Aura Islami | Facebook*, n.d.), with "Film Marker Muslim". The argument that the film collaborated with one of the brands was based on the presence of two logos, "Sasha Pancaran Aura Islami" and "Film Marker Muslim" at the beginning of the film before entering the story.

However, the short film "Cerita Hijrahku" highlights the image of Islam brightly in new media (read: film). To see in more detail the image (sign) of Islam in the new media (read: culture—screen—popular) presented in this film, the author divides the analysis plot based on scenes with analytical indicators that include scenes, language—also including dialogue—, the background, and appearance of the actors. Attention to every detail in the film is not required for practical analysis. However, attention to the sequence in each scene can help to indicate the development of the narrative, the setting, the function of an event, and the character of the story (Kurniawan, 2021, p. 219).

The short film "Cerita Hijrahku" is divided into four acts (scenes). In the first scene (opening sequence), the film shows the setting in a bookstore. These scenes are an introduction to the character, as well as the character, and at the same time, an introduction to the storyline that will be presented in the next section. The center of the spotlight was on a sign that read, " Toko Wali Songo. Buku-buku Islam, Al-Qur'an dan Terjemahan, Kitab Kuning, dan Poster (Wali Songo's Shop. Islamic books, Qur'ans and translations, yellow books, and posters." This plan affirms that the books sold in the library center on the study of Islam. On the one hand, at the same time, it hints that the film has a solid foundational base, which is sourced from Islamic literature. To make it clear that these scenes are an introduction to the story, the camera highlights the scene of Sasha's encounter, as the main character, with Bima, who is choosing a book, and by chance—if it can be said so—the book of the same title, "Cinta Subuh".

The image of Islam in the first scene is at least present in some form. Prominent images in this scene can be identified through the presence of Islamic literature, the hijab Sasha uses, and the scene between Sasha and Bima. The image of Islam present in the scene between Sasha and Bima can be seen in the scene of Bima clenching his palms on his chest. Bima did this as an apology. The selection of such actions is based on the teachings and norms of Islam; a person should not come into contact with other than his muhrim.

Entering the second scene, the film shows the presence of Sasha and Jihan, Sasha's close friends, in a place. I strongly suspect the setting in the scenes is Sasha's

house or boarding house. The story of his meeting with Bima in the bookstore, as well as in several other places, at length Sasha told Jihan, Sasha's best friend who looks more closed but does not leave the trendy aspect and has religious insights that are considered quite masterful. Bima figure, described as a handsome-looking man, looks neat, has enough intelligence, is well established in economic aspects, and most importantly, in Sasha's view, he is an alim (read: shaleh). The critical point presented in this scene refers to the feeling of "liking" that Sasha has for Bima, which ultimately requires Sasha to change everything in her life. "Hijrah", so the point conveyed by Sasha. This is seen in the dialogue:

Jihan : *You Stalking him?*
Sasha : *That's not the point*
Jihan : *Yes, I know. You want to tell me if you have a crush on him.*
Sasha : *Who's not? Try Han, now I ask you. Which woman does not have a crush on a handsome, intelligent, funny, established, alim, handsome?*
Jihan : *Sha, you mentioned her handsome twice.*
Sasha : *I know Han, because he's so handsome.*
Jihan : *Yes, okay, okay. Do you want to ask me what to help? Jodohin? Duh Sha, I don't know.*
Sasha : *No, no, no, Han. All I need is for you to change me.*
Jihan : *Makeover?*
Sasha : *Han, you know a good woman.*
Jihan : *For a good man?*
Sasha : *That's the point. Han, I want to be the same brother Bima that means I have to change for the better. I have to Hijrah Han.*
Then Sasha moved on and took something that was then thrust into Jihan.
Jihan : *This is what?*
Sasha : *This is my starterpack hijrah*
Jihan : *Duh Sha, but hijrah is not like this also times, not about physical appearance, not just change the appearance.*

The dialogue snippet, as mentioned above, is a fundamental point of the storyline presented in the short film "Cerita Hijrahku". The hijrah story presented through Sasha's figure illustrates a change in several aspects, which has the initial intention to pursue the man she wants. There are at least two critical conceptions of the image of Islam that— following the perspective of Roland Barthes—have become myths in society in this scene.

First is the conception of hijrah. This scene shows the message that hijrah is always about changing aspects of appearance. This is evidenced by Sasha's dialogue with Jihan about her desire to emigrate and thrust her hijrah starter pack to Jihan and the dialogue between Sasha and Jihan at the end. The scene also confirms that for Sasha, the values of spirituality must provide the value of tranquility, enjoyment, and tranquility that are all displayed, not hidden, and there are narcissistic values (Rofhani, 2013, p. 72). Interestingly, the starter pack that Sasha brought was partly an item from

the "Sasha brand". However, simultaneously, the conception of hijrah is also disputed with the concept of hijrah that Jihan understands. Second is the concept of a dream husband, which follows Islamic teachings. Second is the concept of a dream husband following Islamic teachings. The ideal husband-to-be, depicted through the figure of Bima, must be intelligent, handsome, alim, soleh, have good morals, and be financially well established. The third is the concept of Muslim women. In addition to these three concepts, the image of Islam comes with a symbol of the Bima scene that will pray and the background of the mosque as one of the places that Bima often visited.

Moving on to the third scene, these scenes feature the hijrah process by Sasha. Sasha, who changed her appearance, was secretive but got scorn from some of her office comments, and finally, Sasha got a defense from her superiors. Then it shows Sasha performing morning prayers while sleeping. Before leaving for work, Sasha first cleaned the house and cooked and prepared breakfast to eat with her mother. Interestingly, the conception of hijrah with physical appearance was also applied to her mother, who was seen through the scene of Sasha wearing a hijab to her mother. At the end of the scene, the film shows Shasa studying religion by visiting the halaqah in a mosque.

The image of Islam in this scene can be identified through several aspects. First is the prayer scene performed by Sasha. Prayer is one of the obligations that a Muslim must do. The order has been mentioned well in, among them, QS. Al-Baqarah [2]: 43 and QS. An-Nisa [4] 103 describes the obligation of prayer for Muslims. Second, be filial to the parents. What Sasha did to her mother in this scene represents important teaching in Islam. This commandment to be filial to parents has been explained directly in the Qur'an, among them in Q.S An-Nisa [4]: 36. Third, study the things done in the mosque.

Included in the fourth (last) scene, this film shows the conflict as well as the final story of this film. This scene shows Sasha and Bima meeting in a café to discuss an agenda. An essential point in this scene is that Bima, the man of his dreams, has had another woman. The response to this last storyline received any responses from the audience. Generally, the audience gets a moral message from the incident that is wishing for humans is not recommended.

Bima : *Assalamualaikum, Sha*
Shasha : *Waalaikumsalam, kak*
Bima : *Oh yes, Sha, know this is my wife, Hana.*
Then the camera highlights Hana, who is wrapped in Muslim women's clothes, robes, and a dark green veil that looks still fashionable.
Hana : *Hey, Hana*
Sasha : *Shasa. Greetings. Let us sit down.*

The image of Islam in this scene can be identified through two aspects. First, say and answer greetings. In Islam, saying and answering greetings is part of the worship charity that can be valued on the side of Allah SWT. The second is Muslim clothing. Muslim women's clothing can be interpreted as women's clothing that can cover aurat and, at the same time valuable to maintain the benefit and be suitable for the woman herself. Thus, Muslim women's clothing can cover the whole body except the face and

palms, is not tight or thin, and not excessive, can attract the attention of others, and can cause arrogance (Arifuddin, 2019, p. 81).

The Meaning of a Short Film "Cerita Hijrahku"

The discussion of the meaning of the short film "Cerita Hijrahku" in this context leads to Julia Kristeva's offer of two analysis points, namely genotext and fenotext (Kristeva, 1980, p. 7). Simply put, genotext is original texts with unlimited possibilities of meaning, becoming a substratum for actual texts. Genotext is also considered a means of evaluation that makes the entire language historical and various marking practices. While fenotext is actual text sourced from genotext. In another sense, fenotext are also interpreted as something in which there is a form of language performance that serves as a means of communication, representation, and expression; as something that can always be discussed and form a set of cultural values that are directly related to the ideology of the times.

Related to fenotext, Julia Kristeva provides two forms of distinction in the process: signification, meanings that are institutionalized and controlled by social codes, and significance, a subversion, and creative meaning, which is the process of releasing stimuli in humans through language expressions. The significance aspect provides a space for openness to the presence of intertextual processes in the process of meaning (Hoed, 2014, p. 81). Just as signs refer to other signs, each text also refers to the other text. In other words, a text is a form of transformation from another text. This effort is aimed at being able to read and circulate text, find distinctive characteristics, and give it a structure.

Operationally, Julia Kristeva offer works in two forms of analytical objects, namely the general form related to the use of the short film "Cerita Hijrahku" as a whole; and a particular form, which is related to the presence of the word "hijrah". The analysis of these two forms aims to show that the film is used as a means of religious learning for young Muslims on the one hand and shows that the film is a provider of religious services. To facilitate practical understanding and analysis processes, this article limits attention to the meaning of the audience in comment fields that are considered relevant through the table. Here the author attaches the meaning to both forms:

Table I. The Overall Meaning of The Short Film "Cerita Hijrahku"

Genotext: Original Text	Fenotext: Actual Text, Meaning, Unlimited	Signification: Meanings Instituted and Controlled by Social Codes	Significance: Subversion and Creative Meaning
Short film "Cerita Hijrahku"	Islamic inspirational films for the better	Islamic inspirational films for the better	
	Hidayah movies		Hidayah movies
	Movies about Romance		Movies about Romance
	Motivational films		Motivational films
	Films that reinforce principles		Films that reinforce principles
	Movies as a reminder (in the audience's language, "slapping movies")		Movies as a reminder (in the audience's language, "slapping movies")
	A movie with a lot of moral messages		A movie with a lot of moral messages
	Films that can lead to self-introspection		Films that can lead to self-introspection
	A heartfelt film		A heartfelt film
	Film as a means of learning		Film as a means of learning

Table. II
Meaning of the Word "Hijrah" in the Short Film "Cerita Hijrahku"

Genotext: Original Text	Fenotext: Actual Text, Meaning, Unlimited	Signification: Meanings Instituted and Controlled by Social Codes	Significance: Subversion and Creative Meaning
Hijrah	Move from one place to another	Move from one place to another	We can move for any reason, but as long as we do it wholeheartedly, God must still give the best 1. Self-discipline must wake up when others are sleeping soundly 2. Adab and ethics to the parents, more diligent and caring about the house even though it is tired

			again 3. You must hold yourself with people who do not like (do not appreciate) your changes 4. Time off for the science assembly 5. So inspiration hijrah for others
	We can move for any reason, but as long as we do it wholeheartedly, God must still give the best 1. Self-discipline must wake up when others are sleeping soundly 2. Adab and ethics to the parents, more diligent and caring about the house even though it is tired again 3. Must hold yourself with people who do not like (do not appreciate) your changes 4. Time off for the science assembly 5. Such an inspiration hijrah for others		Changing to a better person is not easy. Not everyone will be able to accept our change. We can begin hijrah for any. The reason is that when we live it wholeheartedly, God will still give us the best results. God is good. Let's straighten out our intentions.
	Changing to a better person is not easy. Not everyone will be able to accept our change. We can begin hijrah for any reason because when we live it wholeheartedly, God will still, give us the best results. God is good. Let's straighten out our intentions		Never suudzon. The practice depends on the end. Barakallah fiikum, hijrah is divine
	Never suudzon. The practice depends on the end. Barakallah fiikum, hijrah is divine		Changing to a better person is not easy. Not everyone will be able to accept our change
	Maa shaa Allah, the story is very similar to mine "we can start hijrah for any reason, because when we carry		Changes in the appearance aspect of style (including the use of Muslim

	it out wholeheartedly, God will give the best results.		clothing and hijab)
	Changing to a better person is not easy. Not everyone will be able to accept our change.		The search for a soul mate
	Changes in the appearance aspect of style (including, in this case, the use of Muslim clothing and hijab)		Wake up early
	The search for a soul mate		Helping their parents and being polite to him
	Wake up early		Surviving all sorts of temptations
	Helping their parents and being polite to him		Obedience to religion
	Surviving all sorts of temptations		Improving the financial aspect
	Obedience to religion		Looking for God's blessings
	Improving the financial aspect		Personal staging efforts
	Looking for God's blessings		To look good before God
	Personal staging efforts		Solidifies hearts, feelings and improves morals
	To look good before God		The best path when heartbroken
	Solidifies hearts, feelings and improves morals		Something difficult to do
	The best path when heartbroken		Something easy to do
	Something difficult to do		Beautiful
	Something easy to do		To find something new
	Beautiful		Whatever the original intent, in the end, the goal remains God
	To find something new		
	Whatever the original intent, in the end, the goal remains God.		

Based on a review of the meaning related to the two forms, it can be seen that each audience has a different meaning from the other. Like Julia Kristeva, separation from aspects such as genotext and fenotext is a crucial thing to do. This leads to a clear separation of original texts from actual texts, which in this case is an interpretation that indeed leads to heterogeneity of meaning over one single thing.

The meaning in the aspect of "significance", which is the meaning based on subversion and creativity, has opened up vast opportunities in the presence of intertextuality (Hidayat, 2021, p. 158; Hoed, 2014, p. 81). This term refers to the understanding that the actual text production process is not only sourced from one object but also through the subject. It occurs as a process derived from various other texts that are known to it. It is argued that "creativity" is not pure. Creativity always shows the relationship of influence results from various other texts. As Julia Kristeva put it, it got to this point that the text was mosaic.

In this regard, the author finds another text in harmony with the presence of meanings, as mentioned in the previous section. QS. An-Nisa' [4]: 100, as the author presents below, save the author, is the initial basis of the formation of the short film "Hijrahku Story" and the meaning that is present outside the film itself. This verse is often used as legitimacy when you want to emigrate. The selection of this reference object is based on Talal Asad's argument that the primary basis of The Reason of Muslims is the religious text, which in this case, the Qur'an. A review of this aspect is an integral part of the community, especially when considering religious practices, beliefs, and meanings in society (Asad, 2009, p. 20). The redaction of the verse is as follows:

وَمَنْ يُّهَاجِرْ فِيْ سَبِيْلِ اللهِ يَجِدْ فِى الْاَرْضِ مُرَاغَمًا كَثِيْرًا وَّسَعَةً ۚ وَمَنْ يَّخْرُجْ مِنْ بَيْتِه مُهَاجِرًا اِلَى اللهِ وَرَسُوْلِه ثُمَّ يُدْرِكْهُ الْمَوْتُ فَقَدْ وَقَعَ اَجْرُه عَلَى اللهِ ۗ وَكَانَ اللهُ غَفُوْرًا رَّحِيْمًا ۩

"Whoever emigrates in the way of God will undoubtedly get on this earth a place of many hijrah and spaciousness (sustenance and life). Who goes out of his house to emigrate because of Allah and His Messenger, then dies (before reaching their destination), indeed, his reward has been established by Allah's side. Allah is merciful again".

There are several histories related to the decline of the QS verse. An-Nisa' [4]: 100 (Sholeh & Dahlan, 2000, pp. 162–164). First, the history comes from Ibn Abi Hatim and Abu Ya'la, with sanad being Jayyid and sourced from Ibn Abbas. It is mentioned that this verse came down when Dlamrah ibn Jundab went out of his house to emigrate. He said to his family: "*Get me and move me from this land of musyrikin to where the Prophet died. The decline of QS. An-Nisa [4]: 100 is intended as a form of Allah's promise to those who died while carrying out religious duties*"

Second, the history is present from Ibn Abi Hatim, sourced from Sa'id bin Jubair. This history mentions that Dlamrah az-Zurqi belongs to the people in Mecca (not yet hijrah). When receiving news about QS. An-Nisa' [4]: 98, he said: "I am quite located

and capable". "He was also preparing to move to the place of the Prophet (saw) in the village of Tan'im. On the way, he died. This verse describes the position of the fallen when carrying out His Rabb call. Third, the history comes from Ibn Jarir, sourced from Sa'id bin Jubair, 'Ikrimah, Qatadah, as-Suddi, asl-Diahhak, and others. This account states that the person who died in the hijrah, some say Dlamrah bin 'Ash or al-'Aish bin Dlamrah; Jundab bin Dlamrah al-Junda'I; adl-Dlamrah; a man from Bani Dlamrah; a man from the tribe of Khuza'ah; a man from Bani Laits; one from the Bani Kinanah; and some say someone from Bani Bakr.

If viewed more deeply, as contained in the record of Muhammad Hasan Jabal (Jabal, 2010, p. 2290), lafadz "Hijrah" in that context refers to the notion of exit from one place to another. The analysis of the intertextuality aspects shows the similarity of some circles' meanings, which clearly shows that, by following Julia Kristeva, one text is strongly related to the other. The similarity of the message of change from good—not to say bad—to better, as desired in the short film "Cerita Hijrahku," is also the meaning presented by the audience connected to QS. An-Nisa' [4]: 100.

Opportunity or Threat?

