

Dampu Awang Legends and Its Contemporary Perception of Indonesian (Javanese) Muslim Against Chinese

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Abstract

Dampu Awang is a legendary figure who is always mentioned in various legends about Cheng Ho/Zheng He on Java. By looking at these legends in the current context, this article re-reads the figure of a legend who was always attached to this figure of Cheng Ho as a reflection of the stereotypical perception of Javanese people towards the Chinese in relation to Islam and Java (Indonesia). An image that existed long ago until now, namely as a creature full of paradox and ambiguity: from being admired and respected to being hated and reviled. This article was closed with a reflection of the relations between China, Islam and Java during the Post Reformation which represented Cheng Ho as the carrier of peaceful Islam.

Dampu Awang adalah sosok legendaris yang selalu disebut-sebut dalam berbagai legenda tentang Cheng Ho/Zheng He di Jawa. Dengan melihat legenda-legenda tersebut dalam konteks kekinian, artikel ini membaca kembali sosok legenda yang selalu melekat pada sosok Cheng Ho ini sebagai cerminan dari stereotip persepsi orang Jawa terhadap orang Tionghoa dalam kaitannya dengan Islam dan Jawa (Indonesia). Citra yang ada sejak dulu hingga sekarang, yakni sebagai sosok yang penuh paradoks dan ambiguitas: dari dikagumi dan dihormati menjadi dibenci dan dicaci maki. Artikel ini ditutup dengan refleksi atas relasi Cina, Islam, dan Jawa pada masa Pasca Reformasi yang merepresentasikan Cheng Ho sebagai pembawa Islam yang damai.

Keywords: Dampu Awang Legends; Stereotype of Chinese; Islam; Javanese

Dampu Awang: Enigmatic Figure in Javanese Muslim and Cheng Ho Discourses

Hearing Chengho as a heroic figure propagator of Islam was no longer a foreign matter discussed in Indonesian Muslim communities, especially in Java, after reformation during the presidency of Gus Dur or K. H. Abdurrahman Wahid. The peak of euphoria can be seen from Gus Dur's statement, as president, visiting Beijing University, China, on December 3, 1999. On this campus, Gus Dur revealed that his ancestors were from Hokkien.¹ Intentionally or not Gus Dur's personal statement plus his political policies has revoked Presidential Instruction (Inpres) number 14/1967 by issuing a Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 6 of 2000. Along with that, Gus Dur also later made Imlek as a facultative holiday (applies to those who celebrate it). This seems to be able to close the wounds of the stigma of events in 1998 and even the dark past of the relationship between the state and the nation which is often called the *peranakans*. This moment made the euphoria of the *peranakans* come up and uprooted the new atmosphere of the reform era with the beginning of the construction of the Cheng Ho Mosque in Surabaya which was completed in 2002 and until now more and more people build mosque-style mosque "Cheng Ho".²

Since then the study of Javanese Islamization and Cheng Ho's role as a pluralist and pacifism ulama of Islam began to flourish both from academics in the form of scientific writings and from popular mass media.³ Since then the study of Javanese Islamization and Cheng Ho's role as a pluralist and pacifism ulama of Islam began to flourish both from academics in the form of scientific writings and from popular mass media. Although there is a critical historical rebuttal such as young Indonesian researcher Novi Basuki who is studying doctoral studies at Sun Yat-sen University, China, in historical magazine, *Historia*⁴ or Geoff Wade's⁵ review of Cheng Ho's voyage stating that Cheng Ho's role in Islamization in particular, it is still debated because there is evidence that Ma Huan, the figure who participated in Cheng Ho's voyage, found that in Java there were already mainly Muslim communities who also came from Chinese who had long been on Java long before Cheng Ho arrived.⁶ Novi Basuki found interesting evidence that from the voyage record of the conviction of this admiral who turned closer to the belief as a Buddhist as written in "*Sramanerikasila Sutra (Shamini Lijie Wen)* made in 1420. Cheng Ho bluntly called himself "*da Ming Guo feng Fo xin guan taijian Zheng He, faming Fu Jixiang*". 'Eunuch of the Great Ming State who is Obedient to Buddha. This silk can be seen in the Yunnan Provincial Library.'

It seems that there needs to be further research whether the discourse focused on Cheng Ho's figure and its role in the Islamization process, which has the tendency of politics of awareness, can bring a cool breeze to the

relations between China and Java, in which the historical memory of the Indonesian had recorded of its dark relationships. What is certain was Didik Kwartanada's notes, in his foreword to Peter Carey's book; he argued that the fate most of the Chinese people became an intermediary minority society and they lived as "trade man" or "intermediate minority" were indeed wanted by the local "rulers", so history made them:

[...] as a "shield" or "scapegoat" in the event of riots against the authorities or when a government vacuum occurs. This pattern appears many times in Indonesian history. It can be said that examples include: the destruction of the Dutch East Indies and the arrival of Japan (March 9, 1942); Japan's defeat and independence revolution (1945-1950); Government Regulation (PP) No.10 / 1959 (which prohibits Chinese traders from operating in the countryside); the fall of President Sukarno (1966); Malari events (January 15-16, 1974); Solo-Semarang Event (20-25 November 1980), Tanjung Priok (12 September 1984); Rengasdengklok (30 January 1997), Makassar (15-17 September 1997), and May 1998 riots. Even during this Reformation there were also several anti-Chinese riots with various reasons, but the scale was much smaller and local.⁷

A further consequence of this situation is the absence of total loyalty from those in the "trade man" or "intermediate minority". In fact, according to Didik Kwartanada, "Their loyalty will be given to anyone who can guarantee their safety. Ironically, even if the enemy is able to provide security, they will not hesitate to divert "loyalty" to the enemy ". Furthermore, Didik Kwartanada quoted Charles Coppel, who saw the difficulties and problems of this people. Kwartanada underlines,

"So it's not surprising if you don't know the minority mentality of intermediaries who live in this world of commerce, it will be easy to accuse and blame them as those who have no loyalty if they don't support mainstream political currents. However, they are considered subversive if they join the flow of government opposition groups, and if they do not act anything they will still be considered opportunists too."⁸

Such stereotypes and prejudices are still very strong in the minds of the Javanese, even though from the surface, harmony is seen in their daily social life. Kwartanada concluded that this legacy of negative awareness of the ethnic minority brokers was nurtured and fostered since the colonial era which placed their society as "trade man" or "intermediate minority". And it will be seen in the discussion of this article that from Pierre Yves Manguin's discussion of the past before the colonial period, the more positive tone of the position of the Chinese people in the minds of the people of the archipelago was felt more. However, pinning the fate of history alone has not satisfactorily explained why and how this racist awareness of negative stereotypes and prejudices continues to grow and crystallize in Javanese society. There must be other elements

besides the mentality-scape problem in Javanese people in seeing this "trade man" or "intermediate minority". Here the author argues that the missing element is the inheritance of racist awareness of negative stereotypes and prejudices on the indigenous side, in this case the Javanese. So, mentality-scape that sees Chinese as an intermediary minority will not be sturdy and sustainable if there is no system of inheritance of memories of "racism stereotypes" subtly and naturally. The general view of the stereotypes of Indonesians seems to be not much different from Abu Hanifah (1906-1980), a religious figure as well as a figure of the early independence movement quoted by the Kwartanada as follows:

"[...] most Chinese in Indonesia really have no sense of loyalty. In the Dutch era, they were pro-Dutch. When Japan became masters, they became friends with Japan. Then comes the revolution and they are kind to us [...] finally what can be said is that they are "incorrigible opportunists".⁹

The mentality fostered by similar narratives such as Abu Hanifah's statement is not foreign and is still ringing in the minds of many Javanese Muslims, in particular. Narratives that are constantly being revived are processed with rumors and hoaxes that are still circulating today. This is evident, especially during the two presidential elections (2014 and 2019); and during the DKI regional election which defeated Ahok with racist issues wrapped in religious beliefs that led Anies Baswedan, *peranakan Arab*, to become Governor of DKI.¹⁰

The last cases mentioned, also reinforce the awareness and emphasis that the politics of assimilation of ethnic Chinese (and others) into Indonesian (national politics) will be more easily recognized if they convert to Islam.¹¹ As in his Preface, Kwartanada, who carefully reviews Peter Carey (2015) book *Orang Cina, Bandar Tol, Candu dan Perang Jawa: Perubahan Persepsi Tentang Cina (1755-1825)* shows that this kind of book is Babon Diponegoro -as oral and writing tradition in the past - must have been much copied and sung by Javanese Islamic communities followers of Diponegoro; and this is a vehicle for effective dissemination and inheritance of memory for Javanese, who relate their relationships with Chinese people. And unfortunately we have to admit to being full of prejudice and racial stereotypes, which can result in one side of the sharp and deadly knife. Therefore, chronicles and other Javanese folktales that recount the relations of Javanese and Chinese people should need to be reviewed, and this article aims to reveal one of the general narratives of folklore circulating in the Javanese Muslim community in particular, concerning the enigmatic figure who was present along the narrative of Islamization of Java by Admiral Cheng Ho, the figure of Dampu Awang (DA).

In general, according to Jan Harold Brunvand¹² folklores are classified into three major groups: (1) oral folklore, (2) partial oral folklore and, (3) non-oral

folklore. Oral folklore is divided into several types, namely folk language, traditional expressions, traditional questions, folk poetry, folk prose stories and folk songs. According to William R. Bascom, people's prose stories can be divided into three major groups, namely (1) mite, (2) legend and, (3) folktale. According to Brunvand,¹³ stories of folk prose belonging to the type of legend are classified into four groups: Ireligious legends, supernatural legends, personal legends, and local legends. The DA legend, thus, can be included in the 'religious legend' because it tells the story of the relationship between DA and Walisanga (Islamic saints) figures in Javanese society.

As is not known for sure since when the narrative of Cheng Ho's role in the process of Islamization of Java was in the consciousness of the Javanese people, so is the DA's folklore. Both of them were deeply imprinted in Javanese consciousness, sometimes even equating this figure with Cheng Ho itself. However, there is no scientific study that addresses the role of the DA figure in the process of Islamization of Java as with Cheng Ho¹⁴ in addition to the story which generally has a background as a proud and arrogant merchant figure. The discussion of this article will be divided into two things: 1.) discusses how the DA legend (possibly) is the oldest source of stereotypes about Chinese as "intermediate minorities" and "trade man" by Javanese people in the past and what their relational consequences are with Javanese awareness and 2.) Looking back at the changes that occurred in the DA figure after Cheng Ho's narrative as the spreader of Islam grew stronger which culminated in the post-Gus Dur period to become the 4th President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Methodology

This DA legend study will depart from the memories of the author hearing the stories of legendary Dampu Awang and Sam Po Kong (Cheng Ho) which are confusing because of the similarity of this legendary story with other legendary stories in the archipelago or the existing paradox because DA is often equated as Cheng Ho in some legends, and appears in sometimes good or bad figures It is interesting that the DA legend is now also widespread in cyberspace beyond the nature of stories that were originally very local. The author takes, collects, and sees these legend stories then compares them with regard to the four folklore functions of William R. Bascom: (a) as a projection system, namely as a reflection tool for the imagination of a collective; (b) as a means of ratifying cultural norms and institutions; (c) as the next generation educational tool; (d) as a means of forcing and supervisors so that the norms of society will always be obeyed by their collective members.¹⁵ Then look back at this folklore in the discussion of stereotypes of Chinese people as "trade man" or "minority intermediaries" and their influence on the formation of stereotypical Javanese

personalities. If seen from the personality theory of Nettle (2007) the four functions of the Bascom folklore, in the context of the formation of personality, is one part of the formation of the cultural environment other than genetic factors.¹⁶

Dampu Awang's legend as a Chinese stereotype "Trade Man"

Like the folklores that exist in the archipelago, in Java the figure of DA is also always described as a merchant figure. The study has been reviewed genuinely by Pierre- Yves Manguin in his article "The Merchant and the King: Political Myths of Southeast Asian Coastal Polities."¹⁷ This discussion will be adapted quite a lot of what Manguin has studied and will reflect the memory of the current generation that they are now uploading on the web page as a reflection of the continuing inheritance of collective memory in the minds of these Javanese who are now increasingly devoted Muslim.¹⁸

Manguin said that these legend stories show the role of rich merchants from across, who are generally from China with the names Ki Mpu Awang / Dempo Abang aka Sampo Tua Lang / Dampu Awang aka Sampukong, in the establishment of kingdoms on the coast of Java and Bali, for example: in Babad Buleleng, Legend of Jokotole Sumenep, Kalinyamat Jepara. Manguin found the structure of this story pattern as follows:

... The tales above may easily be trimmed to the parts [...] into the seven following motifs (not all of these necessarily being always present in a single tale): 1. a local character has exceptional powers/sakti; 2. then comes an overseas ship fully laden/sarat with rich merchandise 3. Usually under the captain ship of shipmaster Dampu Awang, alias Sampo); 4. The ship may get stranded/kandas and 5. A competition takes place, either a fight or a bet, the prize of which is the ship cargo; 6. The local character, thanks to his sakti, wins over the riches in the ship and thus acquires considerable wealth, after which 7. He rules over his now prosperous country.¹⁹

From this Manguin pattern it can be said that the position of the local people is to have more magic than the merchant (from China) who came because the ship ran aground. The merchant may on the one hand want to protect the possessions that fill his ship, but on the other hand he needs the help of local people (it could fulfill logistical food needs for ship crews so that the ship can sail back) In this case, the psychology of wealthy traders who want to protect their wealth and certainly do not trust people and do not know the rules of local ethics that are foreign to them, usually causes communication to be inappropriate for local people. Therefore, the expression of the merchant's arrogance and ignorance is a pretext for local people to interpret the style of command to ask for that assistance as a challenge to fighting. For local people who see ship cargo that is so laden, at a glance the side of greed is

reasonable if it emerges, so the challenge of fighting becomes a place of betting. Although there is a moral message that wealth is not enough if there is no ethics and morality so that life can be harmonious with the other, we can also read that greed and ego pride of both parties make communication and relations between immigrants and hosts not harmonious. But then, the strength/supernatural power of the local figure with the wealth he "got" from the conquest of the merchant was able to make his people more prosperous.

Manguin also discusses the root of the name of this load-laden jong (jong, jung, junk) known as Dampu Awang (aka Sampo, Sampo Kong, Sampo Tua Lang, etc.) by tracing from the origin of the Javanese word ***dang mpu hawang*** as:

Dang is an honorific prefix denoting persons of distinction, or high rank; ***(m)pu*** has a similar usage; the title ***(h)awang*** conveyed among various Malay World people (Minang, Malays, etc.) the idea of a non-noble official of high rank, at times associated with shipmasters (nakhoda). This last meaning is precisely that of the title puhawang when it first appears in the Old Malay Sriwijayan inscription of Telaga Batu, dated from the last quarter of the seventh century C.E. It is often found again with the same meaning in late first millennium Malay and Javanese epigraphs, as well as in Old Javanese literature (in twelfth-century texts such as the *Bharatayudha*, the *Smaradahana*, or the *Hariwangsa*). So what we have in our tales is a character clearly bearing the title Dang Puhawang (turned into the propername Dampu Awang by folk tradition) who has from early times been associated with shipping and trading at the highest level. He is not a petty trader: in the tales, he owns the ship and the rich cargo with which she is laden. Inscriptions make it clear the puhawang were part of the ruler's chosen retinue. In Central Java, they make offerings to royal sanctuaries (Dang Puhawang Gelis inscription of 827 C.E.). In East Java, enough revenue was derived from transactions with puhawang and merchants (banyaga) from other islands (dwipantara) to prompt the ruler into launching hydraulic works, so as to facilitate their mooring in Ujung Galuh (Kamalagyan inscription of 1037C.E.).²⁰

Manguin then discussed the important role of trade and traders in relation to the establishment of a kingdom or ruler. So, the ruler or kingdom exists because of trade and not vice versa. Therefore it is not surprising that the legend of Dampu Awang is motivated by the relationship of traders and the glory of a kingdom. Manguin also investigated the terms of traders and crowds in the concept of prosperity in Java. The word crowded or *ramai* (jw / mly) or *rejo* (jw) shows the role of traders and trade as a measure of progress and prosperity in a royal region.²¹ Thus, during the voyage of Cheng Ho (1405-1433) which carried out a trade mission also over the past 7 times, the archipelago became iconic in the memory of people in 'lands below the winds', including Java. Manguin noted that it might not be a coincidence that the ships

of Cheng Ho's fleet were called "treasure ships" (bao-chan) because stories about DA seemed to be "cargo-cult" for the bearers of the prosperity of the ruler and his region. Manguin concluded that it was no wonder the dynasty in which Cheng Ho was sent to do this colossal worship was to continue the maritime trade network that had long existed and was certainly profitable. Thus, it is not surprising and inevitable by the coastal rulers if the character of Cheng Ho, who holds the title Sam Bao / Sam Po, which means the majesty eunuch "Tri Ratna" is then associated as this DA figure.²² In Melaka, Semarang, and Jakarta's syncretic Sam Po Kong cult (and not surprisingly involving the elements of the story and Islamic rituals of the era) were celebrated by the Chinese diaspora and local people who settled in the pockets of the port cities of the archipelago. This gives an idea that the crowded Chinese traders in the past until the Nusantara period was Islamized became the main factor of the economic trade vortex in the archipelago. Chinese merchants became capital advocates and at the same time became a barometer of the glory and wealth of a kingdom.²³

During Cheng Ho's reign, the countries below the wind had undergone a change in mentality after formally increasingly choosing Islam as the foundation of spirituality. Furthermore, Manguin showed how the DA version of the pre-Islamic period in the world of commerce at that time also experienced adjustments. DA version of the legend like Hikayat Raja Pasai and Datu Baduk from Banjar shows the role of Muslim traders (from India, Arab, Africa, and Parsi) who seek fortune as well as in the spirit of preaching to local communities. Even in the legends of Islamization of the archipelago in Java in particular, da'wah is also included for invisible beings.²⁴ Now it can be re-read that there is certainly trade competition and other political interests if these two ethnic merchants meet in one location and at the same time.