The picture of the presence of religious services in the digital era, represented through film and disseminated with the internet network, needs to be considered further. His presence brings religion into entertainment and gets a relatively good level of attention in some circles. Some elements and religious values in the entertainment world, especially in film, are a small part of the broader phenomenon. Referring to Ariel Heryanto and Yasraf Amir's understanding, this kind of phenomenon is often referred to as "post-Islamism" (Heryanto, 2018, pp. 59–65; Yasraf Amir Piliang, 2010, pp. 217–218). Both terms simply refer to a process in which there is a communion of things of a worldly nature and a divine nature. Meanwhile, specifically, referring to Stig Hjarvard, this phenomenon is often referred to as "The Mediatization of Religion" (Hjarvard, 2008, p. hlm. 6., 2011; Lövheim & Hjarvard, 2019, p. hlm. 208). The term refers to a long process in which there are other social or cultural changes—including religion—in media logic. Some stories involving religious references are produced and edited according to the demands of popular media genres and story needs.

The high use of the internet (APJII, 2020) and the desire for religious learning among young Muslims in Indonesia seem to have encouraged the production team of "Film Marker Muslim" to present religion and entertainment simultaneously in each work. Through the short film "Cerita Hijrahku", the production team of The Muslim Marker Film has presented lessons about religion that are packed with issues that are close to young Muslims who are connected, confident, and at the same time creative. This also proves Ariel Heryanto's thesis that Islamization has been incarnated in the realm of popular culture (Heryanto, 2018, p. 36).

This activity is undoubtedly a step that needs to be appreciated on the one hand, but it also needs to get a "critical" attitude. Muslim Marker Film's production team and several other parties who do similar work have made it easy for young people to know about religion. A review of the meaning in the previous section proves that the film produced and presented on his Youtube channel helps further understand the concept of being a good Muslim. However, on the other hand, we are also faced with the fact that film, as one of the products of popular culture, is not only limited to what is meant by art but also as a commodity and ideology (Hidayat, 2021, p. 157). The film encapsulates the ability to explore every nook and space that exists, something that can

be traded, creating its own aesthetic space and instilling various values and views of life.

Irwan Abdullah's study seems relevant to how critical attitudes should arise in this context (Abdullah, 2017, pp. 119–120). He cited the consequences of the active involvement of the media (internet) in religious discourse in three key points. First is the codification of religion, a media process of summarizing religion into symbols (imagery), such as language, images, sounds, and visuals. This process has an impact on reducing and, at the same time, simplification to give rise to various interpretations that are at risk of misunderstanding and shallowing. Second, religious divergence is a process that allows all parties to talk about religion in the media. Consequently, we will have difficulty distinguishing between right and wrong because each side has ideological interests. Third, religion is co-opted by power. Parties often construct the meanings presented by the media about religion with power for economic and political purposes. This also reinforces Greg Fealy's argument that Indonesian Muslims, especially the urban middle class, are a best-selling market in how symbols of piety are traded, a place of cultural and spiritual commodification, and forming a new meaning of religious conception in life (Fealy & (ed.), 2012, p. 16).

This research, as Anwar's research on Nusa animation, shows that the film Inspiration of Muslims, as one of the sectors involving Indonesian Muslims, is very intertwined with the trends and context in which the film is produced (Kurniawan, 2021). That the process of Islamization in the area of popular culture is present in the public space with surprises, challenges, and at the same time, ideological contestation.

CONCLUSION

Departing from the above presentation, it was found that digital religious services today are present in at least three primary forms, da'wahtainment, religiotainment, and writing scattered on the website. As a reflection of religiotainment, the film is one of the most strategic parts of popular culture in how the teachings, values, and norms about Islam are present and interrelated with modern reality and affect its audience.

A review of the meaning presented by the audience of the short film "Cerita Hijrahku" is evidence of this argument. Although the film "Cerita Hijrahku" presents a package with a set of meanings determined by the production, at the same time, other meanings appear presented by the audience. The meanings presented by these audiences confirm how the film media is quite capable of constructing religious knowledge among young Muslims. It also shows that the film "Cerita Hijrahku", like other films, is a fact of the presence of Islamization in the area of popular culture, as mentioned by Ariel Heryanto, contains surprises, challenges, and even segments of ideological contestation. This research opens up space to discuss the presence of religious services widely spread in films, short videos, and other social media content.

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TRAVEL BUBBLE POLICY IN INDONESIA: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

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ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic has hurt the world economy. Indonesia's tourism industry was the most affected by the air travel restrictions policy during the COVID-19 era. After the first wave of COVID-19 moved slowly, several countries began to think about recovering their economy through travel arrangements. The term travel bubble is increasingly popular to revive the economy through cooperation in the tourism sector between countries. Indonesia has launched a travel bubble arrangement in Batam and Bintan with Singapore in January 2022. This study analyzes the opportunities and challenges of the Travel Bubble policy in Indonesia. Data collection techniques used secondary data such as documentation and literature study. Data analysis was carried out in three stages: condensing data, displaying data, verifying data, and drawing conclusions. The results of this study are opportunities and challenges related to applying the travel bubble in Indonesia. The opportunities are (1) the travel bubble able to increase tourism activities, (2) the travel bubble has had success in island-based countries, (3) the travel bubble procedure is suitable to be tested and adopted, and (4) momentum for cooperation with neighboring countries. The challenges are (1) public sentiment related to the increase in COVID-19 cases, (2) there is travel anxiety to travel to Indonesia rank in the transmission of COVID-19 cases, (3) the opinion of epidemiologists regarding the variants and waves of COVID-19, and (4) the difficulty of collaborating with neighboring countries.

Keywords: travel bubble, tourism, tourists, economic recovery, Indonesia

INTRODUCTION

The impact of COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically affected the social, economic, and welfare of humankind in all countries (Simatupang & Ismanto, 2021). Tourism is one of the most affected sectors (Sharun et al., 2021). Air travel restrictions caused foreign travelers in 2020 to decrease by 60-80% (UNWTO, 2020). There are at least 75 million jobs in the world tourism sector, and there is a risk of losing a turnover of more than US$2.1 trillion (WTTC, 2020).

Figure 1. Foreign Travelers Arrivals in Indonesia 2016 - 2020
(Source: Kemenparekraf, 2021)

Figure 1 shows that Indonesia also lost 74.84% of foreign tourist arrivals, or around 12.06 million, from 2019 to 2020 (Kemenparekraf, 2021), whereas since 2016, tourist visits have shown an increase every year. This led to a decline in the contribution of tourism to GDP at 4.05% in 2020 and was followed by a large number of the tourism industry experiencing a slump (Paramita & Putra, 2020).

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) estimates that the COVID-19 recovery will take a long time with high uncertainty, so international travel restrictions are no longer considered the best solution (Sun et al., 2022). The survey results also show that 60% of tourists think the air travel restriction policy lasts too long, and 75% of tourists believe that they feel suffering and stressed because of this travel restriction policy (IATA, 2021b). Some countries are starting to open their travel arrangements to recover their economies (Sharun et al., 2021). The term travel bubble is increasingly popular to revive the economy through cooperation in the tourism sector between countries (Sugihamretha, 2020). This policy is an alternative for countries in the world because the travel bubble is considered a solution for inter-regional travel, and the pandemic is expected to last a long time (Luo & Lam, 2020).

Some of the countries that have implemented this policy are Estonia – Latvia – Lithuania as the pioneers, then Australia – New Zealand, China – the Republic of Palau, Malaysia – with several countries, and India - the Maldives. Applying the travel bubble in several countries is considered to bring in foreign tourists, so this policy is a breath of fresh air for countries that have a tourism attraction to reorganize their tourism industry (Sharun et al., 2021). This policy tries to travel between countries with strict health protocols without quarantine to attract foreign tourists while traveling. The Malaysian government recorded a tourism revenue of RM 24.9 million or around 85 billion during the trial period of the travel bubble (*The Malaysian*

Reserve, 2022), with a total visit of almost 250,000 travelers. Gu et al. (2021) also show that the travel bubble strategy is the most effective way to attract foreign tourists to the Maldives compared to social distancing and tax incentives for business actors.

Indonesia, as a country that has the best tourist destinations, also has the opportunity to recover its economy, considering that Indonesia is the most beautiful country in the world (Haqqi, 2022). In the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2020-2024, the government sets ten priority tourism destinations known as the "new Bali" (Peraturan Presiden Nomor 18 Tahun 2020 Tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional 2020-2024, 2020). This "new Bali" can provide economic benefits for the people in the area (Pambudi et al., 2020). Research from Chusakul & Nonthapot (2020) found that Thailand and Laos tourism are integrated and can implement a travel bubble because foreign tourists visiting Thailand, on average, will also visit Laos and vice versa. Therefore, the travel bubble can be one of the policies that the Indonesian government can adopt to bring in foreign tourists to restore the economy of the tourism sector by opening routes or limiting travel access.

By looking at the above phenomena, researchers are interested in researching the opportunities and challenges of the travel bubble policy for economic recovery in Indonesia. Studies with the theme of travel bubbles are rarely found because the number still needs to be increased (Table 1). The table below found that only one nationally indexed journal and six globally indexed international journals researched the travel bubble.

Topic	Author
Travel Bubbles in Air Transportation: Myth or Reality?	(Sun et al., 2022)
Is the travel bubble under COVID-19 a feasible idea or not?	(Yu et al., 2021)
Travel bubble policy supporting between Thailand and Laos: Evidence from tourist market integration testing	(Chusakul & Nonthapot, 2020)
Limited tourism: travel bubbles for a sustainable future	(Fusté-Forné & Michael, 2021)
International travel during the COVID-19 pandemic: Implications and risks associated with 'travel bubbles'	(Sharun et al., 2021)
Travel anxiety, risk attitude and travel intentions towards "travel bubble" destinations in Hong Kong: Effect of the fear of COVID-19	(Luo & Lam, 2020)
Covid-19 Policy Response: Revitalizing the Indonesian Economy by Opening the Travel Bubble and Intra-Indonesia Corridor	(Sugihamretha, 2020)

Table 1. Previous research about the Travel bubble
(Source: data processed by author)

This research aims to see how the travel bubble concept is developed and what opportunities and challenges will be faced with the travel bubble policy in Indonesia. This paper will contribute to stakeholders implementing travel bubble policies, such as the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy, Local Government, and Tourism Managers. It also will give more insight into public policy study, especially on how the government adopts a policy based on opportunity and challenge aspects.

METHOD

This research is qualitative research with a descriptive approach. Data collection techniques use secondary data, namely library research, such as books, scientific journals, proceedings, official reports, mass media, and other documents relevant to the research theme. Then the data analysis technique is carried out through 3 stages: data condensation, data display, and drawing and verifying conclusions (Miles et al., 2014). Condensing data begins with selecting, focusing, and simplifying information from books, scientific journals, reports, and news relevant to the travel bubble. Next, to display the data, this stage helps the author to understand what information is related to the opportunities and challenges of the travel bubble policy in Indonesia. Then verify the data and compare one source with other data sources. This research was conducted from January to March 2022.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Travel Bubble Concept

According to IATA (2021), a travel bubble can be defined as a state-level agreement that enables international air travel between two countries by reducing the restrictions or conditions compared to those that apply to travel from and to other non-travel bubble countries. This policy started with the opening international flights to accommodate business and tourism destinations between countries with specific travel rules. Then Sugihamretha (2020) defines the travel bubble as a response to international travel restrictions in the form of travel rules between countries that have agreed to it in the context of economic recovery. The same thing was said by Yu et al. (2021H), that the travel bubble is the implementation of conditional tourism activities, namely the control of cases and mutual trust between countries regarding quarantine. The International Organization for Migration/IOM (2020) added that the travel bubble allows individuals to visit a country freely without the prerequisites of quarantine upon arrival. So, it can be concluded that the travel bubble is a concept of international travel rules without quarantine carried out between countries with certain conditions, such as cases between countries being mutually controlled in the context of economic recovery as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

A travel bubble offers tourists who visit without the need to quarantine (ANZ, 2021), considering that quarantine has been one of the inhibiting factors for international travel (Yang et al., 2021). Taiwan – Palau travel bubble, Trans – Tasman

bubble, and Langkawi International Travel Bubble have implemented a quarantine-free policy with several requirements, namely foreign tourists have taken the second or complete dose of vaccine, RT PCR results or foreign tourists' antigens are declared negative for COVID-19 before departure, and not tested positive for COVID-19 in the last 14 days (CDC, 2021; Covid19, 2021; MOTAC, 2022). Some of the above requirements must be owned by foreign tourists to prevent an increase in the transmission of COVID-19. This means that this policy considers the health aspect of economic recovery activities to reduce the risk of new clusters or imported cases.

Several countries that have implemented a travel bubble are geographically similar. Among them are island-based regions, such as the Palau Islands - Taiwan, Langkawi Island - several countries, Tasman Island - New Zealand, Fiji Island - Australia, and Maldives - India. (Reksa et al., 2021). The archipelagic region is classified as the most economically affected because the area is very dependent on tourism (Gu et al., 2021). Even though the archipelago is the most affected area, its geographical condition has the potential to apply the travel bubble policy. This is because this area has a small scale so that the mobility of foreign tourists can later be adequately controlled. This is in line with the opinion of Taufan Rahmadi, a tourism activist, that the travel bubble is more likely to be carried out in island tourist destinations, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Republic of Palau, and Langkawi, Malaysia (Metrotvnews, 2022).

Travel Bubble in Tourism Recovery

The country's economy is getting weaker while the COVID-19 19 pandemic is still going on for a long time, and it is not sure when it will end (Moti & Goon, 2020; Luo & Lam, 2020). Communities whose livelihoods depend on tourism, such as the creative economy, local transportation, and the provision of accommodation, food and drink, and trade, are particularly hard hit (Pambudi et al., 2020). Current international travel restrictions cannot be a permanent solution (Sun et al., 2022). Therefore, governments in several countries have begun to open travel arrangements to restore the economy, considering that a good economy can be sourced from an increase in people's income. (Sharun et al., 2021; Mankiw, 2015). Economic growth and tourism also have an interdependent relationship in some European countries where tourism stimulates economic growth (Dogru & Bulut, 2018).

Langkawi International Travel Bubble, Malaysia, is one of the successful bubble travel destinations. The Ministry of Tourism, Arts, and Culture of Malaysia recorded more than 720,000 arrivals of domestic and foreign visitors during the opening of the travel bubble and incised tourism revenue of RM 24.9 million or around IDR 85 billion (The Star, 2022). The hotel occupancy rate also increased by 40% on weekdays and 90% on weekends (The Malaysian Reserve, 2022). This policy is the right decision, considering that 90% or around 106,200 of the 118,000 population directly benefit from being involved in the tourism industry, such as culinary and transportation (The

Malaysian Reserve, 2022). The Baltic bubble in Lithuania received nearly 62,000 tourists from Latvia and Estonia (Ministry of the Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, 2021.) This policy dramatically helps the accommodation, culinary, and other sectors by opening up business opportunities and being an example of good regional cooperation. The Republic of Palau also stated that the travel bubble in the country was successful, with the arrival of 300 foreign tourists since the start of the trip (ABC, 2021).

Opportunities Travel Bubble in Indonesia

The Indonesian government started implementing the travel bubble on January 24, 2022, in Nongsa Batam and Lagoi Bintan with Singapore (Bisnis, 2022). Although this policy has just been tested, the author tries to analyze the opportunities and challenges of the travel bubble in Indonesia by looking at the dynamics of implementing the travel bubble in various countries.

First, this research found that the travel bubble is the best alternative for a country whose economy depends on tourism. This can be observed in several countries implementing the travel bubble and generating tourism activities such as foreign tourist visits and hotel occupancy rates (Table 2). Since its opening, last November 2021, Langkawi International Travel Bubble (LITB) Malaysia has reached more than 5.000 foreign tourists from 99 countries, including Indonesia (Chairunnisa, 2022; Ling, 2022). The PM of Malaysia also said that the travel bubble in Langkawi had generated over RM28 Million in revenue for Langkawi's economy. It was signed by hotel occupancy rates reaching 80%, especially on the weekend (Singh, 2021). In addition, other tourism activities, such as culinary and car rental, are also starting to increase in transactions (The Malaysian Reserve, 2022). It means more for people in Langkawi because most of their economy depends on tourism activity. Since its implementation, no new cluster has happened in LITB travelers (Ling, 2022). The Baltic bubble in Lithuania received nearly 62,000 tourists from Latvia and Estonia. This policy dramatically helps the accommodation, culinary, and other sectors by opening up business opportunities and being an example of good regional cooperation (Palkova & Bukovskis, 2022). The Republic of Palau also stated that the travel bubble in the country was successful, with 287 foreign tourists arriving and 113 domestic arrivals within one month from the start of the trip (ABC, 2021). Based on the table below, Thailand Sandbox Scheme has generated more than IDR 20 billion in local revenue since it launched in July 2021 and 400,000 foreign and domestic tourists (Chuenniran, 2022). This policy also created jobs and generated income for people at the grassroots level (Zhu & Yasami, 2022).