Indeed, I have quoted earlier in this paper a few first and early second millennium C.E. references that fit in closely with the motifs in the tales. That of the Kan-to-li ruler's "dream" about trade and associated wealth is particularly relevant in this context. This in turn points to the earliness of the process explained in such myths. I also identified two specific clusters of transformations undergone by the motifs that can be traced down to the fifteenth-sixteenth century period (which corresponds to trade expansion and to the rise of Islamic consciousness): the Sam Po / Zheng He variation and the shift of the legitimization process towards Mecca and Islamic values. Such transformations can only have been initiated when the producing societies further elaborated on their myths, generating a new set of referents within a pre-coded narrative. The myth must therefore have antedated this elaboration and cannot merely be a by-product of this recent "age of commerce".²⁵

During the voyage of Laksmana Cheng Ho, at the same time that the Javanese coastal rulers had been Islamized with figures of the Walisanga

legend, this DA figure also found a new interpretation. The personality of DA as a wealthy merchant from across this, interestingly in the story, is always emphasized from China which is associated with the figure of Cheng Ho or Sam Po Kong. If it turns out that Cheng Ho is a devout follower of Sam Bao (Tri Ratna aka Buddhism), as Novi Basuki found in Chinese records, the narrative of the story of Sam Po Kong's legend as the bearer of Islam is an ingenious narrative engineering politics for Cheng Ho's political and trade voyages to the spice countries and economic centers of the maritime silk route that have been Islamized, were well received. The accused made rumors that it certainly led to the followers of Cheng Ho's Muslim voyage, Ma Huan. Ma Huan, as a scribe figure of the Ming Dynasty "treasure ship" (baochuan) giant who must have been very intellectually involved in the Cheng Ho expedition supposedly up to Mecca. Therefore, he must have understood the mentality of Muslims who put forward the spirit of da'wah besides trade. So that, sprinkling Islamic spices, is an easy door to carry out political and trade communication with them.²⁶ Ma Huan's writing "*Yung-Jai sheng-lan: A Comprehensive Survey of Ocean Soares*", 1433 which contains marriage and funeral rituals, domestic architecture, religious beliefs, languages and dialects, trade practices, units of weight and size used, local flora-fauna, science and technology and the strengths and weaknesses of the visited government are important notes for consideration in diplomacy with the Islamized community and rulers of the archipelago.²⁷ There is no denying that the similarity of religion and the view of life has always been one of the social capital in the smoothness of a relationship between interested parties, and the political language of Islam which includes trade has clearly become the lingua franca in the Islamized Archipelago this is evidenced by increasingly popular characters Jawi Pegon became the communication media of the Nusantara Islamic network since the time of the Pasai Kingdom (1297-1326 AD).

The narrative above reinforces the view that ethnic Chinese in the eyes of the people and the rulers of the Archipelago, especially Java, are as 'trading people' who are close to the authorities and society. However, history shows that this position brings its own dilemma. If traced, anti-Chinese history and its relation to Islamic ideology began to be felt during the Java War, namely when Diponegoro declared his jihad against the Chinese on 15 August 1825²⁸ which was then marked by a massive massacre in Ngawi by the Princess Sultan Hamengku Buwono I, Raden Ayu Yudakusuma. All this is due to the hatred of the ruler and the Javanese community towards this small group of Chinese people; which was actually given trust by the Javanese sultans and later by the VOC rulers to become a community of traders and brokers as toll tax collectors in banda, connecting bridges, main city roads, and markets. Since then the Javanese have considered the Chinese people to be cheeky

creatures, mercenaries, and exploiters of indigenous treasures. This is where these primordial indigenous ideas against Chinese immigrants become legitimate for crime.

Post-Reformation Agenda for Repositioning the Dampo Awang Legend

Thus, whether the story of DA legend on the Java coast which was originally embedded with the figure of the pacifist and legendary disseminator of Sam Po Kong was later transformed into a figure of DA as an opportunistic creature and other bad attributes as depicted in the DA legend discussion in Kudus - Rembang - Lasem below was transformed during this Diponegoro war? As is known, the Manguin study does not seem to have touched on the version of the DA legend version of the northern coast of Central and East Java, which could be a newer DA legend after the Cirebon and Semarang versions which tell about the positive role of DA in both Islam and the local community.²⁹ Three versions of Kudus show the paradox of the DA figure, which on the one hand is a 'bad-guy' figure but at the same time a 'good-guy'. The version of the City of Kudus is as follows:

1. Another tomb that is also crowded with pilgrims is the tomb of Syadzali. The history of Syeh Sadzali itself is still full of mystery. The community believes that Sheh is one of the students of Sunan Muria who is said to have originated from Iraq (Baghdad) and has very high physical science. He was one of the students who was loved, because he played an important role when Sunan Muria competed with the Dampo Awang.³⁰
2. On the coast of the Muria Strait, a Muslim cleric named Mbah Pendek lives. Some sources said that Mbah Pendek was actually a resident of Hamlet Jetak, Kedungdowo Village who had come to open a settlement area and decided to stay there. "At that time Mbah Pendek, saw Dampo Awang who was busy repairing his leaky ship." Mbah Pendek approached to help Dampo Awang patch the ship with clay," said the Village Head of Banget, Suyadi, Tuesday (04-24-2018).³¹
3. Gunung jamu is the name of the local term in the Muria slope region taken from folklore, namely: the result of the feud of Cheng hoo (Sampho Khong) / Dampo awang with R. Umar Said (Sunan Muria). When his ship Sampho Khong, which contained a variety of medicinal plants, flew up Mount Muria so that it rolled over and exploded in the Muria mountain slope because of the anger of Sunan Muria. And at the end of the day, a variety of medicinal plants grow, that's when the term Gunung Rowo and Gunung jamu begin to exist. The extent of mountain jamu covers all the slopes of muria.³²

DA's 'good' story (stories 2 & 3) shows a good and mutually beneficial relationship. The third story seems to have a connection with the Legend of DA

Semarang narrative, when Captain Sam Po Kong was sick and needed a physician.³³ However, this 3rd version of the narrative also contains the impression of ignorance or concern of the DA over etiquette as a 'guest' when passing through the area of Sunan Muria. The DA figure here is still equated with the figure of Sampo Kong, who in the memory of the Javanese still plays a role as an Islamic preacher. While in story 1 it is not clear whether DA is also the figure of Sam Po Kong. And what problems are there so that clash of magic, so DA seems to be an antagonist; although the 3rd story shows there is a hidden blessing from a fight between Sunan Muria and DA. The fight was started because DA's 'magical ship' which was loaded with medicinal crates fell while flying past Mount Muria because 'was reprimanded' Sunan Muria [?]. The story of DA's powerful and flying-able ship is a story that has the same pattern as the version in Rembang-Lasem which will be told as follows:

1. The story of Dampu Awang, also referred to as Cheng Ho, was a big merchant messenger of King Zhu from China. His ship landed at the port of Lasem, Ndasun Village on the banks of the Babagan river, a place which later became a village of Chinatown and a temple was erected. Long story short, DA or Cheng Ho is a foreigner who conducts commercial activities and temporarily lives in Lasem which almost controls the entire trade in the Rembang Coast. It is said that he had a large temporary residence which was guarded by the strong troops he brought from China. Initially the community accepted Dampo Awang well because of his friendliness, but after he felt rich and successful in trading he became arrogant and arrogant and even seemed arbitrary to the local people. Another version of this story is an additional scene where the DA also made restless because he taught Confucianism while Sunan Bonang taught Islam. DA didn't like it because many of his followers became Sunan Bonang santri. This attitude was then heard by Sunan Bonang. Then Sunan Bonang and his santri met DA to ask to change his attitude. Finally the DA did not like the advice of Sunan Bonang and the demands of the santri and the local community. DA then invites a miracle and a draw, but surely the end of the DA's defeat is inferior to Sunan Bonang. The victory was due to the prayer of Sunan Bonang who was able to make DA anchors float, not sink.³⁴
2. The second version is similar to Malin Kundang's story in Sumatra and also the story of Legend of Gunung Pinang from Banten. There are two DA versions of Rembang-Lasem, a.) DA as a child of four siblings in Punjul Harjo village, the coastal area of Rembang, lives a widow who is said to be of ethnic Chinese descent. Her husband was killed by pirates at sea when his ship was about to dock on the coastal coast of the city of Rembang. He has four sons who are now growing up. The first child was named Dampo Awang, second was Dampo Alung, third was Dampo Aming, and the

fourth was Dampo Bunsu. Dampo Awang went sailing on a merchant ship to China, Dampo Alung to Malaysia, Dampo Aming to Palembang in Sumatra, and Dampo Bunsu to Banten at the western end of Jawadwipa. From the story of Dampo Bunsu, his mother found out that Dampo Awang became a wealthy merchant becoming king's son-in-law because of marrying his only daughter in China. Dampo Alung in Malaysia became a merchant as well and married Malaysian women who were also the daughters of the wealthiest and most respected merchants there. Whereas Dampo Aming became a wooden merchant in the country of Palembang and had a family.³⁵ Version b.) Once around the 1500s in Tasik Agung Village, Rembang, there lived a Chinese ethnic widow named Mai Lae, she had 3 sons, the eldest named Dampo Awang, the second child named Dampo Awung, and her third child named Dampo Awing.³⁶ DA migrated and became a big merchant, married the daughter of a rich man (unclear whether a Chinese / Malay princess) then returned to being an arrogant figure who did not recognize his brothers and even his mother so that his mother condemned DA; As a result the DA ship was hit by a powerful storm and lightning so that the ship sank.

Some versions are still found in the cities of Java and Cirebon, most of which give the teachings that evil or evil will get a worthy reply. In the version of Kudus it is not very clear what "bad actions" caused DA to clash with the students of Sunan Muria. The interesting and strangest thing about the DA version of Rembang-Lasem is that legend stories from this area are patterned from the origin of place names and utterances about filial piety to the mother, but behind these stories show motives that it is clearer how the stereotype of ethnic Chinese is included in Javanese consciousness. If the narratives are digested together, they form a similarity in the mental impression on the Javanese that the powerful Chinese personality is a friendly person when he comes to Java; however, when he becomes a rich person he will turn arrogant, audacious, like to make restlessness, destabilize Muslims, prickly troublemakers, and not filial to his mother. Because of this DA's behavior, scholars and Muslims concluded solutions by defeating them back to China or their place of origin. The metanarration in these legendary stories operates under the consciousness of the Javanese people. Thus, using the analysis of the four functions of the Bascom folklore above, the DA legend stories discussed show a reflection of the stereotype of the Chinese people, namely: (a') Javanese people's collective mentality sees DA as a powerful figure of opportunist traders and magicians. DA was a friendly personality when he came to Java but when he became a rich man he became arrogant, audacious, likes to make restlessness, destroys Muslims, makes troublesome, and not filial to his mother (connotative meaning: betrayed his foster-mother land and his Javanese foster brothers); (b') therefore' legitimately 'see their position as' other', 'foreign', and the climax is seeing them

as not-Islamic; (c') This legend aims to remind each generation of Javanese of the character or personality of these merchant beings from across (especially) from China; (d') therefore it is the normative attitude of Javanese people to be always vigilant, suspicious, and careful when associating, and trading with them. Meanwhile, the other side of the knife is to instill dislike and hatred for ethnic Chinese who once became a time bomb when there was a feud between Java and China.

In closing the discussion of the DA Legend story, it is better to disclose here the new phenomenon of the DA legend that was Islamized and recognized as a legend long before Sam Po Kong or Cheng Ho. If the existing Sam Po Kong sites have long been referred to and sacred by the Javanese people there are still found syncretic rituals; this is marked by the mixing of pilgrims from Chinese and Javanese and santri as well as the existence of Kelenteng and a little Mosque (*mushola*), so this is different from the newest DA site that appears in Indramayu. In the discovery of the Dampu Awang Well (inaugurated in 2015) in Sudimampir Village, Balongan Subdistrict, Indramayu Regency, as published in the mass media, it was reported that the petilasan had a story that he was a different figure from Sam Po Kong (but a public servant) sacred site confirmed that his tomb was located in Semarang). It is believed that the DA version of Indramayu is a Chinese guardian named Wang Ching Hong. Dampu Awang at that time was believed to be known as a very tolerant Muslim religious leader. It was stated that his main vision was referring to the Qur'an Al-Hujarat verse 13, which was grateful for the blessings of Allah SWT which created humans with various ethnic groups to get to know each other, while glory can only be judged by Allah SWT as the ultimate creator.³⁷ The latest version of DA's story from Indramayu also places pressure on the role of the DA as an Islamic figure who preaches while trading but also fights three Javanese rulers who still worship idols. It appears here that there is a similar pattern with the older one namely the emphasis on Islamic issues in this latest DA narrative and legitimizes the validity of the narrative by relating it to narratives from China, Semarang, and even local Sundanese rulers to the founder of Islam, the Prophet. This unique narrative is of course based on dreams and whispers from the occult, a distinctive tradition commonly found in Javanese Muslims as well as the practice of the 4th presidency Gus Dur.³⁸ In the DA Narrative version of Indramayu no longer found metanarasi anti-Chinese sentiments as stories of legend before the reformation. Regardless of whether history originates from inspiration or the free interpretation of the executive committee, the story of the DA version of the post-reform era reveals an era of enthusiasm in the discourse thrown by Gus Dur to build new relations between Muslims and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

Even so, the old narrative that is mixed with the narratives of the legend of

DA aka Sam Po Kong aka Cheng Ho, which is mixed and not clearly full of metaphorical stigmatization and stereotypes of anti-Chinese sentiments in it, shows that there is still a paradoxical awareness within Javanese people in seeing their relationship with ethnic Chinese. Meanwhile, the new narrative of the Islamic story of the DA seemed to be a solution to unravel the psychological tensions of Javanese people in dealing with ethnic Chinese.