Country	Visitors	Revenue	Cluster

Malaysia	5,000 foreign tourism	IDR 85 billion	No new cluster occurred
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania	62,000 tourists	-	No new cluster occurred.
Palau	278 foreign tourists 113 domestic tourists	-	Open-closed policy
Thailand	400,000 foreign and domestic tourists	IDR 20 billion	-

Table 2. Travel Bubble Policy in Many Country
(Source: data processed by author)

Tourism data shows that the growth of foreign tourists visiting Indonesia is increasing yearly (Figure 1), with an average gain of 11.77% (2016-2019) per year. The highest number of visits was 16.11 million visits in 2019, and most of them were foreign tourists from Malaysia, Singapore, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Air/airport entrances are also the most extensive route for foreign tourists to come to Indonesia, which decreased by 82.58% in 2020. Looking at this data, the travel bubble can be seen as an effective strategy for recovering tourism activities. This is in line with the opinion of Dogru & Sirakaya-Turk, (2017), which states that tourism supports socio-economic development by stimulating job creation, lowering unemployment, and generating taxes. Reopening international travel by land, sea, and air will encourage foreign tourists who want to travel to Indonesia. The arrival of foreign tourists will also increase hotel occupancy in tourist areas visitors have deserted. Tourism activities such as culinary, creative economy, and accommodation will also have a positive impact. This can be seen by applying the travel bubble on Langkawi Island, Malaysia, which revived tourism activities.

Second, the travel bubble has succeeded in island-based countries, such as the Maldives, the Republic of Palau, and Fiji. This island region is identical to its coastal and underwater tourism potential. It is highly dependent on tourism (Gu et al., 2021), so the territory of Indonesia, which is famous for its beautiful and exotic beaches, has the potential to become a travel bubble destination. In addition, the archipelago has a limited area. It is surrounded by the sea, making it easier for the government or tourism managers to control the mobility of foreign tourists.

Considering that this condition is similar to Indonesia's geography, this could be Indonesia's opportunity to implement a travel bubble in several island-based tourist destinations that are a priority for the Indonesian government, such as:
1. Batam and Bintan, Province of Riau Islands, which has been running for two months, are some destinations that can be attractive are Nongsa and Lagoi. To get to Batam, you can use air or sea transportation. However, tourists can use sea transportation at the Port of Sri Bintan Pura to get to Bintan.

2. Tanjung Kelayang, Province of Bangka Belitung Islands. This marine tourism destination can be visited via sea transportation, namely Tanjung Pandan port and H. AS Airport. Hananjoeddin (kek.go.id, 2021).

3. Seribu Island, Capital Region of Jakarta. This region has a series of islands with charms, such as Tidung Island, Pari Island, Pramuka Island, Harapan Island, and others. To reach a thousand islands, you can use sea transportation from Jakarta (pulauseribu.co.id, n.d.).

4. Derawan Islands, Province of East Kalimantan. This archipelago has at least four controlled islands: Maratua, Derawan, Sangalaki, and Kakaban. To get to this destination, you can use sea transportation from Balikpapan or Samarinda (kaltimprov.go.id, 2017).

5. Wakatobi, Province of Southeast Sulawesi. Destinasi ini adalah akronim dari empat pulau, yaitu Wangi-wangi, Kaledupa, Tomia, dan Binongko. Tourists can visit this location by sea at Panggulubelo port (maritim.go.id, 2017).

6. Morotai Island, Province of North Maluku. This area has a geostrategic advantage, namely the outermost island on the northeastern side of Indonesia, which is close to ASEAN and East Asian countries. In addition to the benefits of marine tourism and beautiful beaches, Morotai is a historical place as one of the military bases of World War II. Access to this island can use sea transportation to Daruba Harbor and air transportation to Pitu. Airport (kek.go.id, n.d.-b).

7. Mandalika, Province of West Nusa Tenggara. In addition to marine tourism and the beauty of its beaches, this area is one of the MotoGP event circuits. To get to this area, you can use sea transportation at Lembar Harbor and Zainudin Abdul Majid International Airport (kek.go.id, n.d.-a).

8. Labuan Bajo, Province of East Nusa Tenggara. This destination is the main road to Komodo National Park, which is known as an ancient animal that is worldwide. Tourists can land for air routes at Frans Sales Lega Airport in Ruteng and H. Hasan Aroeboesman Airport in Ende. (Indonesia Travel, n.d.).

By expanding the location of the travel bubble, it is hoped that other tourist destinations will come back to life and restore the economy of the community and the tourism industry in the region.

Third, the procedures or requirements for foreign tourists using a travel bubble are easy to adopt and can be tested; some procedures have similarities to several air travel regulations in Indonesia related to COVID-19 vaccination, RT PCR or Antigen, COVID-19 history, and filling out the Care application. Application of the travel bubble in Batam and Bintan with Singapore has brought in 39 people in February and 151 open trip orders for March (Travel Tempo. co, 2022). This indicates that the government and foreign tourists can carry out the travel bubble procedure. This condition can implement the travel bubble in other destinations in Indonesia.

Figure 2. Highest Foreign Travelers in 2019
*(Source: Kemenparekraf, 2021)*

Fourth, East and Southeast Asia have a high potential for foreign tourists, given their relative proximity to Indonesia (Figure 2). By looking at 2019 vs. 2020 visits, it can be concluded that travel restrictions due to COVID-19 have reduced the number of foreign tourists visiting from Malaysia, Timor Leste, Singapore, Australia, and China. Thus, this has an impact on decreasing tourism foreign exchange earnings. This is in line with the opinion of Afdi (2010) in his research which says that the increase in the number of foreign tourists visiting Indonesia will increase the growth of foreign tourism exchange. Therefore, the five countries have the potential to establish cooperation regarding the travel bubble policy in Indonesia.

Challenges Travel Bubble in Indonesia

Although applying the travel bubble is the main alternative to economic recovery, the travel bubble in several countries has also caused many problems, especially health and public fears.

First, the implementation of the travel bubble in several countries has been delayed, like the Trans-Tasman Bubble, which postponed the travel bubble due to the carelessness of the Australian government regarding the escape of quarantine patients (Sabin, 2020). This carelessness gave rise to negative sentiments or anger among Australians, especially in Victoria. Epidemiologists have also warned of the potential for a second wave to emerge. Thus, the governments of New Zealand and Australia have agreed to postpone the travel bubble until the COVID-19 situation is safe and under control. Hong Kong and Singapore also briefly delayed their policies because, in August 2021, each country's cases experienced a spike; the two countries agreed to

start a travel bubble when the COVID-19 situation was under control (straitstimes.com, 2021).

Figure 3. Indonesia's COVID-19 Case and Death Rate Ranking
(Source: Katadata, 2021)

Second, data from Worldometers, dated January 28, 2022, reported that the COVID-19 death rate in Indonesia was ranked the 9th highest in the world, with a total of 144,261 people. Then Indonesia also recorded 4,195,958 COVID-19 cases as of September 21, 2021, and was ranked 13th worldwide. If you look at the rating (Figure 3), Countries that have implemented the travel bubble, such as Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Palau, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Baltic countries, do not have the highest COVID-19 case and death rate data in the world. This is an essential point for Indonesia in implementing the travel bubble because the high number of cases and the death rate will be a consideration for foreign tourists' intentions to visit Indonesia. This is in line with Tejedor et al. (2020), who state that the increase in cases causes people's fear. So if we look at the ranking of cases and the death rate due to COVID-19 in Indonesia, it will affect the travel intentions of foreign tourists and the sustainability of the travel bubble. This is different from what was done by Taiwan - the Republic of Palau, where the travel bubble in the country was running smoothly because the improvement and handling of cases were both considered good so that they had a sense of trust between the two countries (Yu et al., 2021).

Figure 4. Cumulative Cases in Batam and Bintan
(Source: Gugus Tugas COVID-19 KEPRI, 2022)

Third, based on the covid19.go.id site dated February 23, 2022, the risk of an increase in COVID-19 cases in Batam is in the medium-risk category (level 3), and Bintan is classified as low risk (level 2). Nevertheless, graph 3 shows that Batam and Bintan continue to experience additional monthly cases. This, of course, encourages the government to be able to control the spread of cases first before implementing the travel bubble policy. Although several foreign tourists have been visiting Batam and Bintan, it seems unsafe to visit because the addition of COVID-19 cases has not been controlled. Fusté-Forné & Michael (2021) found that in the summer of 2020, many European countries relaxed their borders and offered quarantine-free travelers. Still, this policy only lasted a few weeks due to the emergence of several increases in the number of COVID-19 cases. This is also a challenge for other regions when planning

a travel bubble. It is necessary to consider the trend of increasing COVID-19 cases in their area to reduce the fear of foreign tourists visiting.

Fourth, looking at the challenge of the second point, Indonesia will have difficulty cooperating with several countries to implement the travel bubble policy. The data from graphs 2 and 3 still show that the handling of COVID-19 in Indonesia still threatens countries with good handling of COVID-19. If we look again, the travel bubble is the implementation of conditional tourism activities, namely controlling COVID-19 cases and mutual trust between countries regarding quarantine (Yu et al., 2021). This prerequisite has been implemented in Taiwan - the Republic of Palau, which both have a good handling of COVID-19 and have resulted in foreign tourist visits between the two countries.

By seeing these opportunities and challenges, Indonesia can implement the travel bubble as a strategy for economic recovery in the tourism sector. However, controlling the spread of COVID-19 cases in tourism destination areas is crucial before this policy is implemented. The aim is to reduce anxiety in Indonesia's countries that want to establish travel bubble rules. The government also needs to identify tourist destinations compatible with the application of the travel bubble, such as island-based areas where the economy of the population is highly dependent on tourism activities. Thus, economic recovery will be able to directly touch local communities that have a livelihood in the tourism sector.

CONCLUSION

This study finds that the travel bubble is an opportunity to restore the tourism economy. Some options with the implementation of the travel bubble concept during the pandemic are: First, the travel bubble can fix the economy of island-based tourist destinations, including returning foreign tourists, replenishing hotel occupancy, and reviving tourism activities such as culinary, creative economy, and accommodation to improve income local tourism. Second, the travel bubble in island-based areas can make it easier to control COVID-19 cases and the mobility of foreign tourists. In addition, the archipelago depends on tourism, so it is necessary to restore the economy immediately. Several super-priority destinations can implement a travel bubble to expand economic recovery efforts. Third, the similarity of the travel bubble procedure and the ease with which it can be tested can increase the chance that it can be adopted in other regions. Fourth, countries that have the highest number of foreign tourists visiting Indonesia have the potential to cooperate with travel bubble travel regulations with Indonesia.

However, implementing a travel bubble has several challenges, especially regarding the health sector. First, applying the travel bubble needs to pay attention to public sentiment, considering that the current COVID case threatens everyone.

Second, the high number of COVID-19 cases and deaths need to be controlled to reduce the anxiety level of foreign tourists who want to visit. The trend of increasing COVID-19 cases in areas that want to implement a travel bubble is also a concern. Third, the opinion of epidemiologists regarding the potential for cases and the increasing trend of COVID-19 is considered. Reasonable control of COVID-19 cases is the first thing to do before implementing a travel bubble. Fourth, the high cases and death rates of COVID-19 in Indonesia in the eyes of the world will make it difficult for Indonesia to establish travel bubble cooperation in several countries where the transmission of COVID-19 cases has been well controlled.

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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION RECONSTRUCTION IN LEGISLATION FORMATION IN INDONESIA POST-PANDEMIC

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ABSTRACT

Covid-19 is not only a dangerous disease for humans, but this pandemic also impacts the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia. In the last decade, Indonesia's democracy index has declined and even reached its lowest position in 2020. This is due to the lack of freedom and public involvement in actualizing their political interests, including in forming laws and regulations. The principle of openness in forming laws and regulations is intended to prevent corruption in legislation. Nevertheless, implementing public participation in forming laws and regulations is only a pseudo-ritual. This research method uses normative research with approaches (statute approach, case approach, and comparative approach). The results of this discussion find that the decline in Indonesia's democracy index is the lack of community involvement caused by the lack of government transparency in operating and less proactive legislators in preparing and screening public participation. Also, it still needs to is an absence of regulations governing participation mechanisms that accommodate input from the community. Then there is a need for improvements to the parliamentary system by reconstructing public participation, which is not only limited to parliamentary agreements but also provides opportunities for the public to take part and have the right to an opinion and the right to ask for answers to opinions.

Keywords: *public participation, legislation, democracy*

INTRODUCTION

A democratic government is a government that provides space for the people to take part and participate in all forms of state problems. Amin Rais (Suparyanto, 2008, p. 11)also stated that one of the forms of a state that is said to be democratic or not is community involvement in decision-making. In line with that, Sidney Hook also argues that in a democracy, all government decisions, directly or indirectly, must be based on the majority agreement the adult people freely give. (Suparyanto, 2008, p. 3).

The existence of a pandemic not only threatens human health but also threatens the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia. Joen Hoey, the author of The Economist Intelligence Unit EIU's report, said, *"The pandemic confirms that many rulers have*

become accustomed to exclude the public from discussion of today's pressing issues, and shows elite government, not popular participation, has become the norm." Indonesia has declined and even occupies the lowest position in 2020. The EIU, which released the 2020 Democracy Index Report, puts Indonesia in the 64th position (Putra, 2021)out of various countries with a score of 6.3. This score has decreased from the previous year, which was 6.48.

Based on these data, there are five indicators used by the EIU in determining a country's democracy index, including the electoral process and pluralism, government functions and performance, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. Based on these indicators, the EIU classifies countries into four regime categories: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes. In Indonesia, the EIU scores 7.92 for the electoral process and pluralism. Meanwhile, the function and performance of the government with a score of 7.50; political participation was 6.11; political culture was 4.38; and civil liberties with a score of 5.59. This is the lowest figure obtained by Indonesia in the last 14 years, and Indonesia is categorized as a country with a flawed democracy.

On another note released by Freedom House (*Freedom House*, 2022), a non-governmental organization that focuses on democracy in various parts of the world. It shows Indonesia is still in the Partly Free classification, scoring 59 out of 100. This Partly Free classification is in the middle between Free and Not Free. Even in assessing the openness of the Indonesian government, it scored 2 out of 4. This indicates that if the openness process is low, it can be ascertained that the community's involvement in all matters is also low.

In fact, according to K.H. Ma'ruf, public openness is the spirit of democracy (Kusumaningtyas, 2020)which stipulates the obligations of transparency and accountability to public bodies, as well as opening channels for public participation in the formulation and implementation of development programs. Openness is a prerequisite for the birth of a democratic government (Riskiyono, 2017, p. 25); the principle of openness should be translated into real terms in various aspects of governance, including in the formation of laws and regulations.

In Freedom House's notes, the issue of openness highlights the controversy over *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja,* which lacks public participation; the process is concise and discussed during the pandemic. *RUU Cipta Kerja,* which includes new laws and revisions to 79 existing laws, in its report that the government did not consult the public adequately on the contents of the law; they claimed consultations were intentionally avoided to sow confusion over the provisions of the law (*Freedom House*, 2022).

Whereas in the provisions of Law 12 of 2011 concerning the formation of laws and regulations, the principle of openness must be carried out to invite the public to provide the broadest possible input. Matters regarding public participation are regulated in article 96, where the public can provide input either orally or in writing. *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja* has legally violated the rules in the process of its

formation; this has been proven by the Constitutional Court's decision which affirms that *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja* is unconstitutional with conditions.

Another thing in public participation that becomes a problem in forming legislation is the lack of clarity about community input, whether it is considered or not. So that the Indonesian government system relies on legislators; in other words, even though the whole community refuses, the government agrees, and the government's decision is absolute, and this is indeed a consequence of the entire representation system given. In a democratic government, legislators should not pursue quantity but rather the quality of legislation. Community involvement and, in its accommodation, community input in the drafting of legislation is a determinants of the quality of a legal product. Clarity regarding public participation must specify the extent to which the public can take part in the process of forming a statutory regulation.

METHOD

As socio-legal research (Wiratraman, n.d.) that examines issues of democracy, this research studies the involvement of public participation in the formation of laws and regulations. The main focus of this research is to examine and analyze public participation as one of the requirements for forming laws and regulations. This study uses a statutory approach contained in Law 12 of 2011 concerning the Establishment of Legislation and other related regulations. In addition, this research uses a comparative approach which, in this case, compares the implementation of public participation in forming legislation in various countries. Moreover, finally, using a case approach related to the issue of public participation, including *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja, Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi, and Undang-Undang Ibu Kota Nusantara* (IKN), in which the entire law has become a polemic because of the process of its formation, the network of aspirations, and formation during the Covid-19 pandemic.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Problems with the Establishment of *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja, Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi, and Undang-Undang Ibu Kota Nusantara* (IKN)

As a democratic state of law, the formation of law in Indonesia must be carried out according to a mechanism under democratic principles. Because democracy in Indonesia is based on law, the mechanism of law formation under democratic principles must also be institutionalized in the form of law (Ayus, 2021, p. 23).

Law 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Legislation refers to forming laws and regulations up to regional regulations. In forming legislation, a series of stages must be carried out, from planning to enactment, and nothing is missed. In the process of its formation, it must also comply with the principles and content contained therein. The process of its formation not only transforms texts into articles but also guarantees vast opportunities for the community to participate in its formation. Carbble (VCRAC

crabble, 1994, p. 4) argues that the most critical aspect of statutory regulations is not only related to the process of their formation; good laws and regulations, in essence, also need to pay attention to the basics of their formation, especially those relating to the foundations, principles, which are related to the material content. Maria Farida also stated that the preparation of Legislation includes two main problems, namely: Formal/procedural elements, which are related to the formation of Legislation that takes place in a particular country, and Material/substantial elements, which are related to the problem of processing the contents of an Act (Afif, 2017, p. 7).

Thus the formation of good legislation must comply with the substantial and formal aspects so that the enactment of the law is not only the will of the policymakers but also the will of the community as the owner of sovereignty. In line with that, Eka Nam Sihombing stated that every statutory regulation established by an authorized institution or official is expected to apply in the community so that it becomes a parameter for the community. Thus the norms contained therein are obeyed and implemented by the community so that they are not just a collection of arguments for the legislators.(Eka NAM Sihombing, 2021, p. 60).

Several Indonesian laws were enacted and felt to override transparency and ignore public participation, we can see these problems from the process of forming *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja, Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi, and Undang-Undang Ibu Kota Nusantara* (IKN), which are all laws were formed and promulgated during the COVID-19 pandemic.

a.   Law Number 11 of 2020 concerning *Cipta Kerja*

Before the decision of Constitutional Court No. 91/PUU-XVII/2020, *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja* has reaped many polemics, including the lack of transparency in the formation process, making it difficult for the public to participate. Since the drafting process, there has been confusion over the draft work copyright law, and it has never received clarification from the government; this has made the public even more confused because there is no clarity from the initiating institution.

In the notes of Fajri Nursamsi, a researcher at the Center for Legal and Policy Studies (PSHK), three things underline toward *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja*, namely discussions during recess and outside working hours, minutes of discussion meetings are not disseminated to the public, and decision making is not based on votes. In the plenary session of approval. (Firdaus, 2021, p. 75)Regarding discussions outside working hours or other than Monday - Friday, it is possible if it is approved in a meeting and by the leadership of the people's representative council. However, the public still has to know; the problem is that outside the meeting time and the House of Representatives building, this is never published to the public. So it is unknown why the discussion of *RUU Cipta Kerja* is so fast and tends to be forced(CNN Indonesia, 2020).

The discussion process that was carried out also seemed rushed and took advantage of the Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) situation; this became a particular concern for the public because, during the pandemic, the public's room for

movement in overseeing the discussion of *RUU Cipta Kerja* was limited by the strict PSBB rules so that there will be no more advocacy in the form of rallies or demonstrations.

In the end, after being submitted for a judicial review, *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja* was canceled or declared conditionally unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court; in its decision, the Constitutional Court stated, "the establishment of *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja* is contrary to the 1945 Constitution and has no legal force to bind conditionally as long as it is not interpreted as 'no improvement is made in the law,' 2 (two) years since this decision is pronounced'. Stating that *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja* is still in effect until repairs are made to the establishment by the grace period as determined in the decision (Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2021).

The Court thinks that the process of establishing *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja* does not meet the provisions based on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, so it must be formally declared invalid. In its consideration, the Constitutional Court questioned the concept of omnibus law in *Cipta Kerja*, whether the method included making new laws or making revisions, because so far in the process of forming laws and regulations, only the concept of revising and making new ones was known.

Then in the decision of the constitutional court, the process of its formation did not apply the principle of openness as described in Article 5 letter G. The implication of not being open to the formation of laws and regulations is that there will be no public participation, so this is contrary to Article 96 of Law 12 of 2011 concerning Establishment of laws and regulations which discuss public participation, which should access the law required to make it easier for the public to provide input orally or in writing.

b. Law Number 7 of 2020 concerning the Third Amendment to Law Number 24 of 2003 concerning *Mahkamah Konstitusi*

On September 1, 2020, the DPR, together with the President, ratified the revision of *Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi,* which received several criticisms of both substance and procedure. The dynamics of changing *Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi* do not touch on such substantial aspects as adding or reducing the duties or authorities of the Constitutional Court Judges but only revolve around the requirements to be appointed as constitutional judges (Dahoklory, 2021, p. 229). Even though the government's focus at that time was dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic.

The condition of the Covid-19 pandemic that limits crowds and mobilization is undoubtedly felt, which results in minimal public participation. Previously, the discussion was only carried out for two days on August 26 and 27, 2020, which was then taken at the plenary meeting on September 1, 2020.

The closed discussion meeting was revealed by the Deputy Chair of Commission III of the DPR, Pangeran Khairul Saleh, that the Working Committee meeting to discuss the revision of the Constitutional Court Bill must be held behind closed doors.

The reason is that the articles to be discussed do not cause misunderstandings in the community. (Sari, 2020)This is contrary to the principle of openness in forming laws and regulations that must be carried out openly.

According to a researcher at *Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan* (PSHK), M. Nur Sholikin, the speedy and closed legislative process can be seen as a deliberate attempt to limit or even shut down public participation. The repeated practice of closed and non-participatory legislative processes indicates a disregard for the orderly procedures or formal aspects of forming laws. Bagir Mana also mentioned that ratifying the revision of *Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi* was fast. However, it cannot be said because there are urgent and urgent circumstances, so it is necessary to ratify the Act in Fast track legislation (Sausan & Syahruri, 2021, p. 47).

c.   Law Number 3 of 2022 concerning *Ibu Kota Nusantara*

The last example is the formation of law no. 3 of 2022 concerning *Ibu Kota Nusantara*, which has received a lot of criticism and rejection because its formation is considered less aspirational and does not become a significant need for the community during a pandemic. The formation process, which only took a short time, was considered not to accommodate the interests of the community.

In the process of its formation, Sholikin, a senior researcher at *Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan* (PSHK), provided notes on the IKN Law. First, closing the space for public participation, according to him, in drafting the IKN bill, the House of Representatives and the government deliberately closed the space for public participation in providing input on the substance of the IKN Bill. Both discussions of the IKN bill were considered to be dominated by the elite; Sholikin saw that the community had no place in the discussion of the IKN bill. The discussion also seemed to be dominated by elites by ignoring the rights of community participation guaranteed in the Constitution and the Constitutional Court Decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020. Third, neglecting the substance because the preparation has closed the space for public participation can result in weak accountability of the IKN draft law, both in-process and substance. (Hidayat, 2022).

Professor of Law at the University of Muhammadiyah Jakarta (UMJ) Syaiful Bakhri revealed that the IKN law is formally and materially flawed, similar to *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja* (CNN Indonesia, 2022). If the formal formation does not carry out public participation, then the material aspects of the substance of the law do not represent the community. This lack of public participation is based on the time that the discussion of the bill into law only takes 42 days. If we refer to the legislative process, starting from the preparation stage to the discussion, it takes about 130-160 days (Mahardika, 2020, p. 214). The long time is the result of public participation, in which the legislators are obliged to hold meetings with public opinion, working visits, and socialization.

The short duration of the formation of the IKN law has caused many interests that have not been accommodated. For example, there are several indigenous tribes

whose interests have not been accommodated in the IKN law. In addition, environmental activists are not involved in public discussions even though the relocation of the capital city has the potential to damage the environment; this is based on the results of research conducted by several non-governmental organizations in the environmental field, which tend to see the negative impact of moving the capital city (Gelora Mahardika & Saputra, 2022, p. 17).

Comparison of Public Participation in Legislation in Different Countries
a.   Public Participation in Indonesia

In principle, all parties within and outside the state structure can initiate the idea of the Formation of Legislation (Asshiddiqi, 2006, p. 141). The Council of Europe makes participation part of the 12 Principles of Good Governance (*12 Principles of Good Governance*, 2008) which explains these principles to provide broad access to the public in obtaining information. Participation is a principle and a character which reflects good governance. On the other hand, Ismoyo, Muluk, and Saleh stated that good governance emphasizes the compatibility among the actors; are the government, the private sectors, and the society, which makes the inclusion of the stakeholders in the development, becomes essential. Therefore, active participation from the stakeholders from the private sector and the citizens is required to strengthen their role in succeeding the policy (Mindarti, 2016).

Participation in the Big Indonesian Dictionary is participation or participation (KBBI Online, n.d.); in forming legislation, participation can be interpreted as participating in an activity from planning to evaluation. Participation is also defined as community involvement directly or indirectly through representative institutions. Meanwhile, community participation is defined as participation, either individually or in groups, actively in determining public policy (Isra, 2010, p. 282).

Community participation in forming legislation is one form of actualizing the political interests of the community, which in political science is referred to as political participation. Samuel Huntington and Joan Nelson, as quoted by Pataniari Siahaan in Sihombing, define political participation as follows "political participation as activity by private citizens designed to influence government decision-making"(Sihombing, 2021, p. 163).

The space for public participation in forming laws and regulations is regulated in Article 96 of Law 12 of 2011 concerning the formation of laws and regulations. Community participation is not only limited to spectators but also has the right to participate in a law that is formed. The community can provide input orally and in writing to form laws and regulations. Oral and written input can be made through public hearings, work visits, outreach and seminars, workshops, and discussions.

On the other hand, Law 12 of 2011 mandates that every process of legislation formation, starting from the planning, drafting, discussion, stipulation, and enactment stages, must be open and transparent. This openness is the first step in creating

participation because if the formation of laws and regulations is closed, the public will not be able to participate.

Of the five stages in forming legislation, Sihombing divides three forms of public participation: pre-legislation, legislation, and post-legislation (Sihombing, 2021, p. 167). According to him, community participation in each stage must be different, although some are the same. This means that participation in the preparation process differs from participation in the discussion process after it becomes a statutory regulation.

1) Pre-legislation

This pre-legislation stage is contained in the planning and drafting of legislation. At this stage, four forms of community participation can be done. First, community participation in the form of research, in this case, can be done by the community; there are no problems in society that need to be studied in-depth and require the completion of arrangements in legislation. Second, community participation is in the form of discussions, workshops, and seminars; this participation is carried out as a follow-up to the research results on an object that will be regulated in laws and regulations. Third, participation in the form of submissions or initiatives. This submission is intended to propose a statutory regulation. Fourth, this is the last form of community participation in planning and drafting legislation by providing proposals for draft laws and regulations from the community.

2) Legislation

At this stage, six forms of community participation are contained in Article 96, paragraph 2 of Law no. 12 of 2011, including participation in the form of hearings or meetings with public opinion. Second, public participation in the draft alternative legislation, this alternative draft can be given when the draft legislation being discussed in the legislature has not been or is not even aspirational to the interests of the wider community. Third, participation in the form of input through print media. Fourth, participation through electronic media, in this case, can be done by creating a dialogue by presenting competent resource persons in their fields. Fifth, participation is in the form of demonstrations, which support or reject a law being made. Sixth, participation in discussions, workshops, and seminars, in this case, was carried out to obtain clarity on issues regarding the material being discussed in the legislature.

3) Post Legislation

The last public participation is at the stage after becoming a law; this participation can be done by testing the law against the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, whose authority is in the Constitutional Court and regulations under the law against the law. Law under the Supreme Court. This is done if legislation enactment violates the community's constitutional rights.

b.   Public Participation in South Africa

Parliament is South Africa's legislative body. Thus, one of its primary functions is to pass new laws, amend existing ones, and revoke or abolish (cancel) old ones. This

function is based on the South African Constitution. The National Assembly (NA) and the Provincial National Council (NCOP) play lawmaking roles. A Bill can only be submitted in Parliament by a Minister, Deputy Minister, a parliamentary committee, or Member of Parliament (MP). The Executive initiates about 90% of the Bills.

The formation of law in South Africa is regulated in Articles 73 - 82 of the 1996 Constitution; the process begins by discussing a text that the ministry regarding specific issues has made; the text is known as the "Green Paper," which is then published in the Government Gazzette to get input, suggestions, and criticism from the community. The public's suggestions and inputs are then used as the basis by the relevant ministries or teams formed to compile Laws to make improvements to the Green paper. The result of the improvement of the Green Paper is referred to as the White Paper; the relevant commission in parliament then discusses this for later revision or rejection. After being refined by the government through the ministry, the National Assembly approved the bill; then, the bill was then submitted to another chamber, namely the NCOP. Once the National Assembly and the NCOP have approved a bill, the bill is then sent to the President for approval (Czapanskiy & Manjoo, 2008, p. 5).

The Bill can be returned to the National Assembly for review when the President has consideration to disagree for specific reasons after receiving the Bill. If the bill contains material related to the province, then the National Council of Province must be involved. If the bill that has been reviewed agrees with the President's considerations, and the Constitutional Court decides that the bill is constitutional, then the President must ratify the bill. Laws that have been passed must be disseminated appropriately and have been in effect since they were promulgated.

Historically, Since the advent of democracy in 1994, all citizens can be involved in what happens in Parliament. Article 59 of the 1996 South African Constitution states that Parliament must facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes in the National Assembly and the NCOP.

c.   Public Participation in the United States

The first step in the legislative in the United States process is to propose a bill to Congress. Anyone can draft it, but only members of Congress can propose bills. Several important bills are usually proposed at the request of the President, such as the annual federal budget. However, the initial bill could undergo significant changes in the legislative process. Once proposed, a bill is referred to the appropriate committee for review. There are 17 Senate committees, with 70 sub-committees, and 23 house committees, with 104 sub-committees.

A bill is first considered in a subcommittee, where it can be accepted, amended, or ultimately rejected. If the sub-committee members agree to proceed to the following process, it is reported to the full committee, where the process is repeated. During this process stage, committees and subcommittees hold hearings to investigate the merits and demerits of the bill.

When the bill was discussed, the debate process in the House of Representatives was very structured. Each member who wishes to speak only has a few minutes; the number and types of changes are usually limited. In the Senate, debate on most bills is limitless. A bill must pass through both houses of Congress before being submitted to the President for consideration. Although the Constitution requires that the two bills have the exact wording, in practice, this is rarely the case. A Conference Committee was formed to harmonize the Bill, consisting of members from both chambers. Committee members produced a conference report intended to be the bill's final version. Each room then votes again to approve the conference report. Depending on the bill's origin, the final draft is then registered by the Secretariat of the House of Representatives or the Secretary of the Senate and submitted to the Chair of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate for signature. The bill is then sent to the President (Firdaus, 2021, p. 53).

Based on Article 1 Section 7 number 2 of the United States Constitution, every bill must be approved by the two chambers of Congress: the Senate and the House of Representatives. Before it becomes a law, it must be submitted to the President for approval. If they agree, the Act will be signed, and if not, the President of the United States will return it to the Senate and the House of Representatives by giving reasons for rejection (objection).

The President's rejection of a bill approved by both chambers of the United States Congress is known as a veto. A veto is the constitutional power of the President of the United States to pass a bill.

Reconstruction of Public Participation in the Formation of Legislation

Public participation is a prerequisite and a representation of the realization of a democratic government (Riskiyono, 2017, p. 25). If the government is not accompanied by participation, there will be no democratic government system in the country. Therefore, as one of the principles of Good Governance and a manifestation of people's sovereignty, public participation in policymaking must be guaranteed in the constitution or statutory regulations. This guarantee is needed to show that the public can be involved in implementing and monitoring a policy.

Democracy is expected to guarantee the realization of a responsive legal product because the community participates in drafting and fostering the birth of law. Public participation in forming these laws will make the community more critical and the government more responsive in the democratic process, thus giving birth to an honest government and responsible citizens (Riskiyono, 2017, p. 26).

Public participation is a guarantee that must be given to the people to be able to participate in the process of administering the state and accessing public policies freely and openly (Riskiyono, 2017, p. 41). Although formally in Law no. 12 of 2011 concerning the Establishment of Legislations has provided guarantees for citizens to be involved in drafting laws and regulations. However, the *political will* of the legislature is still essential to realizing participation in the process of forming the

legislation. If the legislature unlocks this lock, then public participation will be felt by the legislature and the executive in implementing a law.

Mahfud MD, as quoted by Joko Riskiyono, stated that the formation of a participatory law covers the substance and process. At the level of substance, it means that the material to be regulated must be aimed at the interests of the wider community to produce laws that are democratic and have a responsive/populistic character. Furthermore, at the process level, the mechanism for forming legislation must be transparent so that the community can provide input and regulate issues (Riskiyono, 2017, p. 11). Thus, participation, transparency, and democratization are integral and inseparable parts of forming laws in a democratic country.

Public participation in forming laws and regulations can be done in 2 ways: active and passive participation. Through active participation, it can be done with the initiative of the community to play a role in the formation process following the general meeting, public debate, and writing. Passive participation comes from outside the community, which in this case, is carried out by the legislature or the executive; it can be through public dialogue, seminars, and workshops. However, this passive participation needs to be noticed because substantial activities are not only used as a formality events (Susanti & Fazrie, n.d.).