Conclusion

Regardless of whether history originates from inspiration or the free interpretation of the executive committee, the story of the DA version of the post-reform era reveals an era of enthusiasm in the discourse thrown by Gus Dur to build new relations between Muslims and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. By reading the study of legend stories above it can be concluded that contemporary Javanese society post-reform seems to find a new awareness that China's role in spreading Islam has begun since ancient times. These stories are also supported in academic discourses such as Muhammad Azis, Ahmad Atabik, Wirya and M. Akrom Unjiya³⁹ written post-reform that gave a cooler discourse about living harmoniously between Javanese and Chinese. Thus, it was hoped that during the post-Gus Dur reformation there would be a better awareness to build ethnic Chinese relations with Java in particular. Regardless of whether history originates from inspiration or the free interpretation of the executive committee, the story of the DA version of the post-reform era reveals an era of enthusiasm in the discourse thrown by Gus Dur to build new relations between Muslims and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. However, it seems that homework is still a long way from the beginning of the first period of the Jokowi administration and towards the second time period. The metaphorical stigmatization of latent anti-Chinese sentiments seems to be ready to explode actively if the more objective and rational narratives are too little exposed in Indonesian society.

It must be admitted that the emphasis on Islamic roles in traditional and spiritual narratives that are based on legends, a kind of method that is in Gus Dur or the Indramayu case, still feels the spirit of assimilation⁴⁰ in the style of the Old Order to the New Order. The method proved to be still vulnerable, even becoming a political weapon to corner the Chinese as the case of Ahok aka Basuki Tjahaya Purnama who lost in the 2018 DKI Election in the name of accusations of blasphemy and defamation of Islam. Regardless of whether history originates from inspiration or the free interpretation of the executive committee, the story of the DA version of the post-reform era reveals an era of enthusiasm in the discourse thrown by Gus Dur to build new relations between Muslims and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. This shows that Muslims still keep a subconscious memory of the Chinese personality that is very

negative and counterproductive for this nation. The writing of Costas Magos, "'The Princess Is a Racist' Combating Stereotypes through Teaching Folktales: An Action-Research Project with Young Children" provides an inspiration for the Indonesian generation to begin to understand the legendary stories in Indonesia so that they are not hypnotized subconsciously racism which is in its metanarrative.

Endnotes

¹ "Benarkah Gus Dur Keturunan Tan Kim Han?," accessed June 14, 2019, <http://www.gusdurian.net/id/article/opini/Benarkah-Gus-Dur-Keturunan-Tan-Kim-Han/>.

² See "Awal Mula Pembangunan Masjid Cheng Ho Surabaya | Republika Online" n.d.; Then how do new Cheng Ho-themed mosques begin to be copied, trade man Wai Weng Hew, "Cosmopolitan Islam and Inclusive Chineseness: Chinese-Style Mosques in Indonesia," in *Religious Pluralism, State and Society in Asia*, ed. Chiara Formichi, 2013, accessed June 20, 2019, <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/>.

³ Sumanto Al Qurtuby, "The Imprint of Zheng He and Chinese Muslims in Indonesia's Past," in *Zheng He and the Afro-Asian World*, ed. Sally K. Church, English edition. (Melaka, Malaysia: Melaka Museums Corporation (PERZIM) and International Zheng He Society, 2012), 171–186; Sumanto Al Qurtuby, "The Tao of Islam: Cheng Ho and the Legacy of Chinese Muslims in Pre-Modern Java," *Studia Islamika* 16, no. 1 (2009): 28; Agus Alfauzi, "PERAN TIONGHOA MUSLIM DALAM ISLAMISASI DI JAWA PADA ABAD KE XV-XVI MASEHI" (August 2, 2017), accessed June 20, 2019, <http://repository.unej.ac.id/handle/123456789/80630>; Tan Ta Sen, *Cheng Ho : Penyebar Islam Dari China Ke Nusantara*, trans. Abdul Kadir (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), accessed June 20, 2019, <https://opac.perpusnas.go.id/DetailOpac.aspx?id=466678>; Indra Harsaputra, "Cheng Ho Mosque, a Symbol of Peace," *The Jakarta Post*, 2013, accessed March 28, 2019, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/07/28/cheng-ho-mosque-a-symbol-peace.html>; Wiwid Prasetyo and Nur Thairah Syamsuddin, *Cheng Ho: Laksamana Muslim Dari Negara Tembok Besar* (Selangor: Ar-Risalah Publisher, 2012); Leo Suryadinata, *Admiral Zheng He and Southeast Asia*, 2005; Leo Suryadinata, "Zheng He, Semarang and the Islamization of Java: Between History and Legend," in *Admiral Zheng He and Southeast Asia* (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2005), 72–93.

⁴ Novi Basuki, "Adakah Peran Cheng Ho Dan Cina Dalam Islamisasi Nusantara?," *Historia - Majalah Sejarah Populer Pertama di Indonesia*, August 2, 2018, accessed June 20, 2019, <https://historia.id/agama/articles/adakah-peran-cheng-ho-dan-cina-dalam-islamisasi-nusantara-6lJeA>; Novi Basuki, "Apa Agama Cheng Ho?," *Historia - Majalah Sejarah Populer Pertama di Indonesia*, November 16, 2017, accessed June 20, 2019, <https://historia.id/agama/articles/apa-agama-cheng-ho-vXWpm>.

⁵ Geoff Wade, "THE ZHENG HE VOYAGES: A REASSESSMENT," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 78, no. 1 (288) (2005): 37–58, accessed March 28, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41493537>.