Regarding public participation, Sherry R Arnstein, who put forward the concept of *Eight Runs On Ladder of Citizen Participation,* explained that participation is based on the power of the community to determine a final product. In general, the eight stairs are divided into three major groups, namely as follows (Arnstein, 1969):

a) There is no participation or *non-participation,* which includes *manipulation* and *therapy.*
b) Community participation in residence accepts several provisions, including *informing, consultation,* and *placement.*
c) Community participation in the form of having power which includes *partnership, delegated power,* and *citizen control.*

In Indonesia, public participation in the formation of legislation, if examined from the concept of Sherry R Arnstein, is still at the consultation stage or in the concept of tokenism, where the community is allowed to have an opinion but does not have the power to influence their opinion, as in the case described above. . Although the provisions of Article 96 of Law 12 of 2011 concerning the Establishment of Legislation provide guarantees of participation. However, it is only formal in terms of how to participate in the formation of legislation. However, the regulations on community participation in these provisions have not provided a clear picture (Huzaeni & Anwar, 2021, p. 226). The article mandates that government administration accommodate the right of public participation to be involved in the preparation and discussion of legislation. There are no further provisions regarding technical regulations on how the public participation mechanism must be accommodated by government administration (Nugraha & Ratnawaty, 2016, p. 32).

Public participation in forming laws and regulations related to human rights is contained in Article 28 E of the 1945 Constitution. The law guarantees the public to express their opinions responsibly on state administration policies. However, these rights will be difficult to materialize because there is no obligation for the government that this opinion will influence the decisions it takes (Eka NAM Sihombing, 2021, p. 171).

According to Alexander Abe, public involvement in forming legislation can provide three critical impacts: first, avoiding manipulation of people's involvement and clarifying the community's will. *Second,* providing added value to the legitimacy of the planning formulation. *Third,* increase public awareness and political skills (Alexander, 2005, pp. 90–91). In line with this, the consequences of not involving the public in forming legislation have a terrible impact. According to Mas Achmad Santosa, forming legislation that does not involve the public in the regulation process does not solve social problems but creates new problems in society (Eka NAM Sihombing, 2021, p. 165). even worse, due to the non-participatory process of law-making, there will be legislative corruption (Firdaus, 2021, p. 78).

From the example above regarding the formation of *Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja, Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi, and Undang-Undang Ibu Kota Nusantara* (IKN), which are considered problematic, it can be used as a benchmark for the weakness of the legislative process in Indonesia, one of which is related to public participation. Its hasty formation and lack of participation should be a mirror for improving the legislative process in the future.

Indeed, legislators have no legal consequences if they do not involve the community in forming the legislation. This, of course, sparked controversy in the community, which led to the submission of a formal and material review of the legislation itself. The guarantee of community participation should be regulated by providing legal consequences if it does not involve the community in its formation. Because the concept of popular sovereignty as contained in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Article 1 paragraph 2 is not only involved in elections but also the community has the right to actualize their political interests by forming the legislation. JJ Rousseau, who put forward the theory of popular sovereignty, held the (Rudy, 2013, p. 258)view that the sovereign is the people while the government is only a representative. If the government does not carry out affairs by the people's will, then the government must be replaced; the people's sovereignty is based on the general will. Public participation is a form of people's sovereignty. Thus the state should be present and guarantee community involvement in all forms of state problems, including in forming the legislation.

Concerning participation in the formation of legislation, there must first be transparency. Transparency and participation are inseparable units. This is explained in Article 5 Letter G concerning the Principle of Openness "That in the formation of laws and regulations starting from planning, drafting, discussing, ratifying or determining, and promulgation is transparent and open. Thus, all levels of society have

the broadest opportunity to provide input in forming laws and regulations. However, this principle of openness has no legal consequences if it is not carried out in the same way as public participation.

Indeed, in some expert views, the principle of law is not a concrete legal norm, as stated by Paul Schotlen in the quote from Maria Farida that the principle of law is not law, but the law cannot be understood without these principles (Indrati, 2020, p. 253). However, in the principle of openness in the formation of laws and regulations, the author holds a different view that openness should be translated as a legal basis that must be carried out and has consequences, whether the law cannot be ratified or legally canceled because this is related to the concept of people's sovereignty. as well as the parliament, which is the people's representative institution, the most basic function of the parliament is the representation of representation itself. Representative institutions without representation are meaningless (Ayus, 2021, p. 48).

Public participation is generally understood as a series of activities in the form of demands or "resistance" against a policy that is carried out in a systematic and organized manner. The aim is to influence policy formation by the community's will. So legislators should encourage broad transparency to the community; this is related to the consideration of letter b of Law no. 14 of 2008 concerning Public Openness states that the right to obtain information is a human right and the disclosure of public information is one of the essential characteristics of a democratic country that upholds the sovereignty of the people to realize good state administration. With openness, the community can take part in the process of participation in the formation of legislation.

In addition, the active role of legislators in capturing people's aspirations is vital. This is done to reduce the possibility of the interests of institutions and groups contaminating the law. Public participation ensures that the resulting laws are not drawn up only by a political elite. A legislature parliament has a better chance of gaining strong upstream legitimacy than a committee of experts. However, parliament is vulnerable because it can be interfered with by the interests of political parties and the interests of the parliament itself (Luthf, 2015, p. 192). Thus, public participation should be understood as a necessity.

The use of technology is also essential in the process of forming laws and regulations to implement public participation. The majority of countries in Europe consider technology and information as supporting variables for *good regulation*. These benefits include:
1. The number of managed regulations is extensive across fields and institutions, thus requiring technical support to update and retrieve regulatory data. Complex regulations can be implemented with the help of ICT
2. Technology is beneficial for developing online public consultations through discussion forums and access to information, including information on law-making. (This is very useful, like during a Pandemic where access to gatherings is minimal)

3. Electronic consultation can be developed by establishing a website portal to support the government and parliament in opening interactive services to support the decision-making process for forming laws.

By understanding this public participation, inevitably, the content material is only intended for the benefit of the people. Misappropriation of the material content intended for the benefit of the people means denying the nature of the existence of a law in society. In turn, enacting laws that do not support the public interest will be dangerous for the sustainability of the wider society. That is why the blessing community participates in forming laws and regulations (Riskiyono, 2017, p. 40).

CONCLUSION

Law Number 12 of 2011, as amended in Law Number 15 of 2019 concerning the Formation of Legislation, has guaranteed public participation in its formation. However, this participation does not explain further the mechanism for accommodating community involvement and input, so many laws and regulations are made and ignore public participation, which makes Indonesia's democracy index decline.

The absence of legal consequences due to the lack of transparency and participation makes legislators increasingly arrogant in carrying out their duties to form laws and regulations. In popular sovereignty theory, public involvement is one of the rights guaranteed in the constitution and is related to human rights. Thus, legislators should not pursue the quantity of legislation but the quality of the law itself. Therefore, public participation should be translated as a necessity for state administration, including in forming the legislation. The process not only includes text in the articles of legislation but also involves the public and accommodates their interests.

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INTERSECTIONALITY OF POLITICS AND RELIGION IN GLOBAL POPULISM TOWARDS COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSES

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ABSTRACT

COVID-19 has forced all countries to implement various policies to reduce the number of spreads. The biggest challenges in handling the pandemic mostly come from the public's perception towards COVID-19, which follows the same pattern or is strongly influenced by political views and religious beliefs, where both meet in a populist trend. A rife outbreak of populism had colored the world even before the pandemic. Presidential elections in the US, Brexit in Europe, and the presidential election in Indonesia have become a battleground for populist views that have created such polarization. The polarization hinders most of the implementation of government policies and has also affected the handling of the pandemic. Besides that, the existing polarization in society has been aggravated by the growing distortion and misinformation regarding COVID-19. Even when, scientifically, the COVID-19 vaccine can be made and distributed. Conspiracy theories with political and religious backgrounds are the most widely used basis for doubts about the reality and handling of COVID itself. Even worse, various groups do not believe in COVID-19 or refuse vaccines, even in high-literacy countries. This paper will examine the importance of religious leaders' views in mitigating the effect of global populism, which has been a real challenge for COVID-19 handling and policy.

Keywords: Anti-Vaccine, COVID-19, Global Populism, Politics and Religion, Pandemic Responses.

INTRODUCTION

Before the popularity of COVID-19, populism had appeared as one of the appealing global issues. Especially when former United States (US) President Donald Trump and the British Exit (Brexit) rose due to populist revolts in significant constituencies. During the current era of global populism, religion is used as a substantial component of the populist brings in such issues. According to Yilmaz and Morieson (2021), states such as India, Indonesia, and even the US, commonly use religion, language, and concepts to enlarge their political identities and stimulate public support. The interpretation of populism is usually divided into various forms,

such as right-wing, nativist, left-wing, nationalist, and civilizations populism. In typical cases, the relationship between religion to right-wing populism has proven particularly potent. Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity have been commandeered by right-wing populist leaders and parties, most often in the service of a populist program in which religion helps to define a 'virtuous community, a community that can then be mobilized against 'elites' and 'others' who are categorized as a threat to this community. Significantly, while right-wing populism is generally nationalist in orientation, the addition of religion allows populists to define the virtuous community in religion-based civilizational terms. Brubaker (2017) argued that by constructing 'the opposition between self and other not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms, right-wing populists had created religious populisms defined by major world religions, which they can wield against religious minorities within their nations.

Global Populism

Benjamin Moffit mapped out four approaches to understanding populism in various contemporary studies, namely populism as an ideology, strategy, discourse, or political logic. Moffit himself formulated a populist approach as a political style. Stanley (2017) also seems to have a similar view of populism as a political strategy that works both in forming ideational views and certain socio-cultural positions that influence the formation of discourses, opinions, or even definite patterns of action that are the goals of the strategy. Moffit and Stanley also considered that global information and communication technology plays a significant role in the populist approach. Even when domestic political contestation is the aim of those strategies, a discourse will have more effects when it rises as global discourse. Besides that, populist political strategies in one country are also possible and paradoxically almost immediately imitated and reproduced in other countries. This phenomenon has prompted a new characteristic of the populist movement as a global phenomenon.

The essence of populism is often confused with the quintessence of democracy, namely, the people's voice. It is said that both populists and supporters of democracy usually focus on strengthening people's voices and that populism is also considered a bad democratic practice (bad democracy) (Espejo, 2017). The long debate between good and bad democracy has led to many dilemmas and controversies because, in a democracy, the voice of the people is the voice of God. When people elect a leader or a policy considered flawed, is it immediately a result of a populist strategy, or do other aspects exist that may not be entirely related to populism? This question is often used as a shield for populists to ward off criticism, denying the people's choice and the democratic process. In this context, populism encourages democracy to reformulate its arguments. One of them is by reviewing the vulnerability of the democratic process to populism because it often emphasizes procedural democracy rather than substantial. In Indonesia, for example, the era of the New Order

continued to claim that the general election, or political process in general, was organized democratically. Democracy places the people as the primary goal, while populism turns people into the means to achieve the goal. Global populism is a challenge to maintain democracy in a substantial context.

Another challenge is regarding the characteristics of the people themselves. Redefining the people's voice is also very complex because the people have different views about their position in the democratic process. In global populism, the affirmation of this position is also influenced by preferences formed through preferences for information obtained from both social media and other media in digital form, which often contains distortion and disinformation. The flood of information does not necessarily encourage most people to make a healthy and balanced choice, but rather to make a choice based on personal preferences that are prone to receiving less balanced information. Then, these characteristics are used by populists to carry out their strategy.

In carrying out its strategy, populism approaches various aspects which can encourage people to make such views an inseparable part of individual "free" choices and "in accordance" with their worldview, ideology, and even religion. In this context, the intersectionality of politics, religion, social, and culture becomes unavoidable. This phenomenon possibly happens through massive information technology but can still be personalized, as in the case of Cambridge Analytica. The "adjustment" of strategic issues with religious views is widely used and seems effective. In the right way, it can encourage people to believe that their choices have a double value, namely to benefit the world's life and become their religious devotion. For example, the European anti-migrant wave is also widely associated with religious views. In addition, the anti-vaccine perspective also comes from religious groups using the doctrines they believe are related to the dangers of vaccines. In the next section, we will discuss populism and religion in more detail.

Religion and Populism

Religion has re-emerged over the past three decades as a critical calculation in residential and universal legislative issues, to the shock of numerous researchers. The noticeable developing quality of religion in legislative issues is clear in populist talk overwhelming political life worldwide. Hence, to uncover the exceptional nature of the relationship between religion and legislative issues within the 21st century, it is better to encourage inquiry about the marvel through the focal points of populism. Religion—in its different forms—is giving prolific ground not as it were in building a responsive audience—" the unadulterated people" of populists—but moreover provides significant and exceedingly important materials which help populists make "us" versus "them" polarities, and in sustaining these divisive doubles (DeHanas and Shterin, 2018).

Populism, by its exceptional nature, joins itself to "thick" philosophies. In this respect, especially for right-wing populism, religion(s) rises as an irreplaceable have, which is obvious in right-wing populism's approach to the issue of sex (Stanley, 2017). This connecting populism to religion makes a difference populists turn religion into an instrument of control combination inside social orders in which religion plays a vital social part. In connection to this, Case's examination of participation between previous US President Donald Trump and a few driving devout figures from the sexual orientation point of view is very illustrative. Past this, populism's Manichean character, or its division of the world into categories of "good" and "evil," imitates fundamentalist religion. Manichean here alludes to the old religion known as Manichaeism and named after its author, the prophet Mani, which is "traditionally characterized as having instructed an expound myth portraying an infinite war between two co-eternal powers of light and darkness." Whereas the natural religion cannot be decreased to this myth, the term "Manichean" is frequently utilized to depict devout and mainstream belief systems which represent the world in basic, dualistic terms, particularly in terms of a fight between tremendous and fiendish or us vs. them (DeHanas & Shterin, 2018; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2021).

However, populism, indeed when not connected to a religion, may act as a kind of common confidence insofar because it sacralizes "the people," raising them over the "evil" and degenerate elites and other populists charge with being "enemies of the people." A populist pioneer may be recognized or depicted as a messianic figure or guardian angel. Similarly, populism may join itself only to one perspective of religion: devout personality. Populism may subsequently end up identitarian and put individuals in categories of "good" and "evil" based on their devout recognizable proof (as contradicted to their genuine devout convictions and hones). The devout character can be valuable, as we might see, indeed, to common populists since stripped of all otherworldly and moral lessons; religion holds the control to characterize people groups, societies, values, and—important to identarian populists—civilizations. Furthermore, these things, much more than "faith" and ethics, are imperative to populist lawmakers.

In line with the slant towards a more insightful examination of religion and legislative issues, researchers have started to look at the relationship between religion and populism, having recognized the last mentioned to be a developing marvel progressively vital within the Americas and Europe and one maybe with joins to religion in its distinctive shapes. Be that as it may, advance investigate is required to refine and elucidate the relationship between populism and religion, particularly past the religion and populist radical right parties of Western Europe, which have so distant been the most objects to think about. Numerous of these works are undoubtedly centered on Europe and the "identitarian" perspective of religion in right-wing populist developments (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2021). The need for grants on non-Western devout populism is disastrous and nearly mystifying when we consider how

far-reaching the marvel has become. For illustration, Indian Prime Serve Narendra Modi's Hindutva story, Pakistan's Prime Serve Imran Khan's Riyasat-e-Medina, and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan's Islamist talk and fashion are all sorts of religion-based populist offers. This is often differentiated from Western Europe, where the lion's share of right-wing populist developments utilizes minor devout character, instead of religious conviction and hones, as an identifier of "the unadulterated people." It is additionally shocking that more researchers have fizzled to take note of how populism acts as a surrogate religion, sacralizing "the people," making sacred the people's will, and promising "salvation" to a country in case they choose a specific populist pioneer or party into government (DeHanas & Shterin, 2018).

METHODS

In this research, we argue that qualitative interpretive research will suit this research's final goals. According to Elliot and Timulak (2005), qualitative interpretive research emphasizes understanding the issue or phenomena in their own right without outside perspectives. This research also aims to understand why a phenomenon came with and how it unfolds over time. Accordingly, this research will use the secondary data collection technique, which gathers data from online sources, such as news, press releases, and online public video. We will interpret the data linked with a relevant theory to validate the relevancy of the data and ensure that the data is correlated with the bringing context, which is global populism and its relations with politics and religion.

ANALYSIS

COVID-19 amid Global Populism

Populism itself is not a new phenomenon, but many circles, including academics, see that currently, especially during the last decade, the world community lives in a time when populism has grown so broadly, intensively, and massively. Symptoms of populism mainly appear with two paradoxical characteristics, namely, on the one hand, strengthening through the democratic process; on the other hand, in line with criticisms of the effectiveness of democracy in dealing with various public problems, both in economic, political, and social issues, among the various events that show symptoms of the rise of populism on a global scale occurring in countries that are considered the mecca of democracy, namely the US and the European Union countries. The victory of Donald Trump and the various controversies equipped with it is proof of the strengthening of the populist movement. It shows that populists can win political contestations in the US and several other countries. Britain's exit from the European Union, also known as Brexit, is also suspected to be related to the strong influence of populism, which has pushed more British public to choose to leave the

European Union. Big countries in Asia and Latin America, such as India and Brazil, are also affected by the strengthening of populism. Not only from their internal countries but also from the populist movement from all over the world.

The emergence of COVID-19 has also immediately become a populist political commodity in various countries. President Trump used jargon, such as the Wuhan Virus, to strengthen public support for political and economic competition with the PRC, which later gave rise to Asian Hate in the US. Brazilian President Bolsorano joined the demonstration with opponents of the movement restriction policy in the early days of Covid-19 in Brazil, which sparked tensions with his cabinet. In the Philippines, President Duterte has instead used his populist power to threaten opponents of the COVID-19 mitigation policy. Indian PM, Narendra Modi, was initially able to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the first wave and become one of the centers for vaccine production in Asia apart from China and strengthen public support for India.

Populism is thick in discourse that involves public discussion in various countries regarding the name of the virus and its variants, for example, the Wuhan virus, China virus, English variant, and Indian variant. There is also a war of opinion about the effectiveness of vaccines. It is said that vaccine is no longer in the realm of researchers or the medical world, but the general public also contains a preference for which country the vaccine is made. This discourse is also used by anti-vaccine groups to devise strategies and potentially influence more people to refuse the vaccine.

Another symptom of populism that occurred during the COVID-19 outbreak is the return of the country's tendency to prioritize only domestic needs in vaccine supply. Public support has been strong for their government at the domestic level, which has been criticized internationally for having an abundant supply and not sharing it adequately with other countries in need. This is worrying because vaccines ideally must be used as a tool for political bargaining and hegemony domestically and internationally.

At the international organization level, doubts about the WHO's competence in managing cooperation between countries and other parties in dealing with pandemics appeared. It mainly talks about the obstacle to compliance with the same standard of care and the fair distribution of vaccines. This doubt is also one of the arguments used by populist groups, one of which is by proponents of conspiracy theories, who consider the WHO and other international organizations to be part of a global elite that wants to target groups that are considered a threat.

At the individual level, Stanley (2017) stated that the success of populism, among others, is the ability to unite populist issues with the ideational structure of society, which in turn to a motivation for action which shows how strongly the problem is embedded in one's ideas. This statement can be seen from the rise of the powerful polarity of public opinion. In the last decade, the public has been affiliated

with certain socio-political choices such as pro/anti-Trump, pro/anti-Brexit, pro/anti-immigrant, and others. In such situations when COVID-19 hit, it can be seen how public opinion was immediately divided along with heated debates, especially at first those who believed and did not believe in COVID-19, pro/anti-vaccine. Because each of these beliefs is ideologically entrenched, it is arduous to change their views. This is a significant challenge for handling and mitigating COVID-19 in various countries. It is even worse for countries that have previously been hit by polarity in political views. In the United States, anti-vaccine groups are also the majority of groups who dislike President Biden's leadership.

Religious issues in the war of political opinion have resurfaced in the opinion war against COVID-19 and its vaccine. These issues are mainly operationalized through hoax news and responses to news stories containing information on the COVID-19 treatment or vaccine failure. This situation is even more difficult because many religious figures support and even participate in spreading disinformation related to COVID-19 and vaccines. Similar figures also have experience winning public opinion in political contestations using populist strategies. In this context, the world is not only facing COVID-19 but also facing a war of opinion that is hampering the handling of the pandemic. In Indonesia, one of the community's actions that reflects this is the belief that health facilities have infected many people. This is the reason for forcibly taking patients or their family's bodies because they want to be buried according to religious law and not through the COVID-19 protocol. In the US, the anti-vaccines gave the example of Jesus, who was never vaccinated. In Indonesia, religious figures also conveyed the example of the Prophet Muhammad. Although many people criticized and straightened the facts, not a few people also believed the news because religious leaders said it.

COVID-19 and Global Religious Leader's Response

As the emergence of COVID-19 has risen, the political and religious leaders have given clear responses regarding how they see COVID-19 as a human threat, especially regarding the change that must be applied to the practice of religious activities, such as praying and big day celebrations. Since the first time COVID-19 was announced as a global pandemic in March 2020, various political and religious leaders have shown different responses. They are indirectly making some patterns of their view regarding COVID-19. The discussions on the opinions of religious leaders or religious institutions on global populism are essential for understanding global populism during the pandemic because even though some of the responses support the government's prompt and appropriate policies and actions related to handling COVID-19. Precisely at the grassroots level, there are still many denials regarding the existence of a pandemic, with arguments for religious beliefs or beliefs. This is illustrated by various posts uploaded by the public on social media.

The response we adapted from several secondary sources shows the generalization of the response of each religion. We divide the response period into three types: December 2019 to June 2020, July 2020 to December 2020, and from early January to the middle of 2021, July. We mainly use this because some turning points made these periods necessary. The first period is taken from the first six months of cases spreading, where the public (including) religious leaders have not received definite information (still monitoring) on the development of the COVID-19 virus. This can also be seen in many countries' policies, which can be pretty chaotic, and there has been no initiation to make vaccines (Novelli et al., 2020; Wu, Chen, & Chan, 2020). The next period is taken six months later, generally marked by the initiative of major countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Russian Federation, to investigate the virus's origin. This also raises a slight suspicion towards China, as the country is suspected to be the origin of the virus. In this period, religious leaders began to respond, although only religious leaders from major religions, such as Islam, Christianity, and Catholicism. Major policies, such as implementing the Hajj for Muslims and Christmas celebrations, usually centered in the Vatican, have been stopped due to the virus outbreak (Aljazeera, 2021; Syakriah, 2020). And in the third period, which started in 2021, minority religious leaders or branched religions began to give their views on COVID-19. Not so many, but quite controversial, especially religious groups driven by political motives, such as Evangelical Christians in the United States (Lovett, 2021).

First Period of COVID-19 Outbreak (December 2019 until June 2020)

We argue that in this period, the religious leaders still prioritized faith's power as the cure for facing COVID-19. For Islam, especially in dominant countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia, COVID-19 is perceived as a warning from Allah SWT (The Almighty God) for human stinginess towards the universe. This can be shown from interviews and articles by numerous Islamic religious leaders, such as Abdullah Gymnastiar in Indonesia, Khalid Latif in the USA (Newshour, 2020), and Sheikh Ibrahim Lathome in Kenya. Eventually, there has no objection to the government's regulation. However, in this period, most of the Mosques, especially in Asia and Africa, were still open for having a significant number of religious practices, for example, Friday prayer.

On the other hand, Christians and Catholics (especially in dominant countries in Europe and most of Latin America) responded similarly to Islam. If talking philosophically, COVID-19 can be translated as Jesus' punishment for humans who are ignorant about nature and are far from worshiping Him. In the first period of the COVID-19 outbreak, most churches are still open, even in minority countries, such as Indonesia (Syakriah, 2020). There is no particular restriction to praying, but it also does not reject the existence of COVID-19.

There was no further response regarding this matter for other religions, such as Hindus, Buddhists, and Judaism. Some countries with these religions' membership, such as India, China, Thailand, and even Israel, had not calculated as countries with big cases. Besides that, other religions and beliefs (not categorized from the major religions) also gave no response regarding the emergence of COVID-19 and religious practices. According to WHO (2020), the number of COVID-19 infections in remote (indigenous) areas is undetected, reaching only 0.2% of the total cases worldwide. Overall, it shows that in the first period of the COVID-19 outbreak, religion's use as a tool for spreading populism has not been raised seriously. Indeed, all the countries were focused on handling such emerging and unexpected pandemic attacks.

Second Period (July to December 2020)

In the second period, we recorded more than 124,000 news regarding religion's role in COVID-19 awareness. This is interesting since this phenomenon is coming together with other political events, such as the US election, the official statement of Brexit, some controversial European leaders' policies towards non-Europeans, and so on. Even tragedies, such as civil war and border disputes, appeared from mid to the end of 2020. This cannot be a basic assumption for us, but it is always a possible reason populism brings religion as a tool for catching the public's attention. For Islam (especially in dominant countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, most Muslim-dominated countries practice "trust in the leader" like they understand the existence of a caliph (Khalifah) on earth. This means what the religion decides for the ummah. Therefore the ummah must follow them.

The pattern is also applied to Christians and Catholics (especially in dominant countries in Europe and much of Latin America). Unlike Latin America, most European countries did not consider religion in public policy. In most news, no other sources called European populism have a religious basis. In contrast, only the Vatican officially announced its empathy for the COVID-19 cases and sent its support for the government to set the best policy to eradicate the instances.

The interesting response came from Hinduism (especially in Indonesia and dominant countries like India). We assume that the presence of COVID-19 must be responded to with practices to bring God's blessings. As in India, the practice of bathing together and covering the body with cow dung (2020) was chosen as an effort to bring God's help. This has led to a spike in cases in India. This misunderstanding implies that religious leaders have a significant effect on their people. Even in India, this assumption could not help the political leader, Narendra Modi, make rational assumptions in making policy, as it has been known that PM Modi is a devout Hindu. For other religions, such as Judaism and Buddhism, there had no apparent response regarding how COVID-19 relates to or affects their practice of religion.

Newest Adaptation (January to July 2021)

In 2021, COVID-19 was not new for everyone, even religious leaders. Most people have been tired of the situation, many policies have been applied, and the vaccine initiative has been started. Therefore, for some people, the discourse of anti-vaccine, anti-COVID-19, and even anti-government has risen as a response to the unclear information regarding the future forecasting of the cases. Islam still sees COVID-19 as a form of warning from Allah SWT, but what is good here is faith that following the orders of a good leader means following the commands of Allah SWT. Only several minor extremists and unknown Islamic movements do not consider COVID-19 as a human threat.

Christians and Catholics (especially in dominant countries in Europe and most of Latin America) are more cooperative, evidenced by several virtual dialogues held by priests around the world. Likewise, Pope Francis has stated firmly for Catholics to get closer to God and limit the direct religious practice. In contrast to the United States, which tends to be dominated by evangelical Christians who believe COVID-19 is part of an evil demon approaching the earth. Hence, other religions show a similar pattern as the previous period. The open sources also support this fact showed by the majority, Islam, Catholics, and Christians, to give clear rules to their followers.

Those familiar statements are not applied to some small religious communities, which tend to be more respectful to their religious leaders. For example, in Indonesia, the community of Front Pembela Islam (FPI) prefers to follow their leader, Rizieq Shihab, for not taking some government protocols (read: wearing masks, limiting mobilization, etc.) (Oktaviani, 2021). This phenomenon is also applied to some Evangelical Christian leaders in the United States (especially in the era of President Donald Trump). They opposed government regulations, although the US tended to be not that serious in handling COVID-19 before Biden's administration. In England or the United Kingdom, people follow the Queen (Elizabeth II) to show their respect and indirectly signal the kingdom to be more considerate to the people (especially after Brexit). In Africa, big religions, such as Islam and Christianity, cooperate more with the United Nations organization. Once in October 2020, the UN initiated a COVID-19 protection project with religious leaders to persuade people to wear masks, wash their hands, and apply social distancing (WHO, 2020). At this moment, these facts are taken from various sources, potentially implying political bias and some unknown agendas.

CONCLUSION

Thus, the role of religious leaders becomes very major in overcoming challenges and obstacles motivated by religious views. This role is not only limited to rhetorical actions but also concrete actions, which can appear as good examples and inspire those who previously doubted or did not believe in COVID-19 and vaccines. In addition, strategic efforts are needed to counter the populist strategy. Social media is a crucial battlefield; apart from associations/congregations to which the community is affiliated, religious leaders also use it to express support for the world of science during this pandemic because religion and science are often placed side to side.

Furthermore, populism, both before and after the pandemic, shows a wedge between politics and religion. In the context of religious populism, both have long been connected as media in building a political support base. In global populism, this is reflected in discourses at the elite and public levels. Does that mean the slice should be removed? Of course, the intersectionality of politics and religion is required at a certain level with a certain balance.

In a healthy democracy, being someone who has faith is a right that the state must protect. But, of course, without sacrificing other rights, including the right to access health care and others. Religious leaders must understand, and further show their followers that the policy for handling COVID-19 and the vaccination program do not conflict with religious values, which are needed to maintain life.

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PROBLEMS OF POLICY GAP IN LESS MITIGATION OF FACING COVID-19: LESSON FROM BANGKALAN REGENCY

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to identify the weak mitigation policy in response to the increasing case number of Covid-19 and elaborate on why the lack of crisis among community members in Bangkalan Regency occurred. The local government is trying to suppress the growing number of Covid-19 in Bangkalan Regency by restricting mobility during Eid al-Fitr and cooperating with the Surabaya City government and East Java province authority to provide a proper healthcare system. As the Bangkalan regency failed to deal with the crisis, the Surabaya city government responded to the emergency with a social restriction policy on the Suramadu bridge, which ended with rejection from the Madurese community. This study uses the interpretive approach and narrative analysis techniques. The article fully uses secondary data from credible mass media and official documents related to handling Covid-19 in Bangkalan Regency from April-June 2021. The concept of policy gap is used as an instrument to analyze the factors that caused the policy failure in the community in the Bangkalan Regency Government regarding Covid-19 mitigation. The result shows the political policy gap, which makes both policies ineffective, and the cultural policy gap.

Keywords: local government, policy gap, Covid-19, mitigation, pandemic

INTRODUCTION

This article elaborates on the weakness of the policies carried out by the Bangkalan Regency and Surabaya City Governments in handling the increasing number of Covid-19 cases in Madura. Based on data from the East Java Provincial Government, Wednesday (22/6), positive cases of Covid-19 in Bangkalan Regency reached 3,024 cases. While the active cases reached 969, the cases died 297 and recovered 1,758 cases. The death rate in Bangkalan is also relatively high, recorded at around 9.82%. Pusparisa (2021) explained that the increase in Covid-19 cases in Bangkalan was triggered by the movement of people who continued to travel back and forth and the return of migrant workers from abroad to celebrate the Eid holiday at home. In addition, many people still think they are immune from exposure to Covid-19 and ignore health protocols when they leave the house, which is the main trigger for the soaring Covid-19 case in Bangkalan (Salman & Muchlis, 2021). Similar problems

also occurred in Kudus Regency, which experienced the most significant addition of issues in Indonesia within three weeks after the Eid holiday, with an increase of 7.594% because people kept carrying *anjangsana* and the *kupatan*[1] tradition without health protocols (Pinandhita, 2021; Nafian, 2021). Similar to what happened in Sleman Regency, where the people of Degolan and Nglempong hamlets continue to carry out the tradition of *anjangsana*, thus contributing 52 positive cases in the DI Yogyakarta province (CNN Indonesia, 2021a).

In response to the crisis, the Bangkalan Regency Government is trying to reduce the number of Covid-19 cases by collaborating with the East Java Provincial Government and the Surabaya City Government. After placing the background, this article seeks to identify a policy gap for handling the Covid-19 crisis in Bangkalan involving the local government (Bangkalan District Government, Surabaya City Government, and East Java Provincial Government) in April-June 2021. The data we collected ranged from April 2021-June 2021. Using the narrative analysis method, this paper uses secondary data from online media, official government publications, and reports from research institutions regarding the Covid-19 handling policy in Bangkalan and its impact on the Surabaya city government as the basis for the findings.

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSES TO COVID-19: LITERATURE REVIEW

The socio-political changes caused by the pandemic prompted the emergence of contemporary studies in the disciplines of political science and public policy to analyze the efforts and obstacles experienced by the government and other stakeholders in controlling the rate of spread of Covid-19. Capano et al. (2020) compare the response of the central government in 10 countries and what factors characterize each country's policies in tackling the pandemic's impact. China, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Israel, Turkey, and Canada successfully minimize the pandemic risk because they have experience dealing with political and endemic crises.

Meanwhile, America, Sweden, and Italy suffered from poor policy outcomes. Efforts to control the pandemic in America are hampered by the form of a federal state that makes health policies between the central government and federal states become out of sync. Meanwhile, Sweden, which has an excellent public health system, is powerless to face the increase in the positive number of Covid-19 because the central government tends to let the local government and healthcare centers at the local level take the initiative in fighting the pandemic. Italy's inexperience in dealing with crises caused by disease epidemics, with weak health emergency policies and an inadequate public health system, resulted in the most deaths in Europe and economic losses.

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[1] Tradition which held on the seventh day after Eid al-Fitr by opening houses in order to be visited by the neighbors, relatives, or guests.

Djalante et al. (2020) found that the Indonesia Ministry of Health has received harsh criticism for ignoring the recommendations of experts from within and outside the country to increase testing capacity and provide the availability of healthcare facilities. In addition to the lack of leadership in taking preventive steps, the article also reveals that this crisis has exposed the imbalance in health infrastructure between the national and regional levels. Notably, there are only 48 laboratories throughout Indonesia that can diagnose Covid-19. Roziqin et al. (2021) examine that due to miscommunication at the level of government agencies, partial lockdown policy through PSBB (*Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar*, large-scale social restriction) had not been effective in reducing the number of positive patients or reducing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19. Contradictory statements between one institution and another often make it difficult for the public to determine which information is credible to follow.