⁶ In, "Adakah Peran Cheng Ho Dan Cina Dalam Islamisasi Nusantara?" Novi Basuki found that "Ma Huan, Interpreter Cheng Ho who participated in the 4th, 6th and 7th expeditions, [...] wrote that in Java - especially Tuban, Gresik and Surabaya - there were many Chinese who believed in Islam [as follows]: "[Zhaowa] guo you san deng ren. Yi deng Huihui ren, jie shi xi fan

ge wei shang liuluo ci di... Yi deng Tang ren, jie Guangdong, Zhang, Quan deng chu ren cuan ju ci di... duo you guicong Huihui jiaomen... Yi deng tu ren... chongxin gui jiao." ("In the [Javanese] country, the community consists of three classes. Only, all Muslim classes (jie) come from western countries [like Arabs and Indians] who immigrate here to trade ... Only one more, class Chinese people who are all from Guangdong, Zhangzhou, Quanzhou and other areas who run away (cuan) and live here ... many (duo) of those who adhere to Islam ... One last, local class ... [they] believe in animism. ")

⁷ Peter Carey, *Orang Cina, Bandar Tol, Candu dan Perang Jawa: Perubahan Persepsi Tentang Cina (1755-1825) - Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in Central Java, 1755-1825*, 2015, vii.

⁸ *Ibid.*, ix.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Sumanto Al Qurtuby, "Sentimen Anti-Cina di Indonesia," DW.COM, last modified January 2, 2017, accessed June 21, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/id/sentimen-anti-cina-di-indonesia/a-36974659>; "Sejak Ahok Menjabat Gubernur, Tensi Anti Cina Meningkat Di Daerah Ini," last modified May 11, 2016, accessed June 21, 2019, <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/politik-indonesia/2016/05/11/43980/sejak-ahok-menjabat-gubernur-tensi-anti-cina-meningkat-di-daerah-ini/>; Roy Thaniago, "Mempertahankan & Merongrong Kekuasaan dengan Isu Anti-Cina," *tirto.id*, last modified December 31, 2016, accessed June 21, 2019, <https://tirto.id/mempertahankan-merongrong-kekuasaan-dengan-isu-anti-cina-cdqA>; Ahmad Sholikin, "Islamic Political Movement in Indonesia After "Aksi Bela Islam Jilid I, II and III", " *Madani Jurnal Politik dan Sosial Kemasyarakatan* 10, no. 1 (February 14, 2018): 12–33, accessed June 21, 2019, <http://e-jurnal.unisda.ac.id/index.php/MADANI/article/view/373>; Arie Setyaningrum Pamungkas and Gita Octaviani, "Aksi Bela Islam dan Ruang Publik Muslim: Dari Representasi Daring ke Komunitas Luring," *Jurnal Pemikiran Sosiologi* 4, no. 2 (November 6, 2017): 65–87, accessed June 21, 2019, <https://journal.ugm.ac.id/jps/article/view/28581>; Made Supriatma, "'Cina Baik-Baik' vs 'Cina Sok Jago': Pancingan Rasisme Sang Jenderal," *IndoPROGRESS*, last modified March 17, 2016, accessed June 21, 2019, <https://indoprogress.com/2016/03/cina-baik-baik-vs-cina-sok-jago-pancingan-rasisme-sang-jenderal/>; Arbi Sumandoyo, "Jokowi dan Prabowo dalam Bingkai Hoaks Pilpres 2019," *tirto.id*, last modified April 15, 2019, accessed June 21, 2019, <https://tirto.id/jokowi-dan-prabowo-dalam-bingkai-hoaks-pilpres-2019-dl83>; Thung Ju Lan, "Catatan Tentang Orang Cina Indonesia Dalam Politik Lokal," *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*, last modified December 11, 2009, accessed June 21, 2019, <https://kyotoreview.org/issue-11/catatan-tentang-orang-cina-indonesia-dalam-politik-lokal/>; Zainal Abidin Bagir, "Islam Dan Demokrasi Indonesia Setelah Pilkada DKI," *Program Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya Sekolah Pascasarjana*, April 30, 2017, accessed June 21, 2019, <https://crs.ugm.ac.id/artikel/10782/islam-dan-demokrasi-indonesia-setelah-pilkada-dki.html>; Pamungkas and Octaviani, "Aksi Bela Islam dan Ruang Publik Muslim."

¹¹ Nurjanah, "Muslim Tionghoa Dalam Asimilasi Budaya Indonesia: Perspektif Sejarah Politik Keagamaan" (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2014), accessed June 21, 2019, <http://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/38458>.

¹² James Danandjaja, *Folklor Indonesia: Ilmu gosip, Dongeng, dan Lain Lain* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1991), 21.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁴ Kwa Tong Hay and Chendra Ling Ling, "Hipotesa Seputar Dampo Awang, Sam Po = Dampo Awang ?" last modified July 9, 2012, accessed March 28, 2019, <http://web.budaya-tionghoa.net/index.php/item/2179-hipotesa-seputar-dampo-awang-sam-po--dampo-awang->

¹⁵ Danandjaja, *Folklor Indonesia*, 19.

¹⁶ Daniel Nettle, *Personality: What Makes You the Way You Are* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 210–212.

¹⁷ Pierre-Yves Manguin, “The Merchant and the King: Political Myths of Southeast Asian Coastal Polities,” *Indonesia*, no. 52 (1991): 41–54, accessed June 21, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3351154>.

¹⁸ Vedi R. Hadiz, *Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

¹⁹ Manguin, “The Merchant and the King,” 44–45.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 48–49.

²² *Ibid.*, 49–50.

²³ Kwartanada notes this irony which trade manms to be repeated in Indonesian history where every ruler has closeness to the cukongs (wealthy Chinese traders) - each of them as in the ORBA period. “Isn’t it — according to the Dutch — every regent has his own (cukong) Chinese (‘eigen regent heeft zijn elke Chineezee’)” “trade man Carey, *Orang Cina, Bandar Tol, Candu Dan Perang Jawa*, 20.

²⁴ Manguin, “The Merchant and the King,” 50–51.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.