The problem of policy communication between the central government and local governments was also discussed by Putranto and Emilia (2020). Both stated that when a crisis occurs, policy reasoning tends to be polarized into one of the following two models: centralization of state power that assumes the need for a hegemonic leadership that prioritizes common interest *vis a vis* the arguments of democracy and decentralization, which claim that the deliberative process will better accommodate different regional problems (Zizek in Putranto and Emilia, 2020). All the previous literature inspired this article to contribute to enriching research on policy gaps in dealing with the crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic involving three local government entities, namely the Bangkalan district government, the Surabaya City government, and East Java Provincial government.

POLICY GAP AS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This article uses the concept of policy gap as a framework for understanding the lack of policies to deal with the pandemic in Bangkalan Regency and the chaos synchronization coordination with the city government of Surabaya. Foxell and Cooper (2015) moved from an understanding that political intervention led to the policy gap between public policy planning purposes with the outcome of public policy in the field. At least there are eight forms of political intervention that contribute to policy failure, namely:
1. Overcalling: Ignoring the limit of resources.
2. Impatience: Governments tend to rush in implementing policies.
3. Rotation of the regime.
4. Distraction and noise: Political officials often use policy for short-term goals, namely gaining constituents.
5. Temporal misalignment: Short-term oriented policy.
6. Neglect and decay: Policymakers often fail to see the impact and connectivity of a policy with other issues.

7. Multiple jurisdictions: The overlapping authority between institutions or levels causes policies.
8. Events: Budget constraints or the lack of experts.

Despite agreeing to use the policy gap conceptualization initiated by Foxell and Cooper (2015) as a framework, we argue that the cultural dimension at the community level also plays a vital role in widening the policy gap. It is necessary to deeply understand a specific community's cultural and social context to achieve policy goals (Demaio, 2011). Based on this explanation, this article typifies two policy gaps: political and cultural policy gaps. The following discussion will describe the policy gap that occurred in the weakness of the two policies for handling the pandemic in Bangkalan.

POLITICAL POLICY GAP: LOCAL GOVERNMENT DISPUTE IN THE BAN ON *MUDIK* (HOMECOMING) POLICY

This article elaborates on the weakness of the policies carried out by the BangkalaThis section finds two policy gaps in the Bangkalan case: the inability to maintain the impact of specific policy implementation (neglect and decay) and overlapping authorities (multiple jurisdictions). Before the celebration of Eid which falls on May 15, 2021, both the provincial and Bangkalan government issued a state of alert following the decree of the Minister of Transport No. 13 of 2021, which restricts mobility from 6-17 May 2021 to prevent Covid-19 transmission (Bangkalan District Government, 2021a). However, there was misinformation spread among the Bangkalan locals that the government allowed them to come homecoming.

Through an official statement to the media on April 16, 2021, the Department of Transportation of East Java clarified that such information is untrue. Mobility during the Eid holiday only allowed for 'essential sectors,' such as business trips, medical treatment, and logistical transport (CNN Indonesia, 2021b). Furthermore, the head of the East Java Provincial Transport Department stated that in addition to referring to the Minister of Transportation decree, the public should pay attention to the health ministry circulars and Covid Task Force-19, which became the basis for the provincial government to ban back and forth on May 6-17, 2021 (Ginanjar, 2021). Following up on the provisions of the central and provincial governments, the district government, through the Bangkalan Regency Transportation Service, stated that it would implement a policy of prohibiting going home on the specified date in order to suppress the spread of Covid-19 in the area (Bangkalan Regency Government, 2021a).

Ironically, an ambiguous official statement from Bangkalan head of the district transportation office's traffic division on April 21, 2021, opened up opportunities for travelers to circumvent the provisions for the homecoming ban, *"For example, returning before that date* [May 6-17]*, it is permissible because the ban is only on May 6 to 17, 2021"* (Arfa, 2021). By April 26, 2021, Bangkalan had obtained a yellow zone status with details of four positive patients being treated at the Syamrabu Hospital and nine other patients self-isolating at their respective homes (Faisol, 2021a). Responding

to the status, Bangkalan police stated that they would impose insulation at the entrance of the Suramadu Bridge and Kamal Port in Bangkalan. Although the partition was initially set to take effect on May 22, 2021, with a force of 207 security personnel, until May 26, 2021, the Bangkalan police have not been able to carry out the isolation because they still have to wait for instructions from the East Java Regional Police (Faikli, 2021; Zamachsari, 2021a).

The gap for the entry of homecomers re-emerged when the Bangkalan police chief stated that, referring to the categorization of the National Disaster Management Agency, on Eid al-Fitr, only residents from Surabaya, Sidoarjo, and Gresik were allowed to enter Bangkalan (Faisol, 2021a). Data shows that on May 2, 2021, a wave of homecomers will return, dominated by two-wheeled vehicle drivers from Surabaya to various districts on Madura Island, including Bangkalan, via the Suramadu Bridge. Since Friday, April 30, 2021, 65 registered Indonesian migrant workers have arrived in Bangkalan for Eid in his hometown. As many as 75 others will follow to arrive on Monday, May 3, 2021 (Zamachsari, 2021b). The partition policy was entirely held on May 6-17, 2021. The joint apparatus deployed 552 security personnel who were divided into four security posts at the entrance to the Suramadu Bridge, Kamal Port, Blega District, and Tanjung Bumi District, plus two monitoring posts at the Tanah Merah market and the Sinjay Restaurant in Burneh (Bangkalan District Government, 2021b).

However, the imposition of the ban on going home on May 6-17 did not dampen the interest of the people of Bangkalan to return to their hometowns. This is coupled with the fact that inspections that target four-wheeled vehicle users make it easier for two-wheeled travelers to Bangkalan to cross the Suramadu Bridge (Faizal, 2021; Faisol, 2021b). In fact, on the first day of the lockdown, some travelers to Bangkalan were determined to use motorboats to cross the Madura Strait at a rate of Rp. 200,000 to Rp. Four hundred thousand to avoid scrutiny (Prabowo, 2021). This article identified two policy gaps at the provincial and district government levels through narrative analysis.

First, neglect and decay. Inconsistency is increasingly visible at the district level when the attitude of public officials seems not to be committed to the aim of preventing the pandemic, such as the head of the Bangkalan transportation service who does not take seriously with travelers from Gresik, Surabaya, and Sidoarjo going to Bangkalan before May 6, 2021, as well as loose supervision for two-wheeled drivers. In the case of the ban on going home in Bangkalan, both the provincial and district governments, instead of exercising discretion by taking preventive action, both chose to let travelers who come to Bangkalan before May 6, 2021. Consequently, neglect and decay then occur. Two weeks after Eid al-Fitr, Bangkalan Regency, which was initially a yellow zone, became a red zone as of 8 June 2021, with details of the spike in active cases increasing by 1.362% (190 cases), the death rate increasing by 12% (188 cases), and approximately 24 new cases per day per week (Jayani, 2021).

Another severe impact as a result of the omission is the burden of the collapse of the availability of health facilities in Bangkalan as of June 8, 2021, with details of 3 health workers have died and 76 others tested positive, so the emergency room at the Rato Ebu Hospital and two puskesmas in Arosbaya and Tongguh have to be temporarily closed so that patients have to be hospitalized referred to outside the region, one of which is Surabaya (Jayani, 2021). Through executive order, the East Java Provincial Health Office requested six hospitals in Surabaya to receive referrals for Covid-19 patients from Bangkalan (Liputan6.com, 2021). The decision then has consequences for the Surabaya local government, namely an increase in the bed occupancy rate in Surabaya from the previous 21% spike to 53% as of June 13, 2021, due to receiving referrals from Bangkalan (Widiyana, 2021).

The second gap is multiple jurisdictions. The overlapping authority appears when the Bangkalan police, even though they are supported by sufficient personnel, cannot optimally take action in response to the large number of travelers who take the opportunity before the imposition of the homecoming ban because they have to wait for the police authorities at the provincial level to give instructions. In the case of the Bangkalan transportation agency, it is also unable to act to determine the blocking points because this is the authority of the police. The distribution of authority for implementing policies that are not adaptive to the local context also has an impact on not achieving the policy objectives in breaking the Covid-19 chain in Bangkalan, which was brought through the flow of homecomers and migrant workers so that it later transformed into a Covid-19 spike in the district. The following section will analyze the impact of the Suramadu Bridge blocking policy.

MASS PROTEST AGAINST BAN ON *MUDIK* POLICY

In response to the Covid-19 crisis in Bangkalan after the Eid al-Fitr commemoration, Surabaya City Government immediately constructed a checkpoint at the exit gate of Suramadu Bridge. Roosa (2021) reports that this blocking ensures that drivers entering the city of Surabaya are truly Covid-19 negative. The swab test was carried out at the Suramadu Bridge and the Ujung-Kamal Ferry Pier. The blockage is carried out for approximately 12 days, starting from June 6, 2021. The decision is a follow-up to the result of a joint agreement in the East Java Forkopimda coordination meeting between the Surabaya City Government and the Bangkalan Regency Government, which will take place on 6 June 2021. Eri Cahyadi, as Mayor of Surabaya, took this step to minimize residents' mobility, especially from Bangkalan, which has a red zone status, so that there is no spread of active cases of Covid-19 in the Surabaya area.

The public's rejection of the isolation post policy on the Surabaya side erupted on the morning of June 18, when dozens of drivers from the Madura side who were about to go to work in Surabaya damaged the administration desk containing stacks of antigen test files because they thought the picket officers were lame so that the driver's ID cards were lost (Faizal, 2021b). Responding to the incident, Fathur Rozi Zubair, a

charismatic Bangkalan cleric, regretted the action and tried to convince the public that the isolation post was not discrimination against Madurese residents but a joint effort to suppress the pandemic both in Bangkalan and Surabaya. (Yohanes, 2021). Furthermore, Zubair also asked the authorities to scrutinize the isolation post.

However, a mass organization such as GAS Jatim considered this policy discriminatory against Madurese because neighboring areas, such as Sidoarjo and Gresik, were not restricted (Salman, 2021a). Based on this narrative, GAS Jatim staged a demonstration against Eri Cahyadi and threatened to mobilize a more extensive crowd if the demonstration was prohibited (Kurnia, 2021). On June 17, Surabaya Covid-19 Task Force had a hearing session with GAS Jatim and MADAS (*Madura Asli*, Madurese Indigenous Organization) (Mubyarsah, 2021). As a result of the hearing session, GAS Jatim still demands that there be not only checkpoints from Bangkalan to Surabaya but also, at many points on the Surabaya border, should be abolished. At the same time, MADAS agreed with the government's clarification (Salman, 2021a; Mubyarsah, 2021).

The hearings still have not been able to reduce the discrimination against ethnic Madurese issue. On June 21, 2021, hundreds of Bangkalan residents calling themselves *Koalisi Masyarakat Madura Bersatu* (United Madura Community Coalition) mobilized mass protest at the Surabaya City Hall, demanding an apology from Eri Cahyadi because his policy was deemed to have been 'racist' (CNN Indonesia, 2021c). Even though Eri Cahyadi had met the protestors and the crowd voluntarily dispersed, there were still protests against the partition policy in the following days. The situation turmoiled at dawn on June 22, 2021, when a group of Madurese teenagers harassed healthcare workers and police officers stationed at the Suramadu checkpoint by throwing firecrackers (Muchlis et al., 2021; Salman, 2021c). Considering the escalation of the conflict, Forkopimda and the East Java Covid-19 Task Force agreed to close the blocking posts on the Suramadu Bridge both on the Surabaya and Bangkalan sides and only oblige the community, especially from Bangkalan, to show an exit permit papers that can be obtained in the sub-district office (Arfani & Irawan, 2021). The following section explains that the policy gap is political at the local government level and a cultural and developing policy gap at the community level.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL APPROACH AND *ULAMA* AS AN OPINION LEADER

Besides neglect and decay and multiple jurisdictions factors, the failure to handle Covid-19 cases in Bangkalan can also be explained from a cultural perspective. Riski's findings (2021) found that many Madurese do not wear masks and ignore health protocols when doing activities outside their homes. Many people do not believe in Covid-19 due to conspiracy theories. According to Taufiqurrahman in Nasrullah (2019), Madura's cultural specificity is not similar to other communities' ethnography. It is the loyalty and obedience to four key figures in Madurese society: *buppa, babbu,*

guru, and ban rato (father, mother, teacher, and government leader). Compliance Madurese to the figure of the teacher plays in the second hierarchy level after their parents (*buppa, babbu*).

In this case, the teacher refers to *Kiai,* who owns a pesantren or, at least, a religious school teacher. The teacher's role is stressed in the context of morality shown in the life hereafter. The obedience of the Madurese to this teacher figure is a distinctive marker of their culture that cannot be doubted (Nasrullah, 2019). Based on the hierarchy of obedience figures of the Madurese community, the government leadership (*rato*) is at the last level. Someone achieves this figure not from ethnicity but because of the achievements in achieving that status. In reality, not all Madurese have the opportunity to achieve this position due to educational and economic constraints. Thus, the opportunity to occupy this figure is relatively tricky and rare for Madurese to achieve.

Abdussalam on Sari et al. (2019) stated that Madura's human development index (HDI) tends to be low. This is one factor that makes it challenging to overcome social problems, including the problem of fulfilling health in the community. In addition, poverty and low education also affect the understanding of the Madurese community on the importance of paying attention to health issues (Riski, 2021). Surokim also explained that poverty and education are the main problems that impact the health literacy abilities of residents in Madura. For people in Madura, if the problem is not directly related to their lives, they will take it for granted. According to Abdussalam, blocking the Suramadu Bridge is a severe warning to the Madurese community to make them aware of the Covid-19 virus. The local government's socialization has only effectively reached the Madurese urban community. Meanwhile, people living in rural areas, such as those currently infected with the Covid-19 virus, are at most not maximized (Riski, 2021). The increase in Covid-19 in Madura can be suppressed by involving community leaders in areas with legitimacy in the Madurese community. The approach cannot be top-down, as the government is direct to the people, but by the socio-cultural approach.

Demaio (2011) stated that local wisdom and indigenous knowledge are essential tools to support the promotion's success of promoting health in a community. Local wisdom needs to be used as a lesson to alleviate the Covid-19 problem in Madura. The sociocultural aspect is considered ignored by policymakers, while Madurese had nearly unconditional trust in *ulama* (religious leaders) more than state officials. Reflecting on the case of Covid-19 in Madura, it is time for the government to take a sociocultural approach to the lower level. The sense of citizens' trust in the government must be re-emerged, so that social influence on the community can be turned into social compliance and become an agreement to support government programs. In Madura, local religious leaders become people whom residents hear.

As an illustration, the Bangkalan regent, together with the head of the local police, the military district commander, as well as prominent *ulama* figures such as Kyai Aschal and Kyai Nasih Ashal, took part in promoting awareness of Covid-19 and

encouraged health protocols to a local citizen. The involvement of *Kiai* in the circumference broadcast is intended to get attention from the public Bangkalan. Because, for the Madurese, religious figures play an essential role in their lives. In addition, the Bangkalan Regent hopes that inviting ulama to this mobile broadcasting activity can help residents better understand the recommendations of the Islamic religion in dealing with pandemics or disease outbreaks. The collaboration carried out by the Bangkalan Regency Government with security forces, religious leaders, and all elements of society in Madura is very important in preventing the spread of Covid-19 (Ramadan, 2021).

CONCLUSION

The Bangkalan case shows that the weakness of the Covid-19 control policy is a consequence of the inability to anticipate the political policy gap at the local government level and the cultural policy gap at the community level. This article identifies two main policy gaps. First, neglect and decay, alongside multiple jurisdictions, occurred in the homecoming ban policy. Second, cultural factors should not be ignored in the public policy-making process. The findings of this article show the lack of effort by the Surabaya City government to build participatory dialogue with informal elites in Bangkalan, such as *ulama* and ethnic-based organizations, before implementing the partition policy. Building on this research, it is possible to conduct further research to explore a similar theme with another focus, such as the best practice of policies on handling the pandemic or the role of the local institution in dealing with the pandemic.

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FROM NATIONALIZATION TO SECURITIZATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF GENOSE COVID-19 TEST KITS IN INDONESIA

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This research was carried out starting from the contemplation of seeing the Indonesian Government Policy on handling COVID-19 which is often inconsistent in several ways. These problems increased in Indonesian people confirmed positive for COVID-19. One of the inconsistencies in Indonesian government Policy can be seen in using the GeNose C-19 as a legally used COVID-19 test kit in Indonesia. GeNose, developed and produced by Gadjah Mada University, is claimed to be the national product. The procedure of GeNose is different from *Polymerase Chain Reaction* (PCR) and Swab tests. GeNose uses a breathing technique, and its result can be seen in 80 seconds. Aside from that, GeNose is also relatively cheap in terms of cost compared to PCR and Swab tests. The state designated it as an official COVID-19 test kit in early 2021. It has officially been used legally at various airports, stations, and bus terminals. But unfortunately, in the last few days, due to an increase in the number of Indonesians who are confirmed positive for COVID-19, GeNose has started to stop. Hence, this research will examine how the Indonesian government is carrying out the nationalization and securitization of the GeNose test kit. The researcher uses Barry Buzan's securitization theory and public health policy approach as analytical tools. The research method used is a qualitative approach with content analysis techniques. The results of the study stated that the actor of the nationalization and securitization of the GeNose issue was the state. There is a shifting paradigm in threats from military security to human security. GeNose issue so that at first nationalized and then constructed into a security threat and carried out securitization.