²⁶ The Indonesian Islamic community trade manms to easily believe bombastic stories with famous figures narrated by the greatness of Islam through setting conversion as Muslims. It happened in Japan when rumors that the Japanese emperor would enter even had converted to Islam were used as propaganda inviting Indonesian Islamic groups to help Pan Asia Dai Nippon; trade man Saiful Umam, “‘Politik Islam’ Jepang,” in *Ensiklopedi Tematis Dunia Islam: Asia Tenggara*, ed. Azyumardi Azra, Bahtiar Effendy, and et.al., vol. 5 (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru Van Hoeve, 2005), 401–410, accessed June 27, 2019, <http://inlislite.dispusip.jakarta.go.id/dispusip/opac/detail-opac?id=12513>; this pattern continues, how the legendary figures in Wong Fei Hung’s Chinese folklore are now trusted by many Indonesian Muslims as Muslim figures. Even this hoax news was published in national media in Indonesia such as *Republika* and *Tribunnews*; for Wong Fei Hung trade man Biren Muhammad, “Sejarah Panjang Muslim Uighur dan Legenda Wong Fei Hung, Pembela Kaum Miskin,” *swararakyat.com*, December 22, 2018, accessed June 27, 2019, <https://swararakyat.com/sejarah-panjang-muslim-uighur-dan-legenda-wong-fei-hung-pembela-kaum-miskin/>. Another story that is still well-known since writers’ childhood was when Neil Armstrong, the person who first set foot on the moon, was heard hearing the call to prayer on the moon.

²⁷ Ma-Huan, *Ying-Yai Sheng-Lan: The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores*, trans. J. V. G. Mills (Cambridge Eng.: Hakluyt Society, 1970).

²⁸ Carey, *Orang Cina, Bandar Tol, Candu Dan Perang Jawa*; trade man also Benny G Setiono, *Tionghoa dalam pusaran politik* (Jakarta: TransMedia, 2008).

²⁹ Abdullah Dahana and Nusron Wahid, eds., *Telapak Sejarah Sam Po Kong: Menelusuri Peran Tionghoa Dalam Penyebaran Islam Di Indonesia*, Cet. 1. (Jakarta: DPP Partai Golkar, Korbid Keagamaan bekerja sama dengan Harian Umum Suara Karya, 2005); Bambang Iss Wirya, *Langit Pecinan: merunut jalur alkulturasi Semarang-Lasem*, 2018; Suryadinata, “Zheng He, Semarang

and the Islamization of Java: Between History and Legend.”

³⁰ The name Sheikh Syadzili clearly refers to Sufi figures who are famous for his supernatural powers (ilmu hikmah) or supranatural power; see Irwan Kelana and Syahrudin El-Fikri, “Sang Master Tarekat Syadziliyah (1),” *Republika Online*, May 13, 2014, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/khazanah/14/05/13/n5igjq-sang-master-tarekat-syadziliyah-1>. This story can be seen at: Ahmad Falah, “SPIRITUALITAS MURIA: AKOMODASI TRADISI DAN WISATA,” *Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan* 20, no. 2 (December 15, 2012): 439, accessed June 21, 2019, <http://www.journal.walisongo.ac.id/index.php/walisongo/article/view/207>.

³¹ W. Huda, “Kisah Jatuhnya Sapu Tangan Dampo Awang,” *ISKNEWS.COM*, April 29, 2018, accessed March 29, 2019, <http://isknews.com/kisah-jatuhnya-sapu-tangan-dampo-awang/>.

³² Ajisoko, “Berita Muria Dan Sekitarnya: Gunung Muria Penyejuk Alam Pati Kudus Jepara,” *Berita Muria Dan Sekitarnya*, March 5, 2011, accessed March 29, 2019, <http://murianews.blogspot.com/2011/03/gunung-muria-penyejuk-alam-pati-kudus.html>.

³³ Tong Hay and Ling Ling, “Hipotesa Seputar Dampo Awang, Sam Po = Dampo Awang ?”

³⁴ Unknown, “REMBANG DAN LEGENDA DAMPU AWANG Dari Beberapa Versi,” *Mitos Cerita Legenda*, n.d., accessed June 18, 2019, <http://mitos-cerita-legenda.blogspot.com/2017/02/rembang-dan-legenda-dampu-awang-dari.html>.

³⁵ Sita S. Priyadi, “Sita Blog: ‘NINA BOBO’: Legenda Dampo Awang Anak Durhaka Diceritakan Oleh Kak Sita S.Priyadi,” *Sita Blog*, August 4, 2013, accessed June 28, 2019, http://pangarakan.blogspot.com/2013/08/legenda-dampo-awang-anak-durhaka_4.html.

³⁶ Pradikta Andi Alvat, “Cerita Legenda Dampo Awang,” last modified 2019, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://www.quareta.com/post/cerita-legenda-dampo-awang>.

³⁷ Tri Ispranoto, “Tentang Petilasan Dampu Awang, Lokasi ‘Pertapaan’ Baru Mbah Fanani,” *Detiknews*, April 19, 2017, accessed June 18, 2019, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3478960/tentang-petilasan-dampu-awang-lokasi-pertapaan-baru-mbah-fanani>; *WISATA RELIGI GEREBEK KAMAR SYEKH DAMPU AWANG*, 2019, accessed June 28, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eniu2l6BX0U>.

³⁸ Anonym, “Kisah Gus Dur Menemukan Makam Syekh Abdullah Qutbuddin Penyebar Islam Di Pulau Jawa,” *Muslimoderat*, December 23, 2018, accessed June 28, 2019, <http://www.Muslimoderat.net/2018/12/kisah-gus-dur-menemukan-makam-syeikh.html>.

³⁹ Ahmad Atabik, “Harmonisasi Kerukunan Antar Etnis dan Penganut Agama di Lasem,” *FIKRAH* 4, no. 1 (June 30, 2016): 36–49, accessed June 21, 2019, <http://journal.stainkudus.ac.id/index.php/fikrah/article/view/1511>; Wirya, *Langit Pecinan*; M. Akrom Unjiya, *Lasem Negeri Dampoawang: Sejarah yang Terlupakan* (Salma Idea, 2014); Munawir Aziz, *Lasem kota Tionghoa kecil: interaksi Tionghoa, Arab, dan Jawa dalam silang budaya pesisiran*, 2014.

⁴⁰ Nurjanah, “Muslim Tionghoa Dalam Asimilasi Budaya Indonesia: Perspektif Sejarah Politik Keagamaan.”

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