Keywords: nationalization, securitization, GeNose, COVID-19 test kits

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic forces scientists in every country to be able to respond and produce various products to combat and suppress the spread of the virus. Vaccines, COVID-19 virus detection tools, and supplemental medicines are the products of scientists that are most widely consumed by the public in the era of the pandemic. In Indonesia, the emerging virus detection tool COVID-19 that has received marketing authorization from the Ministry of Health is famous for its practical ways of working (through breathing), low cost, fast results, and good accuracy. The product of this nation's children was later named GeNose.

GeNose is a COVID-19 detection tool developed by Gadjah Mada University researchers. This COVID-19 detection tool works by exhaling, in contrast to the PCR

swab test. GeNose works with Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) formed due to the COVID-19 infection and come out with a puff of breath into a unique bag. Furthermore, it will be identified through sensors whose data will then be processed with the help of artificial intelligence.

With the above technique, GeNose is a dynamic medical device. The sensor system can increase intelligence by increasing valid data from measurements. The sensor, integrated with the artificial intelligence system, has previously been trained in various machine learning modules, then detects the concentration pattern of breath VOCs. This process aims to plant intelligence in the machine so that the device can carry out specific tasks with high precision and speed.

When compared to the PCR swab test, the GeNose is very affordable. One unit of GeNose is estimated to cost 40 million rupiahs for 100,000 inspections. No wonder we find data that a one-time GeNose test in public places (stations, airports, terminals, etc.) is subject to a 20-40 thousand rupiah tariff (travel.kompas.com). Because the basic cost of the GeNose tool is only 400 rupiah for one test, considered this affordable price, many agencies have ordered to buy the GeNose COVID-19 detection tool. They start from health facilities, government agencies, campuses, and other offices. The reason is simple: they are an agency and office managers who want to limit the space for the virus to move so it doesn't interfere with employees' mobility and work activities. For the first phase, GeNose has produced 2,021 units and has been distributed to health facilities (clinics, laboratories, and hospitals), ministries, state-owned enterprises, local governments, and universities (health.detik.com).

Besides being more practical and inexpensive, GeNose also has a good level of accuracy. After conducting the first stage of the profiling test, during April - August 2020, using 600 valid data samples at Bhayangkara Hospital and Bambanglipuro Hospital in Yogyakarta, the results showed a high level of accuracy, amounting to 97%. In addition, GeNose is proven to be very fast in detecting the coronavirus in the human body. In no more than 2 minutes or just 80 seconds, GeNose can decide whether a human is reactive or negative (ugm.ac.id).

Table 1. Comparison of COVID-19 Test Kits in Indonesia

Test Method	Right to Use	Procedure	Result Time	Sensitivity (%)	Specificity (%)	Cost in one test (Rp)
RT-PCR	After four days of exposure to the virus	Detection of viral particles from nasal/throat swab specimens	12 hours to one week	89	100	900.000 - 3.500.000
Antigen Rapid Test	After four days of exposure to the virus	Deteksi partikel virus dari spesimen usap hidung / tenggorokan	15 – 30 minutes	89,9	99	275.000
GeNose	After two days of exposure to the virus	Detection of respiratory pattern typical gas composition	2-3 minutes	89-92	95	10.000 - 25.000

Sumber: The Conversation / Dian Kesumapramudya

The presence and breakthrough of Indonesian scientists in producing the GeNose COVID-19 test kit have received appreciation from the government. The Ministry of Research and Technology – National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) will support GeNose's follow-up clinical trials. The Indonesian government sponsored second clinical trial through the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) is expected to be used massively by the community, especially in the screening process (edukasi.sindonews.com).

The number of hospitals and patient samples was expanded in phase 2 clinical trial conducted in November – December 2020. In this next stage, the GeNose clinical trial involved ten hospitals and approximately 1,600 patients as a sample. But unfortunately, in the middle of the external validity process involving three universities (the University of Indonesia, the University of Airlangga, and the University of ANDALAS) as part of the post-marketing analysis, there were calls from several local governments to stop screening using the GeNose tool for people who want to enter their area. For example, the local government of Bali Province, through PT. Angkasa Pura issued a regulation prohibiting the use of the GeNose test starting June 30, 2021. Whereas previously, since April 9, 2021, GeNose was recognized and could be a condition for traveling. Ngurah Rai Airport only accepts health documents based on PCR test results (bisnis.tempo.co).

Furthermore, this study will identify the nationalization of GeNose as a COVID-19 test kit in Indonesia, as well as the securitization of the issue of GeNose carried out by several local governments.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Many studies have been conducted to examine the pandemic, especially in the dynamics of COVID-19 diagnostics. In general, those studies focus on three aspects: COVID-19 diagnostic examination in general (Halmar, Febrianti, Kada, 2020;), COVID-19 Detection Method Controversy in Indonesia (Wahjudi, 2020), and more specifically, discuss the assays of COVID-19 through breath (Nurputra, 2020).

In the general COVID-19 diagnostic examination, Halmar, Febrianti, and Kada conducted a literature study using three databases (Pubmed, Science Direct, and Google Scholar). This article identifies the COVID-19 detection checks that several countries have carried out. This study concludes that an accurate and precise COVID-19 detection test must combine Real-Time Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR), Computed Tomography (CT)-Chest, and Rapid Test (Halmar et al, 2020).

The dynamics of the COVID-19 detection method in Indonesia were discussed by Wahjudi (2020). He departed from differences in public understanding of testing principles, the immune response between individuals, and differences in knowledge of people infected with the COVID-19 virus. The study concluded that the rapid test results may or may not be the same as the (molecular) swab test. Rapid reactive results are not necessarily positive swab tests and vice versa. This is due to several aspects. First, the virus (viral nucleic acid) in the body is detected about 4-7 days after infection but is not seen at the beginning and end of the infection phase. At the same time, antibodies began to be detected seven days after infection. Second, the dissimilarity lies in the method and principle of the examination test between the rapid and swab tests. Serological tests / rapid antibody tests are used for information on the phase of infection and surveillance purposes, namely to determine the dynamics of the spread of the virus in the community and to find out how many people in a population have become immune. In comparison, the swab test is more personal.

A more specific study was conducted by dr. Dian K. Nurputra. With the electronic-nose method, Nurputra added a variant of the COVID-19 detection test that uses the breath technique. Through clinical trials on several patients spread across 8 (eight) hospitals in Indonesia, Nurputra and Kuwat Triyono claimed that the accuracy of the breath method assisted by machine learning was above 90% in identifying the COVID-19 virus (clinicaltrials.gov).

Based on our traces on the sources above, our study shares similarities and differences from the above studies. Our analysis also looks at the various COVID-19 test kits in Indonesia. We also would like to know the correlation of GeNose as a national product in Indonesia with others. But instead of looking at the correlation between GeNose, from nationalization and now being securitized. We focus our study on social-political behavior: should GeNose be securitized?

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs a qualitative approach. According to Neuman (2014), in a qualitative approach, the researcher is the instrument of the study. Researchers actively interact with the environment, employ many logics in practice, are subjective, and use their perspective to gain a complete understanding of social life. A qualitative approach was selected to answer the first two problems of the study, while a descriptive method was employed to answer the third research question.

The study's unit of analysis was GeNose as COVID-19 test kits in Indonesia. Using purposive sampling, the study participants were (1) Prof Kuwat Triyono as, inventor of GeNose, (2) Some of the local governments in Indonesia which prohibit the use of GeNose as a COVID-19 test kit.

In addition, observations were made on the track record of GeNose. These were conducted in the last year. The secondary data of the study was obtained from printed media, online media, books, documents, and archives related to GeNose as COVID-19 test kits in Indonesia. Observations were conducted to collect data regarding the GeNose journey in obtaining marketing authorization from the ministry of health of the Republic of Indonesia until the finally appeared securitization issue of using GeNose (Spradley; 1980, Denzin and Lincoln; 2000).

The data was analyzed qualitatively. Analysis was done interactively and continuously. To ensure data credibility, triangulation and peer group discussion were conducted. The triangulation technique covers data collection triangulation, source triangulation, and time triangulation. Based on the peer group discussion, critiques, feedback, and suggestions were obtained (Sugiyono, 2009).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Nationalization of GeNose

According to Kautsky (1902), nationalization is a method of organizing and administering industry. The community owns the means of production, and the government is, at least in the last resort, responsible for its control. In another opinion, recent nationalization, therefore, is a piecemeal and empirical approach to much broader ideas, such as that the whole of the industry within one country should be brought under state operation or that the entire industry in the world might be usefully organized to work together under some supranational authority.

Kautsky's claim of efficiency is also added when talking about nationalization. Nationalization is a more efficient way of organizing an industry than is possible while it remains in private hands. Several advantages of carrying out a nationalization policy are; nationalization would abolish the evils inherent in competition, private profit-making, and the private ownership of the means of production; that it would open up the way for workers' control in the industry; or that it would result in an equal distribution of income or capital or that it would provide an answer to the manifold dangers of private monopoly.

In line with the above, Jewkes (1953) underlines the location of efficiency when using nationalization. Jewkes provides three conditions for industrial nationalization:

1. The nationalized industry is a larger operating unit than those it replaced. From this arises the claim for the economies of scale.
2. The nationalized industry is monopolistic. The claim that it can adopt complete integration and coordination of related functions arises.
3. The nationalized industry is not operated for private profit. From this, it is asserted that price and investment policy can be made more rational and that the collaboration between different class workers in the industry can be made more willing, smoother, and fruitful.

The researcher then uses the idea above to see how the process of GeNose nationalization in Indonesia. Researchers at least look at some indicators when looking at the nationalization of industry (GeNose) in Indonesia. *Firstly*, Gadjah Mada University, a campus that promotes the discovery of GeNose products, is a state-own campus. *Secondly*, researchers involved in GeNose products do not seek funding from sponsors. *Thirdly*, the government is a sponsor. The Ministry of Research Technology (National Research and Innovation Agency Republic of Indonesia) appreciates and supports by providing a research budget. *Fourthly*, the distribution permit is issued by the Ministry of Health with the number AKD 20401022883 so that it can be mass-produced and distributed to the public. *Fifthly,* the results of the genose test can be used for land, sea, and air travel (the circular letter COVID-19 task force No.12/2021). From these five data findings, it is concluded that the Indonesian government carries out a process of nationalization product of GeNose.

Buzan and Securitization of GeNose in Indonesia

Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver make the security dimension a social construction. His work Security; A New Framework for Analysis (1998) defines securitization as a construction process; something that was previously considered "normal" becomes a "security" problem. Buzan added that the securitization process could be regarded as successful when it meets four conditions:

1. The ability of the securitizing actor to convince the public that an object of reference is facing a threat that can be fatal if it is not handled quickly and appropriately. So it is necessary to provide complete and accurate data that can make the public panic about the threat.
2. The speech act must convince the public that the object is facing a threat, so appropriate political jargon or terminology is needed.
3. The public who becomes the audience must have an adequate level of education and access to sufficient information to understand the message conveyed adequately. This is useful for ensuring that the public understands the speech acts carried out by securitization actors and responds to them with rational actions.

4. The proper socio-economic context will contribute to the securitization process of an issue. A securitization actor will succeed if the speech act is in the appropriate socio-economic context (Buzan et al., 1998).

The idea from Buzan above was then used to guide the researcher to see the GeNose securitization process in Indonesia. Researchers notice that the existence of GeNose after getting the product nationalization process is now a source of threat. A group of actors carries out the social construction of GeNose as a security threat. GeNose is considered not credible in identifying the COVID-19 virus. The evidence is the increasing number of people exposed to the COVID-19 virus.

Then the question is, what is the relationship between GeNose's credibility as a COVID-19 tool kit and the increasing number of people exposed to the COVID-19 virus. After obtaining a distribution permit from the Ministry of Health on December 24, 2020, the results of the GeNose test were then officially a travel requirement. Through the Circular of the Ministry of Transportation No. 24/2021, the Indonesian government aligns the work of the GeNose nation with the results of PCR tests and foreign antigens. Because in the circular letter, GeNose test results are officially a requirement for traveling at train stations, docks, and terminals starting January 26, 2021. While at the airport, GeNose test results have been recognized since April 1, 2020. With massive GeNose test results in all spots and people's mobility, it is easier for people to travel during the pandemic era. It only costs Rp. 20,000 – Rp. 40,000, the public can find out the results of the COVID-19 test in minutes.

Problems arise when policies from several regions explicitly prohibit using the GeNose test as a COVID-19 detection in their area. The Bali Regional Government issued a policy banning the use of GeNose test results at airports, piers, and all entrances to Bali starting on June 30, 2021. The ban on using GeNose test results is stated in the Governor's Circular Letter No. 8/2021 concerning implementing Micro Community Activity Restrictions (PPKM). in Bali. The Bali government only recognizes negative results of the PCR swab test for a maximum of 2 x 24 hours. This is all to suppress the spread of the coronavirus in Bali.

Thus, the so-called GeNose securitization actor is the Bali Regional Government. To protect the Balinese people against the increase in COVID-19 in their area, it is necessary to carry out the social construction of GeNose as a security threat. Due to the growing data, the increase in COVID-19 stems from one of the sources of community mobility which is still high in the pandemic era. This high mobility is supported by the results of the GeNose test, which is cheap and produces fast results. It can be said that the Bali government does not believe that the GeNose test results can carry out maximum screening. The second securitizing actors come from non-state actors, such as the Indonesian consumer agency Foundation and biologists. They urged the government to review the use of GeNose in Indonesia. The conditions for traveling can be back using a swab PCR and a rapid test antigen (tribunnews.com).

The second condition of securitization is the speech act. In this context, what is meant by the speech act is the policy of prohibiting the use of GeNose test results as

stated in the Governor's Circular Letter No. 8/2021. The securitization statement in the official policy smooths the securitization of security issues.

The third condition is audiences/public. In this case, the people must have an adequate level of education and reasonable access to information to understand the message conveyed. If the securitization message is conveyed correctly, the community will respond rationally. One evidence of this securitization process being captured by the community is the decline in the number of visits and tourists to Bali. The number of tourists decreased by 41% after the ban on GeNose test results was imposed (bali.bisnis.com).

The fourth condition is that the proper socio-economic context will contribute to the securitization process of an issue. The Bali government issued a policy to ban the GeNose test results when the delta variant COVID-19 was already widely found in Indonesia. The momentum of the approach taken by the Government of Bali is very appropriate. The delta variant (India) is known to be more deadly and contagious than the Alpha (UK) and Beta (Africa) variants. The accumulation of these four conditions for the securitization process can thus create the social construction of GeNose as a security threat (securitization).

Table 2. Securitization of GeNose COVID-19 Test Kits in Indonesia

Securitizing Actors	• State Actor; Bali Government • Non-State Actors; • Indonesian Consumer Foundation (YLKI) • Biologist
Speech Act	• The statement prohibiting the use of the Genose test contained in Bali Governor's Circular Letter No.8/2021 • YLKI's statement to remove the use of GeNose as a condition of travel • Molecular biologist statement asking the government to stop GeNose temporarily
Referent Object	Indonesian people (has understood the message conveyed) -- The number of tourists in Bali decreased by 41% after the ban on GeNose test results was imposed.
Socio-economic context	GeNose ban policy along with the emergence of the COVID-19 Delta variant.

CONCLUSION

Through this study, we can confirm that there is an effort to nationalize the GeNose COVID-19 Test Kits product in Indonesia. On behalf of the needs of many people in the era of the pandemic for the detection of the COVID-19 virus, the Indonesian government made efforts to nationalize the GeNose product. This effort can be seen in Gadjah Mada University, which promotes the discovery of GeNose products on state-own campus. *Secondly*, researchers involved in GeNose products do not seek funding from sponsors. *Thirdly*, the government is a sponsor. The Ministry of Research Technology (National Research and Innovation Agency Republic of Indonesia) appreciates and supports by providing a research budget. *Fourthly*, the

distribution permit is issued by the Ministry of Health with the number AKD 20401022883 so that it can be mass-produced and distributed to the public. *Fifthly,* the results of the genose test can be used for land, sea, and air travel (the circular letter COVID-19 task force No.12/2021).

Unfortunately, in less than one year GeNose COVID-19 test kits used by the people of Indonesia, there is an effort to GeNose social construction as a security threat. The Government of Bali, the Indonesian Consumers Foundation, and biologists carries out the securitization of GeNose. The form is to make the speech act (Governor's Circular Letter No. 8/2021). After appearing ban Genose test results used to enter Bali, people responded rationally to the evidence that public visits to Bali dropped by 41% since the ban was imposed. From this, it can be concluded that the securitization of genose is running perfectly. When the Bali government issued a ban on genose testing, another area was slowly followed. Bali is one of the icons of Indonesia.

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